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Abstract 
Deception is a central issue in bioethics. This emerges most clearly when considering ways of 
assisting individuals who are incapable of making their own decisions. Deception can be 
defined as purposefully misleading another to think that something one believes to be false is 
true. Philosophically, it is a crucial question whether deception should be considered morally 
indefensible or morally defensible in different clinical scenarios. My dissertation is a novel 
approach to considering deception in caregiving and provides a new method for assessing 
when deception is either morally defensible or indefensible.  
I ultimately argue that deception ought to only be used after considering several key 
morally relevant factors and that deception is prima facie morally indefensible. I argue that in 
very rare circumstances deception may be the most morally defensible alternative. These 
situations are often when a patient is significantly declining with no chance of recovery and 
there are no other plausible alternatives with a higher benefit-harm ratio in light of the morally 
relevant factors I explore. Other more rare circumstances include if there were significant 
chance of benefit to the patient, little chance of harm or risk and no other plausible alternative.  
I develop an organizational framework and a clinical framework to help guide 
caregivers through the decision of whether it is morally appropriate to deceive a patient in 
unique circumstances. The organizational framework is designed to consider organizational 
limitations and conditions from which health care administrators can formulate policies on this 
issue. I argue that constraints on deception include: mental capacity, compliance with treatment 
(when applicable) and risk of significant distrust, and that necessary conditions include: 
significant chance of recovery, disclosure and controlled environments. I further developed a 
case-based (patient-centered) clinical framework, Embedded Specified Principlism (ESP). ESP 
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is a modification of Beauchamp and Childress’ Specified Principlism (SP) and it is both 
practical for the caregiving environment and provides comprehensive moral justification for 
determining when and when not to use deception. 
I consider several other bioethics models, including feminist bioethics and narrative 
ethics, and argue that these ought to be incorporated into ESP to highlight the importance of 
reducing stigma towards vulnerable/marginalized populations, fostering greater trust and other 
relationships between caregivers and patients and understanding the rich narrative of each 
unique patient. I further explore three major objections to traditional SP including arbitrariness, 
systematicity and casuistry and argue for two methods to reduce arbitrariness. On the basis of 
these arguments and the discussions of the morally relevant factors presented in my 
dissertation, I ultimately argue that deception in caregiving, although most often is morally 
indefensible, can be morally defensible in rare circumstances depending on the unique 
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Introduction 
Deception is very common in caregiving, both in healthcare institutions and in caregiving in 
the community. Eleven percent of patients in nursing homes are given medication covertly, and 
seventeen percent of patients in specialized dementia units have medication hidden in their 
food and drink. Deceiving patients is poorly documented and caregivers are hesitant to admit 
to its practice; this opens the door to abuse of vulnerable populations and to serious safety and 
risk concerns.1 The prevalence of deception shows the importance of developing a theoretical 
approach to justify when deception is morally defensible and when it is morally indefensible. 
This is what I will do. 
Deception purposefully misleads another to believe something that one believes to be 
false; thus, deception is a central issue in bioethics. This emerges most clearly when 
considering ways of assisting individuals who are incapable of making decisions for 
themselves. There is also a disconnect between caregivers using deception and their reluctance 
to admit to its use. Are caregivers’ perceptions of using deception misguided or is their 
reluctance justified and should we not be using deception in caregiving? Over seventy percent 
of healthcare staff has faced the decision to administer medication covertly, and almost all 
agree that deception is justified “on some occasions.”2 When is deception morally defensible 
and when is it morally unjustifiable; what is the justification? 
I will defend the notion that deception is morally defensible in very particular kinds of 
cases where individuals suffer from significant mental impairment. I will also argue that 
                                                
1. Øyvind Kirkevold and Knut Engedal, “Concealment of Drugs in Food and Beverages in Nursing 
Homes: Cross Sectional Study,” BMJ (Clinical Research Ed.) 330, no. 7481 (2005): 1–4. 
2. Anton Valmana and Joan Rutherford, “Suspension of Nurse Who Gave Drug on Consultant’s 
Instructions: Over a Third of Psychiatrists Had Given a Drug Surreptitiously or Lied About a Drug,” BMJ 315 
(1997): 300–314. 
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deception can often enhance, rather than impair, autonomy and foster greater well-being, 
which can override the value of honesty. My dissertation project aims to determine when we 
ought to honour one value (or multiple values) more than others when they are in conflict for 
deception in caregiving. Several values involved in the use of deception include beneficence, 
honesty, trust, respect for autonomy and non-maleficence. Additionally, I will argue that 
deception can be a more humane alternative than other methods of treatment. I will provide an 
extensive argument for why one ought to not feel moral guilt for using deception in promoting 
well-being and preventing unnecessary distress in specific situations related to care-giving. I 
will also argue that trust can be developed in multiple ways, not only through truth-telling but 
also through reliability. In developing a theoretical defense of deception in caregiving, it is my 
aim that my dissertation project can provide caregivers with guidelines for when to use 
deception, and justification as to why it is morally defensible in those specific circumstances. I 
will argue for general guidelines that healthcare organizations can adopt, as well as more 
specific guidance for challenging bioethics deception cases at the bedside.  
The kind of deception I discuss is deception related to the treatment and care of patients 
and not deception used in research. I discuss two main forms of deception. Deception can be 
used when administering medication, such as hiding medication in food or drink. This form of 
deception is called covert medication. Covert medication is deceptive because a patient 
believes that she is consuming a beverage or food without any additional substance, and it is 
presented as such by the caregiver. However, the caregiver knows that the beverage or food 
contains more than what is reasonably expected by the patient.3 I will also discuss deception as 
                                                
3. Covert medication is not merely an act of not getting consent directly from the patient, but also 
involves an act of misleading another without their knowledge and presenting the beverage/food as if it were a 
regular beverage or food item. An act for which consent is not obtained and no deception is occurring may occur 
if a patient is being physically restrained, for example.  
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initiating and/or perpetuating false ideas to relieve suffering. Consider an elderly woman who 
suffers from dementia who was recently admitted to a nursing home; she lacks mental capacity 
and wishes to return home to an environment that is unsafe given her medical condition; is it 
acceptable to inform her that she will only be in the nursing home for a few days, although her 
stay is permanent, considering that informing her that she cannot return home will cause her 
much distress? Although these two cases are perhaps most common when considering 
deception, there may also be cases where deception is morally defensible in other patient 
populations, for example those populations who lack treatment decisional capacity after 
sustaining brain injury or even the deception of young children who lack mental capacity. In 
Chapter One, I will provide further distinctions for different types of deception within the two 
types of deception that I focus on for my thesis. 
I will now further discuss the background of deception in caregiving. Family members 
and other caregivers who wish to make the person under their care better often use deception 
out of compassion and sometimes frustration. They can also use covert medication to ensure 
that medication is taken.4 I will use the term caregiver in a broad sense to include not only 
healthcare providers who look after patients/clients/residents, but also family members and 
others who help to look after someone in need of support. Likewise, my use of the term patient 
extends beyond a typical patient accessing healthcare services (including residents and clients), 
but also someone who is being looked after by another. For example, this can include a family 
member with dementia who is being cared for by a spouse in the community. I chose to keep 
these groups broad because I believe that both of these groups struggle with similar ethical 
                                                
4. Scott Stroup, Marvin Swartz, and Paul Appelbaum, “Concealed Medicines for People with 
Schizophrenia: A U.S. Perspective,” Schizophrenia Bulletin 28, no. 3 (2002): 537–542. 
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issues in these cases, and that my thesis would be a useful exploration for both regarding a 
practical and morally defensible decision-making framework. 
Additionally, deception is common not only for providing medication, but also in 
preventing harms to the patients and to others. For example, consider a seventy-year-old 
woman who suffers from advanced dementia. She still has possession over the car that she has 
owned for twenty years. She does not remember that her driver’s license has been revoked due 
to her inability to follow the driving rules as a result of her illness. When she is reminded that 
she can no longer drive, she becomes extremely distressed being reminded of her loss of 
autonomy and the difficulties relating to her illness. Her family resorts to deception, telling her 
that the car needs to be fixed due to a mechanical problem. They feel guilty about deceiving 
their mother, yet they wish to avoid causing her further distress and harm, and causing harm to 
others in the community if their mother were to drive.  
In framing the discussion of deception in caregiving, currently in Ontario there is no 
legislative guidance specific to this issue. What is clear is that if a patient has mental capacity 
to make decisions for herself, consent is required in order to administer any form of treatment. 
What is mental capacity? I will refer to this concept as both mental capacity and capacity. 
Under the Health Care Consent Act 1996 of Ontario, mental capacity is defined as the 
following: 
A person is capable with respect to a treatment, admission to a care facility or a 
personal assistance service if the person is able to understand the information 
that is relevant to making a decision about the treatment, admission or personal 
assistance service, as the case may be, and able to appreciate the reasonably 
foreseeable consequences of a decision or lack of decision.5 
                                                
5. Health Care Consent Act, 1996, 2010, C. 1, Sched. 9., 1996, http://www.e-
laws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_96h02_e.htm#BK12. 
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Mental capacity means that a person can both understand (e.g. acknowledge the basic 
facts that apply to the decision) and appreciate (e.g. recognize how various options will apply 
to one’s personal situation) relevant facts associated with the health care decision. Someone 
might understand the facts associated with a decision, but not appreciate how it applies to 
his/her situation. For example, an individual who suffers from an eating disorder may be able 
to rigorously explain facts about nutrition and how it impacts health in general, but might not 
be able to appreciate how these facts impact his own body and health.    
The facts required for an informed consent are outlined in the Health Care Consent Act 
1996 and include, but are not limited to, the nature of the treatment, the benefits, the risks, any 
alternatives and the consequences of not proceeding with any treatment.6 Capacity is also 
treatment and time specific. It can be regained after a loss, often due to treating delirium and/or 
psychosis, for example.   
Consent is required from a legally appointed substitute decision-maker (SDM), when a 
patient no longer has capacity.7 No further guidance is provided as to when it is legally or 
morally defensible or indefensible to deceive a patient. In Chapter Four, I will discuss in 
further detail the professional (college, association, etc.) duties that often conflict when 
considering deception, as well as general legal concepts that help to inform this issue.  
Comparatively, other provinces than Ontario lack definitive guidance around the use of 
deception in healthcare. Most frequently, if there are policies or guidelines, they have been 
developed for covert medication specifically and provide a brief statement on the issue. One 
such example is a document produced by the College of Registered Nurses of Manitoba. The 
                                                
6. Health Care Consent Act, SO 1996, C. 2, Sched. A; 2010, C. 1, Sched. 9, 1996, http://www.e-
laws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_96h02_e.htm. 
7. Kirkevold and Engedal, “Concealment of Drugs in Food and Beverages in Nursing Homes,” 1–4. 
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document does not provide clear guidance on how to make a decision, yet highly cautions their 
nurses to refrain from covert medication given several professional duties.8 Similarly the 
College of Registered Psychiatric Nurses of B.C. does not support the use of covert 
medication.9 
Many groups in the United Kingdom, however, have created guidelines and documents 
on covert medication. For example, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, 
Northamptonshire Healthcare (NHS Foundation Trust) and the Royal College of Psychiatrists 
all have position statements on this issue.10 These organizations are much more open to 
deception being morally defensible in certain circumstances, and provide various steps and 
questions to guide professionals through these decisions. 
Healthcare providers can use deception to ensure that patients are taking their 
medication for recovery. It is estimated that twenty to fifty percent of psychiatric patients are 
non-adherent with taking medication. This estimate rises to seventy to eighty percent for 
patients suffering from schizophrenia. 11  Taking medication for patients suffering from 
psychotic illnesses can often reduce symptoms of the illness, and allow patients to regain 
mental capacity. I will argue that patients can regain substantial autonomy to make decisions 
for themselves, significantly increasing their well-being.  
                                                
8. College of Registered Nurses of Manitoba, “Covert Medication Administration,” July 2006. 
9. College of Registered Psychiatric Nurses of British Columbia, “Dose Form Modification of 
Medication: Evidence Based Guidelines,” September 2011. 
10. National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, “Managing Medicines in Care Homes,” March 
2014; Northamptonshire Healthcare (NHS Foundation Trust), “Covert Administration of Medicines Policy and 
Guidelines,” July 2013; Royal College of Psychiatrists, “College Statement on Covert Administration of 
Medicines,” The Psychiatrist: Formerly the Psychiatric Bulletin 28 (n.d.): 385–386, accessed January 10, 2015. 
11. Robert Breen and Joshua T. Thornhill, “Noncompliance with Medication for Psychiatric Disorders: 
Reasons and Remedies,” CNS Drugs 9, no. 6 (1998): 457–471. 
  7 
Richard Griffith highlights resource allocation concerns with medication non-
compliance: “This failure to comply leads to drug wastage, mismanagement of medical 
conditions and readmission to hospital, as well as adverse reactions for the patient. For 
healthcare managers, non-compliance results in an extraordinary waste of resources, running to 
billions of pounds.”12 Not only can compliance benefit the patient, but it also benefits society 
as a whole. 
Deception can occur for what many would consider morally objectionable reasons. 
Behaviour modification is one reason why covert medication is used, subduing patients to 
make it easier for caregivers. The patient’s interests are subordinated to the caregivers’.13 For 
example, if a patient is particularly hostile or agitated, staff may recommend psychotropic 
medications be prescribed by the physician, often via phone without a physician’s physical 
presence. Patients with severe cognitive impairments, aggressive behaviour and reduced 
abilities to perform daily activities are more subject to covert medication than other patients.14 
A major concern is that staff assessment (as opposed to physician assessment) trumps actual 
psychiatric diagnosis. 15  According to a study conducted by Sørensen et al., sometimes 
physicians do not even see patients, but rather rely on staff perceptions of the psychiatric 
illness when prescribing medications.16 Sedation of patients is also used more often than 
                                                
12. Richard Griffith, “Managing Medical Compliance,” British Journal of Healthcare Management 16, 
no. 8 (2010): 402. 
13. Lisbeth Sørensen et al., “Determinants for the Use of Psychotropics among Nursing Home 
Residents,” International Journal of Geriatric Psychiatry 16, no. 2 (February 2001): 147–152. 
14. Kirkevold and Engedal, “Concealment of Drugs in Food and Beverages in Nursing Homes,” 1–4. 
15. Sørensen et al., “Determinants for the Use of Psychotropics among Nursing Home Residents,” 152–
153. 
16. Ibid., 147–154. 
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needed.17 This creates concern that patients may be given covert medication for morally 
unacceptable reasons, solely to alleviate staff concerns, rather than acting in the patient’s best 
interests and considering other less invasive alternatives. The result can be that patients are 
quite sedated and unable to participate in other activities that bring them much benefit and 
quality of life, before other behaviour modification methods are explored.  
The decision to use covert medication is often arbitrary. There is no formal decision 
procedure for deciding to use covert medication, which is morally alarming.18 On what basis 
are these decisions made? Whose interests are considered? Are we respecting the patient’s 
wishes and values? Without guidelines and justification, there is room for abuse of power and 
poor decision-making. Although there are concerns with abuse of power by advocating for 
deception (under strict limitations) in caregiving, there may be more abuse of power if these 
practices continue unregulated. This is one reason why it is important to provide justification 
for when it is morally appropriate to use deception. My dissertation is not aimed at being a 
harm-reduction model, even though the outcome of my dissertation will hopefully lead to a 
reduction in current cases where deception is being used and is morally indefensible. I will 
argue that deception not only reduces these kinds of morally unjustified cases, but deception 
can be morally defensible for caregivers in certain other cases. 
Furthermore, trust in healthcare and healthcare institutions can be fostered greatly if 
these practices are brought to the public’s attention and justification is made transparent for the 
use of deception in defensible cases. Transparency and publicity of treatment and other 
healthcare processes are essential for ensuring accountability. Caregivers will be less likely to 
                                                
17. Astrid Sonntag et al., “Does the Context Matter? Utilization of Sedative Drugs in Nursing Homes—a 
Multilevel Analysis,” Pharmacopsychiatry 39, no. 4 (July 2006): 142–149. 
18. Kirkevold and Engedal, “Concealment of Drugs in Food and Beverages in Nursing Homes,” 1–4. 
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abuse their position if deception is clearly documented and justification is provided for its use. 
The decision-making framework and guidelines that stem from my theoretical defense also 
allow caregivers to consider carefully the harms, benefits and alternatives when contemplating 
the use of deception. 
I will use a pluralist approach to explore this problem. I follow in the tradition of 
pluralists, such as W.D. Ross and others who argue that there are many irreducible goods (or 
values) that serve as the basis of ethical principles.19 My thesis will not use a particular 
normative ethical theory, but rather I will adopt the approach that multiple prima facie values 
and principles can come into conflict.20 I use a pluralistic approach because my argument is 
based on applied ethics, and how we ought to make practical decisions in cases. I further 
choose this approach because other common ethical theories do not take into consideration all 
morally relevant reasons – a pluralistic approach does. For example, consequentialist 
arguments only consider the consequences of actions and often do not allow for reasons such 
as the intrinsic value of autonomy. Deontology would not consider violating autonomy for any 
reason, whereas I argue there are other values that might do so. I will however, consider many 
different reasons that may be considered traditionally deontological or consequentialist as part 
of the pluralist reasons that ought to be taken into account when determining what one ought to 
do.21 In moral conflict, these values and principles ought to be weighed and balanced to 
determine which of these values and principles override others in certain circumstances. I will 
                                                
19. For example, see Judith J. Thomson, “The Right and the Good,” Journal of Philosophy 94, no. 6 
(1997): 273–298; Brad Hooker, “Ross-Style Pluralism versus Rule-Consequentialism,” Mind 105, no. 420 
(October 1996): 531–553. 
20. For example, see William David Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford University Press, 2002). 
21. Arguments against each of the canonical ethical theories are beyond the scope of this paper, so I 
intend to use a more widely accepted account of principlism.  
  10 
explore all of the reasons, constituted by values and principles, involved in deception in 
caregiving and I will explain why we ought to balance and weigh them in a non-arbitrary, 
patient-centered way. 
My theoretical approach is greatly informed by Beauchamp and Childress’ 
methodology. This methodology uses balancing and weighing factors for and against 
deception, based on biomedical ethics principles and values.22 Principlism offers a starting 
point of bioethics values, while specification narrows the scope dependent on the case. 
Beauchamp and Childress remark: “prima facie principles do not contain sufficient content to 
address the nuances of moral problems.”23 Specification adds content to the principles. The 
weights of the values within the scope of the case help to determine which value(s) ought to be 
honoured. Balancing does not create distinct guidelines for like cases, but allows for the 
complexity of each case to be considered. In weighing and balancing factors for and against 
deception, I will use reflective equilibrium.24 Reflective equilibrium involves examining the 
principles of biomedical ethics in light of the specific convictions of each individual. Both the 
principles and individual convictions are involved in exploring what one ought to do; both or 
either can be revised in light of the other. I use specified principlism and reflective equilibrium 
because they are the most widely accepted methodology in biomedical ethics. I further justify 
using this methodology against two other standard bioethics decision-making procedures, the 
                                                
22. Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 6th ed. (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009); Henry S. Richardson, “Specifying, Balancing and Interpreting Bioethical 
Principles,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 25, no. 3 (2000): 285–307. 
23. Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 17. 
24. Ibid., 381–387. 
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moral system approach of Gert, Culver, and Clouser, and the kind of casuistry defended by 
Strong.25 
In the first chapter, I will discuss precisely where the conflict occurs between various 
principles and values. The second chapter is my argument that alternatives to deception are 
inadequate in certain situations, and one ought to consider deception as a genuine conflict. I 
will present moral factors both against and in favour of using deception in the third chapter, 
through discussing several major ethical theories. In the fourth chapter, I will discuss weighing 
and balancing the factors presented in the third chapter, using both specified principlism and 
reflective equilibrium. This chapter will provide justification for when deception is morally 
defensible, and for when it is morally indefensible. I include an analysis at both the 
organizational and the clinical levels of decision-making. I will not provide a formal policy for 
the organizational framework, as creating a document such as this requires extensive input 
from each various organizational stakeholders (e.g. legal representation, clinical committees, 
etc.) and is approved and designed specific to each organization. However, the organizational 
framework provides important content for the basis of a policy. The final chapter is a 
theoretical defense of the methodology that I am using, in light of other theoretical approaches 
in bioethics, including the moral system approach and casuistry. Ultimately, my thesis is a 
theoretical defense of when deception is morally justifiable, and when it is morally 
indefensible in caregiving. I will determine the morally relevant features of the conflict, and 
then provide justification for the use of deception in light of these features. I will also defend 
my account against theoretical objections to the use of deception in caregiving. 
                                                
25. Bernard Gert, Charles M. Culver, and K. Danner Clouser, Bioethics: A Systematic Approach 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Carson Strong, “Critiques of Strong and Why They Are Mistaken,” 
Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 20, no. 5 (September 1999): 395–411. 
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Chapter 1  
What is the Conflict? 
Before directly engaging with current philosophical discussions on the conflict between 
principles, I will further define deception in light of its various forms. I will discuss several 
forms of deception under two broad categories – passive and active – and will argue that there 
is no morally relevant difference between these two forms, and both should be morally 
examined with the same scrutiny. 
Forms of Deception  
There are two broad categories of deceptive acts: active and passive. Active forms of deception 
involve the deceiver either stating something that she believes is false or explicitly performing 
an act to deceive. Examples of active deception can include most forms of lying, concealment 
(e.g. covert medication) and cheating. Passive deception requires that the deceiver omits 
certain information in order to deceive or bend the truth.1 Passive deception is often considered 
as telling “half-truths” and/or dissimulation. Examples of passive deception can include 
omissions (e.g. leaving out discharge options when discharge planning, placebos and 
distractions) and bending the truth (e.g. via exaggerations or underestimations). Covert 
medication does not clearly fit into either category, since it involves both an action (placing the 
medication into the beverage or food) and an omission (not providing that information to the 
deceived). I included it in the active category since it is traditionally considered the more 
morally contentious category, but nonetheless it contains elements of both. 
                                                
1. Roderick M. Chisholm and Thomas D. Feehan, “The Intent to Deceive,” The Journal of Philosophy 
74, no. 3 (March 1, 1977): 143–59. 
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Other questionable forms of deception include nudging and framing.2 These two 
concepts are very similar such that they involve manipulating the way in which information is 
presented (framing) and the way in which options are presented (nudging), such that the agent 
wishes the deceived to pick a particular option over others without her knowing that it was 
crafted for her to do so. These forms can be considered manipulative, but not entirely coercive. 
Deception falls somewhere between rational persuasion and coercion. Deception is not quite 
coercion, where someone is fully aware of the act, such as holding someone down and 
administering medication. It is also not truthfully allowing someone to exercise her full 
autonomy such as through rational persuasion. Instead, deception allows for some autonomous 
decision-making, while disallowing other forms.3 
There are many other philosophical discussions that debate whether active versus 
passive acts ought to have equivalent or more/less moral worth or blame. Most notably, the 
active versus passive euthanasia debate engages this dialogue most commonly in health care. 
For example, there is generally shared feeling that in most healthcare settings, it is moral to 
allow someone to die of an underlying disease, whereas it is morally blameworthy to 
administer a dose of morphine that would stop someone’s heart under the same circumstances. 
Even though currently in Ontario is it illegal to participate in active euthanasia, there is a 
general opinion that this act is worse than passively allowing someone to die.4 There is 
difficultly in applying passive euthanasia practically and what actually constitutes passive 
                                                
2. For example, see Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, 
Wealth, and Happiness (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008). 
3. I will discuss this in further detail when I introduce the concerns related to deception and autonomy. 
4. See for example: American Medical Association, “AMA Policy on End-of-Life Care,” accessed March 
6, 2015, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/about-ethics-group/ethics-
resource-center/end-of-life-care/ama-policy-end-of-life-care.page. The Canadian Medical Association is, 
however, currently reconsidering its position on this issue.  
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euthanasia, given that palliative care is considered a withdrawal in many instances of active 
treatment. This debate in practice is still quite controversial. 
James Rachels is the most recognized philosopher who has challenged traditional views 
that there is a morally relevant distinction between active and passive forms of euthanasia. In 
Rachels’ chapter on “Active and Passive Euthanasia” he persuasively argues that agents ought 
to be held morally accountable for passive forms of euthanasia, just as one would for active 
forms. Nonetheless, he argues that sometimes active forms of euthanasia are more humane 
than passive forms, such as to alleviate inordinate suffering quickly, rather than allowing 
suffering for sometimes a lengthy dying process.5 His argument rests on the idea that for both 
forms of euthanasia, active and passive, the intentions as well as the consequence are 
ultimately the same: the intention is for the patient to die, and the consequence is a hastened 
death.6  
Nonetheless, the cause of death in either case is quite different. Should cause be a 
morally relevant difference? Some argue that cause is irrelevant in these cases, as omissions 
can ultimately contribute to death (e.g. omitting the provision of antibiotics for an infection in 
order to allow a patient to die).7 However, the role and purpose of palliative care is often to 
treat symptoms, rather than to prolong life or provide aggressive treatment, which can be 
considered another form of omission. 
Additionally, some have argued that the difference rests upon what is natural. For 
example, technology and life-sustaining machinery, such as ventilators, prolong the disease 
                                                
5. James Rachels, “Active and Passive Euthanasia,” in Bioethics: An Introduction to the History, 
Methods, and Practice, 2nd ed. (Jones & Bartlett Learning, 2007), 64–69. 
6. Ibid., 67. 
7. Eve Garrard and Stephen Wilkinson, “Passive Euthanasia,” Journal of Medical Ethics 31, no. 2 
(February 2005): 66. 
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process and maintain someone’s life, as opposed to allowing someone to die. The difference 
between active and passive euthanasia is that passive euthanasia allows nature to take its 
course, whereas active euthanasia involves unnaturally administering lethal medications, for 
example.8 Ought the nature distinction be a morally relevant difference between active and 
passive euthanasia? Hopkins argues against this notion on grounds that describing passive 
euthanasia as natural simply provides us comfort, as opposed to feeling guilt for contributing to 
the cause or hastening of death.9 Hopkins further argues that people are mistaken to believe 
that naturalness does not involve intervention and that it is a neutral stance.10 Rather, passivity 
is an intervention, which often requires a withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. Hopkins 
concludes that letting die and killing are not morally different. 
Let us now return to the active versus passive deception debate to determine whether 
this argument by analogy applies to forms of deception. I have discussed four key factors in the 
active versus passive euthanasia debate: intention, consequence, cause and naturalness. I will 
explore each individually as it applies to deception in healthcare.  
Intention 
In this section, I will list and discuss three broad kinds of intentions for deceiving. Aquinas 
reflects on three distinct types of lies – malicious, jocose and officious. Malicious lies intend to 
do some kind of evil. Jocose lies are told in jest or as a joke. Officious lies are what we 
                                                
8. Patrick D. Hopkins, “Why Does Removing Machines Count as ‘Passive’ Euthanasia?,” The Hastings 
Center Report 27, no. 3 (May 1, 1997): 29–37. 
9. Ibid., 30. 
10. Ibid., 31. 
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consider “white lies” – lies, which are intended to be helpful.11 Despite forming these three 
categories for various types of lies, Aquinas maintains that they are all morally impermissible 
acts. Aquinas considers any kind of deception, intentionally misleading others, to be inherently 
wrong, despite intentions and/or consequences.12 I focus on officious lies in this section, as 
they are most applicable to the use of deception in caregiving. Hence, I will explore officious 
intentions to argue that there is no morally relevant difference in cases of active and passive 
deception. 
Before Thomas Aquinas’ views on deception and, more specifically, on lying, St. 
Augustine held very rigid views on lying. Augustine held an absolutist position against any 
form of lying.13 What is also interesting is that both Augustine and Aquinas argue that the 
choice to withhold information (passive deception) is not considered morally indefensible, 
despite this kind of act having both the intention and the consequence of deception.14  
Nonetheless, I believe that the three types of lies (malicious, jocose and officious) can 
be useful when considering the prima facie rule or principle to not deceive and the 
circumstances under which it may be permissible to lie and/or to deceive. First, I believe that 
malicious lies, those which intend only to do harm, are morally impermissible and this is 
relatively uncontroversial.  
Jocose lies are intended to be in jest or for humorous reasons. This category of 
deception is beyond the scope of this paper, as it does not directly relate to caregiving 
                                                
11. Joseph Boyle, “The Absolute Prohibition of Lying and the Origins of the Casuistry of Mental 
Reservation: Augustinian Arguments and Thomistic Developments,” American Journal of Jurisprudence 44, no. 1 
(1999): 54. 
12. Ibid., 61. 
13. Ibid., 44–66. 
14. Ibid., 63. 
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deception. However, one might imagine that there would be limitations on the kinds of acts of 
deception that are morally permissible even within the jocose category – for example, some 
pranks that involve deception may not be considered funny to the deceived, and may 
ultimately cause significant unwanted harm to the deceived and/or to others.  
Lastly, let us consider the most applicable form of lie to my thesis – the officious lie. 
Officious lies have the intention to do good for others. This is a paternalistic approach to doing 
good for others – given that the deceiver believes she knows what is best for the deceived. The 
intention in these kinds of cases is arguably selfless and the aim is only towards benefitting the 
deceived and perhaps others affected by the decision.  
Let us explore officious intentions across both passive and active forms of deception. 
For both active and passive deception, a morally acceptable intention would be of the officious 
kind – to do good for the patient. Doing good for the patient includes considering what the 
patient would want and the kind of quality of life acceptable to the patient during moments of 
lucidity. 15  This condition is necessary, but insufficient when considering the moral 
permissibility to deceive. I will discuss additional criteria that ought to be fulfilled in 
prospective sections in this chapter, as well as the process of weighing and balancing this 
intention with other bioethics principles – such as the duty to do no harm, whether or not this is 
the intention of the deceiver. Hence, there is no morally relevant difference of intention 
between passive and active forms of deception.  
Consequence 
Related to intention is consequence, especially the desired consequence of deception. It is 
difficult to determine what the actual consequences or outcomes will likely be of deception. In 
                                                
15. I will discuss this further in the decision-making framework section of this chapter. 
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Chapter Three I will discuss that there are a plenitude of different factors that one ought to 
consider when reflecting on potential outcomes, however, the actual events that transpire may 
be different from those which were expected.  
It is necessary to consider the potential negative consequences associated with 
deception. For example, is interaction with other medications or pharmaceuticals likely? If the 
patient discovers that she was deceived, how will this impact the invaluable trust-relations with 
the caregiver and healthcare system more broadly? I will return to this important component 
later when outlining the decision-making procedure in Chapter Four.  
On the other hand, let us consider the potential positive outcomes. If a patient 
successfully takes her medication and regains decision-making capacity, the caregivers may be 
able to negotiate a treatment plan with her and fully comprehend her autonomous wishes. 
Again, a detailed analysis of potential consequences will be discussed in Chapter Three and a 
decision process presented in Chapter Four.  
Other considerations regarding consequences include the likelihood that the medication 
will be successful or helpful given the patient’s condition. In cases where patients will not 
regain autonomous capacities, such as for Alzheimer’s disease, and deception is used to calm 
or relieve stress for the patient, one must consider the effectiveness of deception. In either 
passive or active forms of deception, the concerns related to consequences will be the same. 
Hence, consequences do not provide a morally relevant difference.  
Cause 
Questions of causation have traditionally been and continue to be very complex and 
contentious in philosophy – I will not provide significant detail regarding causation. A more 
accurate term might be involvement and the degree to which active and passive forms influence 
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the deceived to believe a false belief. Active forms of deception more clearly demonstrate 
greater involvement in the act of deception. For example, lying, the assertion of a statement 
that the deceiver believes to be false as if it were true, is more likely to close the gap such that 
the deceived will believe the false statement.  
Passive forms of deception often require less involvement such that the deceived will 
believe something false. For example, these forms involve omitting certain facts to sway the 
deceived to believe something that the deceiver believes is false. The person who is deceived 
makes the final conclusion or leap. One might argue that even in cases of active deception the 
deceived makes the final inference. This may be true, but passive deception does not explicitly 
state or show that inference or conclusion, whereas active deception does. The deceiver has 
knowledge that the deceived does not, and she frames and composes the conversation or 
scenario in such a way that the deceived will most likely believe what the deceiver believes to 
be false, but one can argue that more of the gap is filled and ultimately owned by the person 
who is deceived. Drawing the conclusion that the false belief is true is a matter of degree 
between passive and active deception, with active deception moving the deceived closer to that 
conclusion.  
As an analogy, let us discuss Rachels’ well-known example of the two men, Smith and 
Jones, who each gain a significant inheritance if their respective cousins die. Smith enters the 
bathroom and drowns his cousin, actively participating in the cousin’s death. Jones has the full 
intention to drown his cousin, but enters the bathroom as his cousin is in the midst of already 
drowning; Jones decides to watch to make sure that his cousin dies, but does not participate in 
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this act.16 Rachels challenges his readers to find a morally relevant difference between the two 
scenarios and argues that both Jones and Smith ought to be held equally morally responsible.  
Just as Peter Singer describes that the deaths of many impoverished children and adults 
across the world are preventable, Rachel argues that in both the Smith and Jones cases, the 
cousins’ deaths were also preventable.17 Not actively contributing to the act, but rather 
passively allowing it to occur when an agent can do something (and at little cost to the agent, 
according to Singer), is equally morally blameworthy according to Rachels and Singer in either 
case. There is no moral difference between active and passive acts. 
I argue along the same lines for both active and passive deception. Despite the active 
form involving a more direct impact, the passive form also impacts the deceived in such a way 
that could have been prevented by the agent and at little cost to the deceiver. Hence, regarding 
cause – both active and passive deception influence cause the deceived to believe something 
that the deceiver believes to be false, and the degree of involvement is not a moral difference.18  
One might argue that being more explicitly involved in the deceit is different from just 
allowing someone to believe something false. Let us explore this distinction. Explicit deceit is 
the active form described above. Passive deceit involves omitting or bending the truth as well 
as, arguably, nudging and framing. Both active and passive forms of deceit mentioned above 
involve the agent doing something, whether that be making an assertion or arranging options in 
a particular manner with the aim of manipulating belief. Another sub-category within passive 
deceit involves allowing someone to continue to believe something that is not true, despite the 
                                                
16. Rachels, “Active and Passive Euthanasia,” 64–69. 
17. Peter Singer, The Life You Can Save: Acting Now to End World Poverty (Random House, 2009). 
18. There is still on-going disagreement regarding differences between active and passive euthanasia – 
Daniel Callahan, for example, argues that the cause of death between active and passive euthanasia is quite 
different; the former being the agent administering a chemical and the latter being the disease itself.  
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observer/listener believing that it is not true. Consider for example, an elderly patient in a long-
term care facility with advanced Alzheimer’s disease. He keeps telling the staff that his wife 
will be coming to visit him in a couple days time and that he is looking forward to her visit, 
even though she passed away a number of years ago. Staff does not correct him about her death 
and allows him to continue to hold this belief.  
There are different reasons why one could choose to not disclose additional 
information. For example, it could be unsafe to disclose, it may not make a difference in the 
other person’s belief if one disclosed the information, or one could genuinely wish to deceive 
by not providing the additional information. Does it matter whether the deceiver is the actual 
conduit for the misguided information? Is there a morally relevant difference for cases when 
the deceiver is or is not the conduit? Is this situation (where no information is actually 
transferred to another person) actually an act of deception?  
Let us explore the definition of deception again. Deception involves purposefully 
misleading someone to believe something that one believes to be false. Chisholm and Feehan 
argue that causing someone to cease to have a true belief and preventing someone from 
acquiring a true belief are included as forms of deception.19 They list these kinds of deception 
under acts of omission.20 Mahon summarizes the Chisholm and Feehan definition of lying in 
the following paragraph: 
To contribute causally toward another person’s acquiring a false belief, or 
continuing to have a false belief, or ceasing to have a true belief, or being 
prevented from acquiring a true belief, or to allow another person to acquire a 
                                                
19. Chisholm and Feehan, “The Intent to Deceive.” 
20. Mahon argues that these kinds of acts should not be considered deception, but rather are merely 
keeping someone ignorant. However, by withholding information to someone when it could change their false 
belief, this seems like an act of deception via omission. See James Mahon, “A Definition of Deceiving,” 
International Journal of Applied Philosophy 21, no. 2 (2007): 181–186. 
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false belief, or to continue to have a false belief, or to cease to have a true belief, 
or to continue without a true belief.21 
The first condition, summarized in the quotation above, involves the purpose or intention of the 
deceiver for the deceived to have the false belief. The second condition, which I contribute to 
this discussion, is that in order for an act to rightly be considered as deceptive, there must be a 
reasonable expectation that the deceived would generally want to know the information that 
the deceiver believes is true (that is being withheld, transformed or lied about) or find the 
information important and/or useful. I will return to this additional condition when discussing 
the value of trust and the role of expectations in caregiving. It is important to note, however, 
that in the healthcare context there is a stronger obligation to provide the truth and the 
expectation that relevant information will be provided is stronger than in regular contexts. The 
kind of relationship will influence the obligation to tell the truth.22 I do not argue that it is an 
absolute principle, but at least the strength is affected by the relationship between the two 
agents. I believe that this definition includes the cases where the deceiver refuses to provide 
truthful information, without being an explicit conduit of that information. Hence, omissions 
can equally be considered deceptive. Whether the deceiver is a direct or indirect conduit of 
deception is not a morally relevant difference in cases of deception.  
With this additional condition, both active and passive acts can be considered deceptive 
and our deceiver or agent can be held morally blameworthy or praiseworthy, depending on the 
situation, for either act. Let us examine the fourth and final morally relevant difference: 
naturalness. 
                                                
21. Ibid., 186. 
22. Another example to consider is one of two friends, and one friend is aware of information that the 
other would want to know or would find important. The principle to tell the truth will be dependent on weighing 
and balancing competing principles. For example, could significant harm come from disclosing this information? 
The nature of the relationship is such that the friend should transmit the information to the other friend. 
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Naturalness (Expectations)  
The discussion of naturalness is significantly different between the active/passive euthanasia 
debate and deception. Deception does not involve a natural process as with allowing someone 
to die of terminal illness, but rather involves an interaction between two (or more) individuals 
with the deceiver acting intentionally to deceive. One way in which to consider naturalness 
relates to the previous discussion of intention and expectations. Deception is founded upon 
interactions among persons – what information would a recipient reasonably expect to be 
communicated in an interaction with another? Instead of natural, the term expectations will be 
used to describe this relationship. 
Considering what is expected from one individual to another is very complex and can 
be somewhat subjective. What grounds expectations? Where do they come from? If the 
deceiver and the deceived disagree on the expectation of what one would reasonably want to 
know, whose expectation should we rely on for moral judgment given the deceiver-deceived 
relationship? 
The OED defines expectation as follows: “A strong belief that something will happen 
or be the case.”23 Expectations involve making predictions about others’ (and perhaps one’s 
own) behaviours. Castelfranchi argues that expectations must involve something beyond mere 
prediction or what is likely to come to be – they include a motivational or active component, a 
concern.24 The concern relates to a goal or what the person would want or desire to happen. In 
cases of deception, the deceiver intentionally chooses to not disclose information that she 
                                                
23. “Expectation,” Oxford Dictionaries (Oxford University Press, 2015), 
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believes the deceived would have wanted to know under normal circumstances. For example, 
if Kathy were hiding medication in Tarek’s food, under regular circumstances or norms of 
society, Tarek would want to know that he is receiving the medication. Additionally, if Omar 
wanted to see his partner and she had passed away, one would reasonably think to tell Omar 
about his partner’s death. This is one reason why deception is not intuitive as a plausible 
treatment conduit, because under regular circumstances or under usual social norms, one 
would disclose this kind of information, unless one had good reason to not disclose (e.g. it was 
disproportionately harmful to disclose) or someone was being malicious. We value autonomy 
and the ability for people to make decisions for themselves. Hence, one would reasonably 
expect that this information would be provided.  
What matters in the cases that I am discussing – the expectations of society more 
generally or the expectation of the person him- or her-self? On the one hand, if the former is 
what matters, then we ought to consider what reasonable people in society would expect 
regarding the transmission of information one believes to be true. Practices within an 
organization influence expectations among others in society – for example, if people think that 
their medication will be hidden in their food, this may cause fear and prevent people from 
seeking help when ill in future, especially those who already have significant clinical anxiety 
and paranoia. On the other hand, if the latter is what we ought to consider, we need to 
implement a patient-focused approach and think about what each individual would want to be 
disclosed, when she is or was capable of making the decision. Each person brings a unique 
foundation upon which expectations are formed. Although person-focused and patient-centered 
care aims to arrange treatment such that it is specific to each unique patient’s needs, actions 
within the healthcare system need to have limitations based on legal, professional and ethical 
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reasons and duties. The question posed in my thesis is whether deception can reasonably fall 
within the scope of ethical practice in the current healthcare system. 
In the discussion of naturalness, it is important to understand patient-centeredness 
through the lens of expectations to capture what is anticipated and required in an exchange. To 
reflect further, I will consider questions such as where do expectations come from and when is 
it reasonable to fulfill them? Expectations stem from many various sources. As Castelfranchi 
describes, expectations are essentially about goals.25 They are grounded in a stake or a concern 
that we have for the way that things are likely to and should transpire. I would also assert that 
expectations are value-laden. They are grounded in the values that we have, based on our 
experiences and what matters to us. 
In the healthcare setting, there are often expectations regarding the following: treatment 
options available, one’s role as caregiver, one’s role as SDM, the role of healthcare team, 
discharge options and continued services, the probability of hope and recovery and, of course, 
expectations surrounding length of time for recovery, length of stay in the organization, to 
name just a few. Each of these notions can be tied back to a value. For example, the role of the 
caregiver is often linked heavily to the value of promoting health and well-being along with the 
duty to look after those with whom one has a relationship.  
Expectations and attitudes are formed from many different sources.26 Some sources 
include religion, family, friends, culture, society, education, personal development etc.. Other 
sources can include past experiences in healthcare, (one’s self, family member, neighbour, 
friend), the media (news, television, movies, YouTube), Dr. Google, stories from other people 
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the patient and/or family knows and discussions with various health care team members. 
Expectations can be conscious, subconscious, intentional, or non-intentional. For example, a 
person may not be aware of the influences from her culture that have contributed to the 
expectations that she has of her interactions with the healthcare system. As a different example, 
someone may be able to articulate and personally own the specific expectations that she has, 
given her understanding of her religion. 
If we consider the patient-focused approach, we should explore the expectations of 
each unique patient to determine their beliefs and concerns related to healthcare – what do they 
believe will happen in healthcare and what do they wish to happen?27 Patient-centered care 
involves attending to these expectations, within realistic limitations. Jennings et al. state: “By 
attending to patients’ needs, values, and preferences, satisfaction can be enhanced, thus 
boosting service quality.”28 However, there ought to be reasonable limitations set on what the 
healthcare provider and other caregivers can and cannot do.  
Ultimately, I believe that healthcare providers should first consider some broad 
limitations on the use of deception. Subsequently, if the use of deception is acceptable at the 
broadest level, the decision to use deception should be focused on each unique patient’s 
experience, clinical indications and expectations of the healthcare system to determine whether 
deception is acceptable or not. In Chapter Four I will outline specifically the organizational and 
clinical limitations and conditions. 
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To summarize the naturalness comparison, both active and passive forms of deception 
involve expectations regarding what information should be provided to another person, 
especially in the context of healthcare and what information a patient would want and/or 
expect to know about her treatment and/or her circumstances. Regardless of whether 
information is directly transferred or if it is passively omitted, there are expectations 
surrounding the transmission and delivery of this information. This is precisely why we have 
developed strict guidelines and legislature around informed consent more broadly and consent 
practices in research.  
In summary, I discussed different forms of deception in detail, including both active 
and passive forms. In order to assess the morally relevant differences between active and 
passive forms, I used an argument by analogy with debates surrounding active versus passive 
euthanasia in healthcare to consider four possible morally relevant factors including: intention, 
consequence, cause and naturalness. I argued that there is no morally relevant difference 
between active and passive forms of deception in caregiving. I further contributed to this 
discussion by adding the following: in order for an act to be considered deceptive, there must 
be a reasonable expectation on behalf of the deceiver that the deceived would want to know the 
truthful information or find the information important and/or useful. This additional condition 
helps to explain why passive omissions can still be intentionally harmful to the deceived 
despite the deceiver seemingly playing a minimal role in the act. In this section I further 
discussed the importance of exploring expectations and how they shape what is considered to 
be deceptive. In moving forward, I have argued that both passive and active forms of deception 
ought to be considered equally morally praiseworthy/blameworthy depending on the specific 
circumstances. I will now shift gears and discuss the current philosophical landscape of 
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deception in caregiving and why I believe that the way the conflict is currently framed should 
be expanded.  
Current Philosophical Landscape of Deception 
The conflict that arises from the use of deception in bioethics is often argued as being between 
either respect for autonomy and beneficence or trust and beneficence. I will refer to the first 
way of interpreting the conflict between respect for autonomy and beneficence, as the 
Autonomy Account. The second explanation of the conflict, between trust and beneficence will 
be referred to as the Trust Account. There are few other articles that discuss the conflict as 
being more complex, but the general landscape revolves around these two accounts, which is 
why I will address them accordingly.29 
I will argue that these accounts are deficient especially in cases of patients who lack 
mental capacity.30 The real conflict occurs between a plurality of values. These values include 
but are not exclusive to honesty, beneficence, trust, non-maleficence, justice and respect for 
autonomy. Caregivers are torn between multiple values; when caregivers use deception they 
often feel as if they have acted morally blameworthy for doing so, but if they do not deceive 
their patients they also feel morally blameworthy for not being able to provide care and to 
relieve suffering. There is no easy answer to this conflict. Various values and principles pull 
the caregiver in different directions. What ought the caregiver do? In this chapter, I will show 
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that the conflict arises between a multiplicity of values when considering deception in 
caregiving. 
I will reject both the Autonomy and Trust Accounts, as they do not adequately address 
cases that involve patients who lack mental capacity. For example, the Autonomy Account 
often focuses on arguing that deception is either morally unacceptable because it violates 
autonomy or deception can be good despite violating autonomy and it does not capture the 
interesting non-autonomous cases (for the specific treatment decision) that are most 
challenging. I will argue that a much more comprehensive account, including the conflict 
between a multiplicity of values, is needed to morally justify deception in caregiving, taking 
into account this patient population. In this chapter, I will first discuss what is meant by 
beneficence in bioethics. I will then present both the Autonomy and Trust Accounts, providing 
reasons why I believe they are alone inadequate to provide moral justification for or against the 
use of deception in caregiving. 
Beneficence 
Beneficence is often defined in terms of the patient’s good or the patient’s best interests. I will 
use these terms interchangeably. Caregivers often enter into the caregiving role because they 
want to see a patient or loved one thrive and do well, given their circumstances. Nevertheless, 
what is considered as the patient’s good can be different from what the patient actually wants 
or would want if able to exercise his or her own autonomy. Hence, how the patient’s good is 
defined will determine if there is in fact a conflict for the Autonomy Account. 
Pellegrino and Thomasma argue that acting in the patient’s good reflects the patient’s 
desires and values, and they argue that in doing so, one is respecting the patient’s authentic 
autonomy; hence, beneficence is merely an extension of respect for autonomy. I do not think 
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that this description of beneficence adequately captures the concept, but I will describe this 
position and explain my reservations. They remark: “the best interests of the patients are 
intimately linked with their preferences” from which “are derived our primary duties toward 
them.”31 They argue that the patient’s good ought to be defined in terms of a patient’s 
autonomy. Hence, there would be no real conflict, but rather patient autonomy and beneficence 
are indistinguishable. If a caregiver acts contrary to the patient’s autonomy, then the caregiver 
is not acting beneficently, and is rather harming the patient’s autonomy. This view reduces 
beneficence to autonomy and fails to recognize that a patient’s good can extend beyond the 
capacity to make one’s own choices. Let me expand further on how beneficence can be 
defined.  
Best interests in the Health Care Consent Act 1996 of Ontario include the known 
values, wishes, and beliefs of an incapable patient prior to becoming incapable, plus a number 
of other requirements. These include any incapable wishes, whether the patient’s condition is 
likely to deteriorate, be maintained or improve with the proposed treatment plan, balancing the 
risks with any benefits and whether there are any other interventions.32 Best interests are used 
when there are no prior expressed capable wishes, but rather a substitute decision-maker is 
required to make a decision in the patient’s good or interest. If prior wishes are not known, 
then substitute decision-makers consider the benefit versus risk or harm of various 
interventions, including no intervention at all. Autonomy is helpful to define what is a benefit 
or harm in each unique situation. Nonetheless, we can likely agree on some general benefits 
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and harms that many would agree upon. For example, most would likely agree that being in 
pain is a type of harm.  
 In contrast to the view presented in the previous paragraphs, the predominant concept 
of a patient’s good is defined as what a reasonable person would desire or value, as opposed to 
what each specific patient autonomously chooses or values.33 DeGrazia describes a patient’s 
best interests as a list of values determined by reasonable persons in society and can be applied 
to a specific medical decision. 34  Kopelman remarks: “The Best Interests Standard was 
introduced to give some standing to the interests of incompetent or incapacitated persons 
independent of their guardian’s views.”35 This standard was created for those who lack 
capacity, and for whom the authentic autonomous wishes are unknown. Nonetheless, the best 
interest standard can also be used when considering a competent patient, given a shared set of 
values by reasonable persons. However, it would require much more justification to override a 
competent person’s capable wishes. 
Kopelman further notes regarding incapable children that:  
Once the threshold has been met of showing that the child is in danger within 
the guardians’ care, the courts apply a second test that I have argued can be 
couched in terms of the Best Interests Standard because judges then should 
choose the best available option for the child.36  
Independent of a specific patient, these are shared values that a reasonable person would hold, 
and they are generally applied in cases where the patient’s wishes are unknown, such as with 
children whose wishes are not yet known. They ought to be considered in cases even when the 
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patient’s wishes are known, to ensure that an open dialogue has occurred given the benefits of 
a medical decision. 
Beauchamp and Childress also argue that beneficence is a distinct concept from 
autonomy, as it represents “mercy, kindness, and charity” by making the condition of others 
better.37 By making the patient’s condition better, they argue for a shared and generally 
accepted sense of good. Hence, beneficence not only applies to groups of patients for whom 
their values and wishes are unknown, but also to patients who have substantial autonomy. 
Consider as an example a patient who wishes to commit suicide. This wish may be completely 
rational, but one would want to first act beneficently, perhaps many times, to ensure that this is 
the decision that the patient actually wants (e.g. to ensure the patient does not have depression, 
has all the supports needed to improve her quality of life, and so forth).38 Acting beneficently 
may also include acting beneficently for others in the circle of care; for example, caregivers 
may be distressed and completely overwhelmed constantly trying to convince their patients to 
take their medication every day. Beneficence may further take into consideration the 
compassion fatigue and burnout of caregivers in this instance; both of these conditions can 
significantly impact the level of care the caregiver is able to provide to the patient. For my 
thesis, I will consider beneficence as acting in the patient’s good, in the shared and generally 
accepted sense of good that most reasonable people in society would want. I also consider 
autonomy as a separate (albeit related) factor.  
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The Autonomy Account 
There are two major positions regarding autonomy and deception. First, there are those who 
argue that deception is morally indefensible because it directly violates a patient’s autonomy. 
In most cases, patients are capable of making decisions for themselves. The second position 
argues that deception in caregiving is morally defensible on grounds that autonomy is a moot 
point since incapable patients lack autonomy, naturally defaulting to beneficence as the ethical 
guiding principle. I will discuss both positions in this section and argue that the conflict for 
those cases which I explore, those involving incapable patients, is much more complex than 
currently described. Both autonomy and beneficence are important considerations among many 
values and principles.  
In the traditional Autonomy Account, it is argued that deception in caregiving is 
morally objectionable because beneficence comes into direct conflict with a patient’s 
autonomous wishes. Deception, in general, is considered to be morally indefensible as it 
directly violates patient autonomy; deception aims at making someone believe something to be 
true that the deceiver believes to be false. It does not allow patients to exercise their autonomy 
appropriately, since their decisions are based on false information. Sissela Bok argues that 
autonomy is directly at stake in deception and lying, and it renders people powerless.39 Bok 
also remarks that deceiving others injures the deceived and her choices, as they reflect false 
information.  
Richard Griffith further argues that consent must always be provided before 
surreptitiously providing medication otherwise it would be a trespass.40 The conflict that 
                                                
39. Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 
xvii. 
40. Griffith, “Managing Medical Compliance,” 402. 
  34 
seemingly occurs in these kinds of cases is between a caregiver’s duty to act according to the 
patient’s autonomous wishes, and the caregiver’s wish to do good for the patient. Acting in the 
patient’s good can include ensuring that the patient’s medication is consumed such that she can 
reap the benefits of the medication. Beneficence can also include deceiving the patient by 
telling a patient a lie such that she does not suffer. In the Autonomy Account, the problem of 
deception in caregiving has been traditionally framed for patients who can make decisions for 
themselves; they have substantial autonomy. The conflict thus occurs when their autonomous 
wishes are contrary to what is in the patient’s best medical interests from the caregiver 
perspective. 
However, a major concern for the kinds of cases that I am exploring is that a patient has 
very limited autonomy during a psychotic episode or when suffering from advanced dementia; 
autonomy is often not substantial and the patient is unable to make substantive decisions for 
herself. Beneficence is an alternative standard to aid decision-making, unless the previous 
capable wishes and values of the patient are clearly expressed and known. The traditional 
Autonomy Account does not adequately address cases of substitute decision-makers deciding 
on behalf of an incapable patient. 
Before directly addressing the Autonomy Account, I will say a few words about prior 
expressed capable wishes. One ought to also be careful when taking prior expressed capable 
wishes at face value. Wishes should be interpreted and adapted to new circumstances given the 
context of a patient’s values and life, as there are often multiple unexpected variables involved 
in medical decision-making given a new context in the medical setting. Taking the time to 
probe and explore what the previous capable wish actually meant for the patient given her 
experiences can help enlighten what one ought do. I would argue that a combination between 
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the patient’s previous autonomous wishes and beneficence is a more comprehensive method to 
explore what should be done in each case. In order to consider what one ought to do to respect 
autonomy, one should ask the kinds of questions such as: “have you considered option X, and 
what does that mean to you?” It is only through the lens of considering what others generally 
in society would want that we can formulate these kinds of questions. Hence, I believe that 
autonomy and beneficence are distinct, but certainly not mutually exclusive, and both 
extremely important when aiding medical decision-making to make a truly informed decision.  
The traditional Autonomy Account maintains that the conflict that occurs with 
deception in caregiving is mainly between beneficence and respect for autonomy. 
Predominantly, authors respond in favour autonomy of when patients have mental capacity, 
and in favour of beneficence when patients lack mental capacity. However, I believe that these 
arguments do not adequately reflect the complexity of these cases. I will now discuss some of 
the major arguments regarding patients who lack mental capacity. 
McCullough, Coverdale and Chervenak argue that for cases where patients lack mental 
capacity the principle of respect for autonomy is redundant. Instead, one ought to consider how 
deception will impact the professional responsibilities healthcare providers have to their 
patients. For example, truth-telling, trust and beneficence are at the forefront of decision-
making.41 The relationship between provider and patient is what matters, including doing what 
is best for the patient while maintaining a positive relationship.  
Schermer similarly argues that Alzheimer’s patients with advanced dementia cannot be 
said to have the kind of robust autonomy attributed to the principle of respect for autonomy. 
She remarks: “So, in the later stages of Alzheimer’s, capacities for authentic self-creation and 
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manifestation may disappear and autonomy may no longer provide a reason against lying.” 
Hence, for these cases, some argue that respect for autonomy is not a factor in deciding what 
one ought to do, but rather beneficence takes over and aims at doing what is best for the 
patient.42  
Although I agree that respect for autonomy takes on a different meaning in light of 
these deception cases with patients who are incapable, I argue that the principle of respect for 
autonomy maintains a vital role when deciding what one ought to do. For example, in cases 
where patients suffer from psychotic mental illnesses that prevent them from having decisional 
autonomy, using deception can positively impact the principle of respect for autonomy by 
providing medication and sometimes therapy that aims at restoring decisional autonomy. In 
cases where patients are surreptitiously provided medication, which reduces psychotic episodes 
and restores mental capacity, then respecting autonomy will play a significant role in decision-
making, if even it is solely the goal of the decision.  
Another function of respect for autonomy is uncovering the prior wishes and values of 
a patient. On the one hand, a patient may not want to experience and live with the side-effects 
of taking anti-psychotic medications and would rather experience the symptoms of the illness, 
as opposed to these side-effects. For example, some short-term side-effects of anti-psychotic 
medications can include “drowsiness, restlessness, muscle spasms, tremor, dry mouth, or 
blurring of vision,” while long term effects may include Tardive dyskinesia and other effects. 
“Tardive dyskinesia (TD) is a disorder characterized by involuntary movements most often 
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affecting the mouth, lips and tongue, and sometimes the trunk or other parts of the body such 
as arms and legs” and weight gain.43 O’Reilly remarks:  
All antipsychotic medication can cause side effects. Some side effects, such as 
parkinsonism or weight gain, may affect an individual’s quality of life; others, 
such as the disruption of glucose metabolism and elevation of lipid levels, can 
actually shorten life. It is hardly surprising that some patients prefer to hear 
voices than to experience these side effects.44 
On the other hand, other patients may consider it more valuable to be on the medication. Each 
individual patient generally has a unique display of symptoms, where some symptoms are 
more intense and apparent than others. Hence, respect for autonomy might include considering 
what the patient would have wanted during moments of lucidity or given the patient’s values 
prior to the illness. Those close to the patient are often important and central for helping to 
determine the patient’s previous autonomous wishes. 
For cases where patients suffer from advanced Alzheimer’s disease, the role of the 
principle of respect for autonomy is not aimed at restoring autonomy since dementia in these 
cases involves a progressive decline in cognitive abilities. Instead, respecting autonomy relates 
to what patients would have wanted during moments of authentic autonomy, such as when the 
patient was mentally capable. Some may argue that after losing certain psychological 
capabilities and connections to one’s authentic self, the patient with advanced Alzheimer’s 
may no longer be considered the same person.45 Questions of personhood and personal identity 
become necessary in these cases. These extremely challenging and philosophically interesting 
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topics will not be discussed in detail here.46 Respect for autonomy in these cases is often taken 
to be what the patient would have wanted considering the patient’s life-long narrative and the 
values espoused by the patient. 
Respect for autonomy may also be important regarding respecting the incapable 
patient’s non-substantial autonomous wishes. Especially for cases where substantial autonomy 
is unlikely to be restored, such as for the advanced Alzheimer’s cases, one might want to 
consider what the patient (in her current state) would want. For example, consider a patient 
who previously stated that she would always want to know whether her partner passed away; 
when told that her partner passed away when she asks after him, the patient becomes severely 
depressed and is unable to participate in the kinds of activities she formerly enjoyed (e.g. 
playing games with other patients, and spending time outdoors). She becomes distressed at her 
caregivers for telling her what happened and expresses she wished she hadn’t been told. When 
she is deceived, she is able to have a much higher quality of life given her other values and 
wishes.47 Hence, considering the patient’s autonomy can involve respecting her non-substantial 
autonomous wishes. Most often, guidelines for caregivers suggest that patients should be 
redirected and, although not directly lied to, focus on the feelings and emotions of the patient at 
the time and avoid direct discussion about the delusion/hallucination.48 
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As described in the example above, patients who suffer from advanced Alzheimer’s 
disease may have some wishes and desires that may not reflect substantial autonomy, but 
perhaps ought to be taken into consideration. The conflict in these kinds of cases is not clearly 
between a robust or substantial form of autonomy and beneficence. Rather, the experiential or 
perhaps more basic desires are what bring the patient satisfaction and happiness at a particular 
point in the disease progression. These experiential desires are important, and one ought to take 
them into consideration, although not necessarily follow them, depending on the patient’s 
authentic autonomous values and the weight placed on these previous values.49 
Thus, respect for autonomy is a morally relevant feature not only for those patients who 
have mental capacity, but also those cases where patients lack mental capacity. The principle 
of respect for autonomy can also take many different (or a combination of different) forms 
when deciding whether it is morally defensible for caregivers to deceive their patients, 
including restoring autonomous wishes, respecting the authentic substantial values and wishes 
of a patient and, in other cases, respecting the non-substantial wishes of a patient. 
The Trust Account 
I argued above that the moral conflict currently associated with deception in caregiving is 
inadequate regarding the conflict between respect for autonomy and beneficence, given the 
complexity of these cases. I will now argue that the Trust Account, which describes the 
conflict between trust and beneficence, is similarly insufficient. 
Gilson describes trust as: “…essentially a psychological state. In common 
understanding, to trust someone else is a voluntary action based on expectations of how others 
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will behave in relation to yourself in the future.”50 He further remarks: “Trust, therefore, 
involves an element of risk derived from one individual’s uncertainty regarding the motives, 
intentions and future actions of another on whom they depend.”51 Trust in cases of deception in 
caregiving can be interpreted in various ways and I will explore these various interpretations in 
this section. However, there are several key components that are common among 
interpretations. I will briefly describe trust in relation to expectations (building from my earlier 
discussion), voluntariness, vulnerability and competence.  
First, trust is about expectations of others and how they will interact with oneself given 
prior experiences, assumptions and so forth. Baier describes these expectations as being 
contracts set up with others regarding their interactions; she focuses on typical contracts among 
competent adults in society, such as a plumber and the client.52 However, in a caregiving 
relationship the interaction is a much more delicate one between a patient and her caregiver.  
Second, even though Gilson describes trust as voluntary, I believe that trust is 
something that can be either active or passive; it is voluntary in the sense that the person 
engaged in a trusting relationship is often not being coerced to do so. An example of passive 
trust is that one can grow to trust someone through their experiences without distinctly 
reflecting and deciding to trust another person. Passive trust, for example, can be between two 
childhood friends growing up and learning to trust one another. Active trust, however, may 
include the decision to trust someone despite prior cases that reveal an untrustworthy character.  
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Gilson is also correct in naming the risk and uncertainty associated with trust, which 
often exposes the vulnerability of the person who trusts another. Trust involves handing over 
or allowing someone to have power over oneself, which can be abused or cherished.53 Baier 
adds that another component of trust involves the level of security provided to the person who 
trusts – it is often quite limited and any recourse after a breach of trust is often challenging, 
unless engaged in a formal contract.54  
Jones provides the following definition of trust: “Thus, we should say that trust is 
optimism about the goodwill and competence of another.”55 Trust is again about managing 
expectations that others have a particular positive and compassionate goal in mind. 
Additionally, trust is about reliability of competency and skilfulness of the person one trusts. 
Jones further remarks that trust is situation and decision-specific and should not be considered 
globally.56 Hence, you can trust certain people for certain things, but perhaps not for others. 
The following study is an example of the conflict between trust and beneficence in an 
instance of deception in caregiving. Stroup, Swartz, and Applebaum discuss the results of a 
study conducted on out-patients with schizophrenia in India (Chennai) from 1999–2000.57 
Patient compliance was measured and it was discovered that out of 148 non-compliant out-
patients, at least 50% were administered covert medication at least once by family members.58 
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Despite being resentful toward their family members for covertly administering the 
medication, the patients voluntarily took their medication after being told what had occurred. 
In these cases, trust was violated to act in the patients’ best interests and arguably (since they 
continued to take the medication) in accordance with the patients’ wishes and authentic 
autonomy. 
Lying and deceiving can leave caregivers feeling as if they are doing something 
inherently wrong to their patients; lying and deceiving their patients is contrary to caregivers’ 
duty to uphold the truth and can erode important caregiving relationships, including trust. 
Ahern and Van Tosh describe administering of covert medication as the following:  
Surreptitious prescribing violates every tenet of the doctor-patient relationship 
and is the antithesis of recovery. Desperate but ill-advised caregivers and family 
members who succumb to this insidious and deceitful practice cannot possibly 
be doing a service to loved ones. They are party to an unimaginable and 
fundamental loss of trust.59  
The authors describe deception in caregiving as violating the caregiver- (doctor-)patient 
relationship, which leads to a breakdown of trust in this important relationship. Trust is vital 
for recovery and for patients to feel comfortable continuing to receive care from the caregiver 
if necessary, as well as returning to the caregiver and other healthcare institutions in future.60  
Beauchamp and Childress do not consider trust as an independent value or principle, 
such as respect for autonomy, but rather as a virtue of healthcare providers. Healthcare 
providers ought to provide care in accordance with the virtue of trustworthiness. Other virtues 
according to these authors include compassion, integrity, discernment and conscientiousness.61 
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They remark: “Trustworthiness has the practical outcome of promoting the image of the 
professional and making health care effective. Nothing is more important in health care 
organizations than the maintenance of a culture of trust.”62 Trust is extremely important, if not 
the most important element, for the patient-caregiver relationship. I certainly agree with this 
claim, and will argue that trust can take different forms, including truth-telling as well as 
managing expectations (reliability). 
According to Gilson, there are several different kinds of behaviours expected with trust, 
including openness, reliability, technical competence and concern.63 I will discuss openness 
(truth-telling) and reliability, and I will include technical competence and concern with the 
discussion of reliability in the context of caregiving.  
Truth-telling 
Let us consider truth-telling. I will explicate the notion of truth-telling in caregiving and its 
importance for trust in this section, and then provide my own insights for why reliability is 
equally important in cases of deception in caregiving.  
Caregivers have a prima facie duty to be honest with their patients. Part of caregivers’ 
responsibilities and duties is to provide truthful information to their patients, such that their 
patients can make informed choices; as noted earlier, informed consent is at the heart of 
respecting patient autonomy. Truthfulness refers directly to the openness component of trust 
discussed by Gilson. This duty also assumes that patients can understand and process the 
information. However, consider those patients who lack this ability; I will return to this 
question shortly. 
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Patients with advanced Alzheimer’s disease often have difficulty forming trusting 
relationships due to their illness, which raises the question of whether harming trust is as 
important in these cases.64 As mentioned earlier, McCullough, Coverdale, and Chervenak 
argue that respect for autonomy ought not be a guiding ethical principle for cases involving 
patients who suffer from advanced Alzheimer’s disease (a position that I argued against 
earlier), but rather beneficence ought to be at the forefront of decisions. I argued above that 
autonomy can be important as well. However, McCullough, Coverdale, and Chervenak 
remark: 
In such cases, to assert that respect for the patient’s autonomy creates an 
ineluctable constraint on what otherwise would be behavior that is deceitful 
misunderstands the implications of this ethical principle. This has implications 
for the trust-argument, because patients with significantly impaired decisional 
autonomy lack the cognitive apparatus to appreciate a trusting relationship in 
the first place. In other words, an autonomy-based objection to concealed 
medication, which was the most frequent objection (but not argument) made, 
does not succeed.65 
The authors argue that trust is not an important consideration for these populations, since 
patients suffering from advanced Alzheimer’s disease do not have the capacity to appreciate a 
trusting relationship. My concern here is that just because this patient population in general 
may lack the ability to appreciate trusting relationships, does not mean that we have a duty to 
try to foster at least some trust among this population.66 Williams and Tappen explore the 
therapeutic relationship between nursing home residents who face the later stages of 
Alzheimer’s disease and their caregivers.67 Extensive literature demonstrates the importance of 
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fostering a therapeutic relationship specifically in these kinds of cases. Williams and Tappen 
remark:  
To remain in a state of well-being, individuals with dementia depend on others 
to nurture and reaffirm them. This reaffirming process involves recognizing that 
persons with dementia are reaching out for social contact, honoring the attempts 
with a response, providing empathy for their “shattered state,” collaborating 
with them to describe their experience, appreciating the needs expressed, 
sustaining dementia sufferers’ actions, responding to their frame of reference, 
and “holding” or supporting them through their emotional experiences.68 
There seems to exist other methods through which trust can be fostered among populations 
suffering from advanced Alzheimer’s disease, which does not rely on truth-telling, but rather 
on other forms of trust-building.69  
Interestingly, much written on therapeutic alliance for patients with Alzheimer’s 
disease is based on the work by Peplau, who aimed to build this kind of relationship with 
patients who suffer from chronic, regressed schizophrenia.70 One can extrapolate that the 
importance of therapeutic alliance and relationship building to foster trust can apply to many 
patient populations who lack mental capacity, and perhaps even to those populations who have 
mental capacity. There are several phases associated with this kind of approach, including: the 
orientation phase, the working phase and the resolution.71 Other ways to increase therapeutic 
alliance include: “forming and maintaining a supportive relationship; being understood; 
expressing concerns; reducing social isolation; maintaining cognitive and verbal abilities as 
long as possible; reducing stress and frustration; maintaining dignity; and preserving quality of 
                                                
68. Christine L. Williams and Ruth M. Tappen, “Can We Create a Therapeutic Relationship With 
Nursing Home Residents in the Later Stages of Alzheimer’s Disease?,” Journal of Psychosocial Nursing and 
Mental Health Services 37, no. 3 (March 1999): 1. 
69. Bendigo Health, “Hallucinations, Delusions and Paranoia.” 
70. Williams and Tappen, “Can We Create a Therapeutic Relationship With Nursing Home Residents in 
the Later Stages of Alzheimer’s Disease?,” 2. 
71. Ibid., 3. 
  46 
life.”72 This article reveals that there are ample ways to increase trust among patients who lack 
capacity, without relying purely on truth-telling. This is not to say that truth-telling isn’t itself 
important, but that there may be other ways of fostering trust that do not involve truth-telling. 
Recall earlier the discussion of redirection of patients with hallucinations and delusions, which 
is arguably a form of deception, but nonetheless a positive way of building trust. The positive 
engagement with patients fosters a caring and trusting relationship, albeit one that involves 
deception.  
Schermer further raises an interesting point that requires addressing; patients who 
suffer from advanced Alzheimer’s disease (and this can be extended to other patient 
populations who lack mental capacity) are unable to appreciate the truth.73 Schermer remarks:  
I will argue that what can be called deception, or a lie, changes over the course 
of dementia because dementia slowly diminishes the capacities one needs to 
distinguish between truths and falsehoods. Once these capacities are lost, the 
ability to be lied to is also gone.74 
Hence, patients who lack mental capacity over time also lack the ability to be deceived, 
according to Schermer; there comes a time when a patient is unable to understand or appreciate 
the truth, and deception can no longer occur. The problem of deception, according to 
Schermer, simply disappears in these cases of advanced dementia. 
Consider again the definition of deception. Deception purposefully misleads another 
person to believe something that one (the deceiver) believes to be false. In cases where patients 
lack mental capacity and they cannot understand and/or appreciate certain truths, can they 
nonetheless be subject to deception? People in comas or who have such advanced dementia 
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that they are unable to hold the kinds of beliefs that are true or false cannot be deceived, 
because no such beliefs are even possible at the time of deception.  
What of those cases where a patient is able to hold a true or false belief, but has 
difficulty or lacks the ability to accurately discern when a belief is either true or false? In these 
cases, I would argue that patients could be deceived. They can hold a belief that is true or false, 
and the deceiver influences (or at least tries to influence) the deceived to hold a belief that the 
deceiver believes to be false. If the deceiver is successful, then deception has occurred; if not, 
then attempted deception has occurred. Nonetheless, patients who lack mental capacity who 
are able to hold true or false beliefs can be deceived. This same argument is not only relevant 
for Alzheimer’s patients, but also for those patients who experience psychosis or lack mental 
capacity for other reasons. 
Schermer further remarks: “New information cannot affect the demented patient’s 
identity, his outlook on life, or his plans and goals anymore. This means that the truth or 
falsehood of this information loses its significance for the patient.”75 However, in my view, 
although the patient is unable to create long-lasting goals, the patient may still have temporary 
interests and be able to appreciate momentary emotions, which can include temporarily feeling 
distress knowing one’s partner has passed away, for example. The truth and falsity of these 
dwindling beliefs are a significant part of the patient’s experience and affect the patient’s well-
being, contrary to Schermer’s claim. 
DeGrazia discusses the notion of critical and experiential interests from Ronald 
Dworkin; the main difference being that critical interests are those that represent the authentic 
values, desires and preferences of an individual, whilst experiential interests are momentary 
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and basic interests that are not reflective.76 Although long-term interests may not be impacted 
by truth-telling and trust, temporary or short-term interests certainly can be. I have argued that 
despite lacking mental capacity, the truth or falsity of beliefs can still greatly impact a patient’s 
experience; the use of deception is not a null consideration, but rather it is something that can 
positively or negatively impact the patient’s experience, if the patient can hold true and false 
beliefs. 
In this section, I discussed the importance of truth-telling and trust, and those 
populations who can be deceived given their ability to hold a true or false belief. I also 
discussed that distraction and redirection are considered deceptive, yet can foster trust through 
showing genuine care and concern in the caregiver-patient relationship. 
Reliability 
I will now turn to the concept of reliability as it relates to trust; this discussion will include 
reliability with respect to technical competence and concern, as forwarded by Gilson.77 
Manson and O’Neill describe trust as the following: “It is specifically a matter of 
relying on what others say; on what they undertake to do; on the truth of their claims; and the 
reliability of their commitments.”78 The authors focus mainly on trust for speech acts and the 
truth of their claims; tracking truth is seemingly more important than tracking reliability 
according to these authors. I have described the importance of openness and truthfulness in 
caregiving, and now I will focus on reliability.  
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Despite these authors placing significant emphasis on truth-telling regarding trust, in 
my view, when a patient lacks mental capacity, trust relies just as much, if not more, on what 
caregivers do and the reliability of their commitments.  
What does reliability mean for patients who lack mental capacity? First, patients desire 
reliability regarding technical competence. They want to ensure that their caregiver is capable 
of providing quality care, has the skill and expertise to do so and is also able to exercise 
discernment when required.79 David H. Thom conducted a study with the Stanford Trust Study 
Physicians Palo Alto, California, to determine what encourages trust in the caregiving 
relationship.80 Through a series of questionnaires and focus groups, 414 patients responded to 
the study question of what fosters trust with their physician. Thom concluded that: “Caring and 
comfort, technical competency, and communication are the physician behaviors most strongly 
associated with patient trust.”81 
In a different study conducted by Mechanic and Meyer, the researchers examined 
various patient populations and explored what elements of trust were important for each 
group.82 They surveyed patients with breast cancer, Lyme disease, and mental illness. The 
patient population with mental illness is much broader than the patient populations that I am 
exploring, but nonetheless encompasses many of the cases that I am interested in. This 
population valued confidentiality when discussing trust, due to the enormous stigma 
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surrounding mental illness. They further discussed the value of a physician listening to their 
concerns around side-effects and addressing those worries.83 These comments reflect other 
forms of trust that matter to patients, which can be considered as forms of reliability. 
Confidentiality ensures that caregivers (in the study, physicians specifically) keep information 
private from others, unless they are obligated to disclose by law. Being listened to is also a 
form of reliability, which shows an interest and concern for patients – this will be discussed in 
the following paragraph.  
Reliability further focuses on acting in the patient’s values and best interests to alleviate 
pain and suffering. Gilson uses the word concern to describe trust in this context: “A health 
care provider is specifically expected to demonstrate impartial concern for the patient’s well-
being.”84 Caregivers are traditionally seen as nurturers and healers; showing concern for the 
well-being of a patient can refer to beneficence and addressing and fostering the patient’s best 
interests. As described earlier, showing concern for a patient can include not only the medical 
best interests of the patient but also a concern for the patient’s specific circumstances, 
including her values and background. Hence, trust as reliability can also be trust to respect the 
patient’s authentic autonomy (values and wishes during moments of mental capacity) if these 
are known, in addition to act in the patient’s best interests.85 The notion of concern is drawn 
very broadly as an empathetic way of interacting with patients to include the various kinds of 
interests that a patient may have. 
A patient also trusts that she will not be abandoned or neglected during times when she 
lacks mental capacity. Instead of wanting to be told the truth at all times, patients may 
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implicitly form social contracts with caregivers, such that caregivers will act in their best 
interests.86 In this instance, reliability relates to how patients are able to trust their caregivers, 
which does not solely rely on truth-telling. I am not arguing that reliability is alone the morally 
relevant feature for deception, but rather that truth-telling and reliability are both morally 
relevant factors to be considered. In some cases, one may have more significance than the 
other – I will discuss this further in Chapter Four.  
Trust is especially important for cases where patients lack mental capacity. When a 
patient lacks mental capacity, she often feels powerless and is extremely vulnerable. 87 
Although this population may be able to hold true or false beliefs, their ability to discern 
between truth and falsity on their own can often be greatly impaired. They rely on caregivers to 
assist with determining what is true and what is not; hence, if this trusting relationship is 
damaged, then this patient population would be even more powerless and vulnerable. 
Immediately, one can recognize the enormous amount of power the caregiver has over a 
patient. Additionally, once this relationship is damaged, it is extremely difficult to rebuild trust, 
especially with a population who finds it difficult to understand and appreciate reasons for 
one’s actions.  
The caregiver is in a position where she can do much good for the patient, especially in 
light of the patient’s unique values and wishes (such as living a fulfilling life by being able to 
exercise her autonomy and live her values if mental capacity is restored). Nonetheless, if the 
caregiver uses deception and the patient is distressed once she is aware of this, trust can be 
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greatly impeded, if not completely lost. In other cases, using deception may increase trust 
through reliability where a patient regains mental capacity, knowing that the caregiver has 
fulfilled her duty to take the necessary means to restore the patient’s mental capacity. Hence, it 
is difficult to determine whether using deception is morally defensible or morally indefensible 
in these cases regarding trust and its various forms without further specifications.  
Reliability as a form of trust need not be at odds with beneficence; in fact, acting 
reliably is often in accordance with beneficence – a consistent set of agreed upon values for 
patient well-being. Hence, although truth-telling can directly conflict with beneficence, it may 
not weigh as heavily as being a reliable caregiver (in some cases restoring autonomy), and trust 
(as reliability) and beneficence may ultimately support using deception in the kinds of cases I 
explore. 
To summarize, one way in which deception has been considered in bioethics is as a 
conflict between acting in the patient’s best interests and encouraging trust in the caregiving 
relationship. I argued that this dichotomy is much more complex, as one ought to take into 
consideration not only truth-telling, but also the reliability of the caregiver to act on the 
patients’ wishes and to perform one’s expected duties as a caregiver; the concept of reliability 
also has many different forms, each of which are extremely important for caregiving.  
The two traditional ways of exploring the conflict of deception in caregiving, the 
Autonomy Account and the Trust Account, do not adequately capture the complexity of 
deception in caregiving. They focus narrowly on one morally relevant feature of the conflict 
and present a simplified perspective of where the conflict occurs, and which value or principle 
takes precedence over others. Where does the conflict actually arise; what is the conflict?  
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What is the Conflict? 
In my view, deception in caregiving is a very complex and multi-dimensional issue; there are 
not two conflicting duties, principles or values, but rather there exists a plurality of values and 
duties that can conflict. All of these values and duties ought to be taken into consideration as 
morally relevant when determining and reflecting upon what one ought to do. In this section, I 
will discuss some of these considerations, primarily focusing on the traditional bioethics 
principles. In Chapter Three, I will consider further factors that can help determine the 
defensibility of deception in caregiving.  
As argued above, respect for autonomy is a primary consideration – determining the 
specific values of each individual patient and what she would want in the current situation. 
Beneficence, or acting in the patient’s good from a generally shared standpoint, is also a 
necessary consideration when the patient’s wishes are unknown; it is also important to consider 
this list of values when obtaining informed consent. I additionally argued above that trust is 
important, but in both its forms – truth-telling and reliability. In addition to respect for 
autonomy, beneficence and trust, there are other morally significant considerations, including 
non-maleficence and justice. For the remainder of this chapter I will focus on the other two 
standard bioethics principles and how they apply to deception in caregiving. Chapter Three 
will expand beyond traditional bioethics factors to include other morally relevant features, and 
in Chapter Four I will present an original framework for assessing and bringing all of the 
morally relevant features together in decision-making. 
Non-maleficence is typically defined as only allowing harms if the benefits are 
proportionate.88 In its most basic form, it is known as the principle of do no harm. The opposite 
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would be providing a treatment where the burdens (or harms) outweigh the benefits – hence, 
acting in malice. Beauchamp and Childress define harms: “thwarting, defeating or setting back 
some party’s interests.”89 The concept of harm defined by interests is subjective based on the 
particular party. Harm is also not defined as merely a physical injury, but rather it encompasses 
the prevention of someone from achieving her interests; the concept of interests can include 
one’s goals, emotions, psychological well-being and so forth. Non-maleficence is hence 
partially dependent on the autonomy of the patient. Gillon remarks: 
People's perception of harm, like their perception of benefit, is idiosyncratic, an 
integral part of the way they see themselves and of their life plan. One aspect of 
people's life plans is what the American lawyer Charles Fried calls their “risk 
budget”, whereby people decide (however inchoately) the sorts of ends they 
wish to achieve and the sorts of risks – including risks of death – which they are 
prepared to take in pursuit of those ends.90 
Non-maleficence asserts that some harm is justified, when the benefits (in relation to the 
patient’s interests) are proportionate to the harm. 
The caregiver must take into consideration the risk of harm that the patient would be 
willing to take given the patient’s values and wishes; what are the patient’s interests and would 
deception cause unnecessary harm to the patient? This becomes difficult especially considering 
a healthcare organization’s responsibility for patient safety. Consider, for example, a patient 
suffering from advanced Alzheimer’s disease who lack capacity to make complex decisions 
and lives in a nursing home; she tends to wander if not supervised. Although the patient 
authentically values her independence and her ability to take walks off the unit when she 
pleases, the organization also has a duty to keep her safe. The organization ought to look at 
ways of allowing the patient more freedom, while balancing the danger that may come from 
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her leaving the unit on her own. Hence, this is a case where respect for autonomy and not 
harming the patient’s interest of independence, ought to be balanced in light of the caregivers’ 
duty to protect the patient. One might also argue that the patient has competing interests that 
come into conflict, such as the interest to be independent, but also the interest to have a safe 
place to live. If the patient wanders, these interests come into conflict. Hence, non-maleficence 
is also a morally relevant feature when considering whether deception is morally defensible in 
these kinds of cases and there are many different factors, as this case demonstrates that ought 
to be considered within the concept of harm.  
The duty to prevent unjustified harms is complex, since there are often different harms 
involved in each case. Consider a patient who lacks mental capacity due to chronic 
schizophrenia, and refuses to take her medication. On the one hand, the harm associated with 
not taking the medication includes a continuing decline in mental capacity, leading to poor 
choices or actions which may ultimately cause significant harm to the patient; for example, 
consider someone living in the community who lacks mental capacity and becomes addicted to 
street or hard drugs; as her mental capacity continues to decline, she may be involved in selling 
sexual favours for money to buy drugs, in the process being physically and sexually abused.  
On the other hand, taking the medication may produce unwanted side-effects, including 
those described earlier such as muscle spasms, excessive drowsiness and weight-gain. 
Additionally, if the patient discovers that she has been deceived, she may be reluctant to return 
to healthcare organizations for future care or treatment, which can cause significant harm, 
especially if she suffers from preventable or curable illnesses. There are harms that can occur 
in either situation, but one must consider and balance (along with the other values) which 
decision will ultimately be best for the patient, and whether deception in either case would lead 
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to an overall benefit, given the associated harms for each choice, for the patient. Hence, non-
maleficence is an important consideration in the decision procedure.  
Issues of justice also play an important role when determining the morally correct 
course of action regarding deception. Justice in bioethics is often discussed in terms of 
allocation of scarce resources (including access to care), not only within a hospital, but also at 
the provincial, national and global levels; for example, how do we fairly distribute resources?91 
Other kinds of issues relating to justice include questions relating to disability – e.g. the right to 
terminate a pregnancy for a disabled foetus and the right to end one’s life early given a 
disability that makes doing so oneself, impossible. I will discuss that deception in caregiving 
impacts resource allocation. I will also argue that one ought to consider carefully notions of 
vulnerability and disability as morally relevant factors for these kinds of cases. 
For the case of deception, resources play a role in non-compliance. The medications 
that patients ought to take are discarded if they are not consumed, when often medications are 
considered a scarce resource.92 Nonetheless, Canadian courts have argued that despite these 
being very real issues that we ought to consider, what really matters when making treatment 
choices is the patient’s wishes and values and the expertise of the healthcare team regarding 
what they can and cannot do for the patient. Numerous court cases have stated that although 
health care resource allocation is a valid concern, it is not to be a reason for providing 
inadequate care. In one particular case (Law Estate v. Simcoe, 1994) physicians argued in court 
that they did not order a CT scan due to financial constraints; the patient died from a ruptured 
aneurism. The judge for the case, Justice Spencer, remarks: “those [budgetary] constraints 
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worked against the patient's interest. That is to be deplored.”93 The patient’s interests come 
above all financial considerations, according to Canadian courts.94 Handelman, for example, 
argues that resource allocation questions should be determined at the legislative level, and not 
in the courts for individual cases regarding withdrawing life-sustaining treatment.95 
If we are not to take into consideration allocation of resources when deciding whether 
to use deception on a case-by-case level, how ought justice be an important moral factor? 
Justice also serves to protect those vulnerable populations who are at a disadvantage due to 
various factors. Beauchamp and Childress remark: “Properties distributed by the lotteries of 
social and biological life do not provide grounds for morally acceptable discrimination 
between persons in social allocations if people do not have a fair chance to acquire or 
overcome these properties.”96 Consider those patients who are unable to make decisions for 
themselves, those who lack mental capacity. This patient population is in a very vulnerable 
position, since their decision-making abilities (regarding treatment) are limited. If there is a 
way to allow this population (this would not be the case for Alzheimer’s patients if 
autonomous abilities cannot be restored) to regain their ability to make decisions for 
themselves it would be just to provide them with a fair opportunity to live the kind of life they 
would likely value and desire. 
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Norman Daniels argues that healthcare is a very special kind of need. It is not simply a 
desire or preference to have access to healthcare, but having adequate (or at least some 
minimal) healthcare is essential for general human functioning.97 Daniels argues in favour of 
having minimal healthcare such that we can have the basic opportunities to fulfill the kinds of 
needs we have as human beings, such as attaining food, shelter, companionship and other 
relationships.98 Without proper healthcare, our minds and bodies can be affected in such a way 
that we cannot attain other basic goods; this is why Daniels argues that healthcare is a unique 
kind of good, upon which so many other goods are contingent.99 
Being left in a desolate condition such that one is unable to achieve or at least attempt 
to attain these goods is unjust since one is not given the opportunity to attain them, according 
to Daniels.100 Daniels further remarks: “Impairments of normal species functioning reduce the 
range of opportunity we have within which to construct life-plans and conceptions of the good 
we have a reasonable expectation of finding satisfying or happiness-producing.”101 Those who 
are in a vulnerable position, such as those who lack mental capacity, especially when 
autonomous abilities can be restored, are in such a position that they can have the opportunity 
to make and fulfill basic needs, if they receive treatment (in some cases, by means of 
deception).  
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Justice ought to be a factor when deciding whether deception is morally defensible, 
since justice requires that vulnerable populations have the opportunity, where possible, to 
achieve the basic needs described above. Does this mean that we ought to use any means to 
allow patients to have these opportunities? Most would argue that the ends do not always 
justify the means – this is where balancing and weighing is important. In what circumstances, 
and in light of the patient’s autonomy, the importance of trust, non-maleficence and other 
values and principles, ought we use deception such that a patient can attain these 
opportunities? Does the patient even value these kinds of opportunities seen as having basic 
value in general society? In my view, deception may be one method to achieve this opportunity 
for functioning, but may not always be the best course of action. Hence, one ought to weigh 
and balance the other morally relevant features of the specific case to determine what one 
ought to do – I will return to this discussion in Chapter Four. 
A similar way to look at opportunities is through creating capabilities. How can we 
support others to be capable of pursing the types of goals that they desire? Fadden and Powers 
are well known for their theory on capabilities and the kinds of good that we ought to allow 
others to pursue. These include: health, personal security, reasoning, respect, attachment and 
self-determination.102 Other authors most noted in this discussion include Nussbaum and Sen. 
Although Sen is vague in defining specific capabilities, Nussbaum lists the following central 
human capabilities: “life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination and thought; 
emotions; practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; and control over one's 
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environment.”103 Nussbaum’s list extends further from Fadden and Powers, yet I believe they 
cover the same general themes of fairly consistent values. These values are also important and 
operative when we consider the concept of beneficence and best interests of patients when 
specific, individualized values and wishes are not known. Hence, these are the kinds of 
capabilities and opportunities that caregivers can consider and in some cases aim towards, 
when possible. 
Another aspect of justice arises from the concept of vulnerability and vulnerable 
populations. Vulnerability is often discussed in bioethics in the context of research; for 
example, how do we ensure that vulnerable populations are not being exploited in research?104 
Beauchamp and Childress remark: “In biomedical ethics, the notion of vulnerability often 
focuses on a person’s susceptibility, whether as a result of internal or external factors, to 
inducement or coercion, on the one hand, or to harm, loss or indignity, on the other.”105 For 
cases of deceiving those who are mentally incapable, this patient population is extremely 
susceptible to inducement or coercion, making them a highly vulnerable population. 
Vulnerable patient populations have also been described as groups that are relatively unable to 
protect their own interests, often from lacking mental capacity.106 
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Being highly vulnerable, this population may be more susceptible to harm, loss or 
indignity if mistreated by their caregivers. For example, on the one hand, if deception is used 
to give a patient medication that makes her less agitated, but nonetheless reduces her ability to 
be as alert and active (what she would prefer given her values) without the medication, one 
might argue that this is harming the patient, and at the very least an indignity to the patient. In 
Chapter Three, I will provide more detail regarding the importance of dignity and its 
consideration when deciding the moral defensibility of deception in caregiving. On the other 
hand, if the benefits of the use of deception seemingly outweigh the harms, then the patient 
may also experience harm or indignity by not being given medication surreptitiously or not 
being told a lie. Hence, there is no easy solution to deception in caregiving and each case will 
have a variety of morally relevant features, some weighing more than others, dependent on the 
specific case. 
There have also been discussions around the need to fix or cure those who are different 
from societal norms, which has also been the focus of recent literature.107 On the opposite end 
of that spectrum is the view that we should be more accepting and welcoming of different 
levels of needs and capabilities and not actively be pursuing cures and changes. Authors such 
as Shakespeare, argue that we need to be careful thinking about groups with disabilities as 
needing to be integrated into society as other would expect.108  
I completely agree that we cannot label everyone who is different from our perceived 
societal norms as needing to integrate into society. I’ve argued above that everyone has unique 
wants, desires and needs and that they are extremely important. I focus specifically on cases of 
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patients who lack capacity to make specific decisions for themselves, which could include 
deception as a method of engagement and/or treatment. In light of some of Shakespeare’s 
work, disability can have some extremely positive implications. For example, there are 
historical examples of those who have had mental illness who have made significant 
contributions, such as Winston Churchill and Vincent Van Gough. Shakespeare’s work is a 
positive reminder that we need to be cautious when wanting to make people’s lives better and 
imposing our own views of good on others. A patient-centered or individualized approach is 
much more inclusive and sensitive to individual needs, recognizing the pros and cons of having 
different abilities and capabilities.  
Conclusions 
Let me return to the chapter title: what is the conflict? For cases of deception, I have argued 
that the conflict is multifaceted. The principles of respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-
maleficence and justice, as well as trust can come into conflict; not necessarily just conflict 
between one another, but conflict can also occur within the concepts themselves. For example, 
conflict may occur between various notions of trust. One may wish to encourage truth-telling, 
but also be pulled toward the duty to be a reliable caregiver by treating one’s patient. 
Caregivers can have many competing desires and duties when contemplating the use of 
deception, and caregivers ought not be considered irrational for holding them.109 Nonetheless, 
they need to make a decision regarding what is morally defensible, and doing so often means 
subverting one duty (or several) for another (or others). 
                                                
109. Patricia Marino, “On Essentially Conflicting Desires,” The Philosophical Quarterly 59, no. 235 
(April 2009): 274–291. 
  63 
The conflict that occurs with deception in caregiving will not be the same for each case, 
but rather unique factors involved in each case will change what the conflict actually is. For 
example, the autonomous wishes of the patient may align with beneficence (doing good for the 
patient) and these two principles or duties will not conflict. In this particular case, let us 
consider that the patient suffers from advanced Alzheimer’s disease, the conflict might be 
between the duty to tell the truth to patients, and the patient’s wish to not be told her partner 
passed away as it causes her too much distress.  
For a different case, the autonomous wishes of the patient (for example she expressed 
that she wanted to be told the truth about her partner’s passing away) may directly conflict with 
doing good and doing no harm for the patient. The patient might be in severe agony when told 
each day that her loved one passed away and be unable to meaningfully participate in other 
activities that she values. In this case the conflict may be directly between patient autonomy 
and beneficence. Hence, the conflict will be different, depending on the specific case.  
These two examples of cases are also extremely simplified, whereas many different 
aspects of the biomedical ethics principles actually come into conflict, as opposed to just one 
conflicting with another. They may all be part of the dilemma, or there may be a conflict 
between just two principles and duties or even a conflict within just one of the duties itself. 
Hence, the response to what is the conflict is extremely complex, and Chapter Three will 
discuss further reasons we have against or in favour of using deception, which add to the 
complexity of the dilemma caregivers face when deciding whether it is morally defensible to 
use deception. Chapter Four will discuss a framework for how we can think through these 
complex dilemmas. 
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Chapter 2  
Alternatives to Deception 
Some argue that the conflict between values, as described in the previous chapter, may simply 
be resolved if caregivers use other alternatives to deception. In Chapter One I argued that for 
cases of deception in caregiving, there is indeed a conflict between various bioethics values; 
this results in a complex and multifaceted dilemma for caregivers. In Chapter Two, I will argue 
that there are several ways to respond to this conflict – I will call these the alternatives. I will 
present each alternative along with its associated concerns. I will then proceed to argue that 
there may be cases where deception is a more morally justifiable option to these alternatives. 
The alternatives that I explore in this chapter include physical restraints, advance care 
planning and absolute truth-telling. I will discuss each alternative in light of the various 
biomedical ethics values and principles discussed in the first chapter and compare the moral 
defensibility with the use of deception. However, in order to fully determine which is the most 
morally defensible alternative one should utilize the organisational and clinical decision-
making frameworks that I provide in Chapter Four. For this current chapter, I will consider 
alternatives for both patients who lack mental capacity with the ability to restore substantial 
autonomy, as well as patients whose autonomy cannot be restored; there will be some overlap 
between these discussions, yet some important differences.  
Patients who lack mental capacity and have the ability to restore substantial autonomy 
generally require some form of treatment, most often in the form of medication. For example, 
consider a patient who experiences psychosis; by taking her anti-psychotic medication, she can 
regain autonomous abilities. The SDM consents to the medication, acting in the patient’s best 
interests. Deception in this case might involve hiding the patient’s medication in her food. 
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Consider another example where a patient is thought to be a strong candidate for 
Electroconvulsive Therapy (ECT). The patient lacks mental capacity and refuses to have an IV 
inserted (a necessary step for the procedure) because she believes, as a result of her paranoia, 
that the ECT allows aliens to access her thoughts. Deception in this case may involve telling 
the patient that the IV is for a simple scan that cannot be done while she is alert.  
Deception for cases where patient autonomy cannot be restored includes those cases, 
for example, where a patient suffers from advanced Alzheimer’s disease and wishes to drive 
her car even though her license has been revoked due to her failing vision. She becomes 
distraught upon learning that she is losing her vision each time she forgets she cannot drive, 
and her caregivers consider hiding the keys or informing the patient that the car needs repair. 
I will ultimately argue that although the three alternatives may be more morally 
justifiable in some cases, deception can be the morally appropriate and defensible course of 
action under certain circumstances. I discuss general scenarios in this chapter from which we 
can compare various alternatives. In Chapter Four I will provide the framework from which 
one can actually determine which alternative to choose in light of a specific case.  
Physical Restraints 
One alternative to deception is physically restraining a patient to administer medication and/or 
treatment. This process requires staff to physically secure a patient, often by holding the patient 
down or by the use of straps applied to the wrists and/or ankles. Feng et al. define physical 
restraints as the following: “Physical restraints are mechanical devices, materials, or 
equipments which restrict freedom of movement or normal access to one's body.”1 Other forms 
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of physical restraints may include being a patient on a locked unit, and/or having a gate-device 
across a patient’s door to his or her room to avoid the patient from leaving (this is common for 
patients with advanced Alzheimer’s disease). Additionally, physical restraints have been used 
to secure patients who tend to have falls – although there are other methods that are now 
frequently used, such as mats placed at the bedside and arm bands/alarms to signal whether a 
patient is moving excessively, or a combination of these. Other forms of restraints include 
chemical restraints (for example, sedating an aggressive patient with medication) and 
environmental restraints (for example, having a locked unit such that patients who tend to 
wander cannot leave without supervision).  
Physical restraints are common practice in healthcare (especially mental health), and 
much of the literature surrounding physical restraints involves patients who are aggressive and 
escalating.2 In one study, the average use of physical restraints among residents in Canadian 
long-term care facilities was 31%.3 In some cases, deception may not be an option, as time 
constraints and the situation itself may not permit staff to offer a patient a drink or food with 
covert medication. There may be ways to deescalate a situation ahead of time to do this. In fact 
there are many different behavioural interventions that have been researched to show the 
effectiveness of non-restraint interventions.4 Thus, to avoid great immediate harms, physical 
and other forms of restraints may be necessary.  
                                                
2. Manuela Jarrett, Len Bowers, and Alan Simpson, “Coerced Medication in Psychiatric Inpatient Care: 
Literature Review,” Journal of Advanced Nursing 64, no. 6 (December 2008): 538–548; Feng et al., “Use of 
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and Research 31, no. 2 (April 1, 2004): 217–224. 
3. Feng et al., “Use of Physical Restraints and Antipsychotic Medications in Nursing Homes,” 13. 
4. McCue et al., “Reducing Restraint Use in a Public Psychiatric Inpatient Service,” 217–224. 
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In 2001 the Patient Restraints Minimization Act was passed in Ontario to ensure that 
the least restrictive method possible was used for patients, to minimize the harms associated 
with restraints.5 It explicitly states the necessity of having a patient’s consent (or SDM’s 
consent when a patient lacks mental capacity); the Act also requires that every institution have 
a policy to implement the least restrictive alternative when possible. The Act additionally 
mandates that staff have adequate training and that patients are monitored carefully with 
respect to quality and safety, among other requirements.6 Nonetheless, physical restraints are 
still used in healthcare.  
O’Brien and Golding argue that both physical restraints and deception are methods of 
coercion in mental health.7 They argue that just because a patient lacks mental capacity does 
not mean that one ought to assume any beneficent act is morally permissible. Rather, one ought 
to strive for the least coercive treatment possible. Their conclusion aims at reducing the 
concerns associated with loss of trust and therapeutic alliance when using coercive methods. 
They remark:  
If on the other hand we apply the principle of least coercive care, we will avoid 
cases of unjustified coercion and always be looking at how to avoid or minimize 
coercion by focusing on how non-coercive interventions can be more beneficial. 
So, coercion is only justified if the client is incompetent in that situation and the 
harm caused by coercion is much less than the harm caused by the action they 
would have chosen if left uncoerced.8 
O’Brien and Golding’s major concern is that coercion is misused for patients who ought not be 
coerced. They argue that the stigma associated with mental illness and patients lacking 
                                                
5. Patient Restraints Minimization Act, SO 2001, C. 16, 2001. 
6. Ibid. 
7. Anthony O’Brien and Clinton G. Golding, “Coercion in Mental Healthcare: The Principle of Least 
Coercive Care,” Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing 10, no. 2 (April 2003): 167–173. 
8. Ibid., 172. 
  68 
substantial autonomy can cause coercion to be used for any situation, regardless of whether 
deception can be morally justified. Hence, they advocate a harm-reduction model, that 
coercion more broadly is only justified when the harm associated with not using coercion is 
greater than if it were used.  
In contrast, my argument rests not only on weighing and balancing harm between either 
using or not using coercion, but rather on a multitude of morally relevant factors. Additional 
factors include the autonomous wishes of the patient, the implications of trust, the patient’s 
best interests and so forth. Some may argue that all other morally relevant factors can be 
reduced to some form of harm.9 For example, a particular decision can harm autonomy and/or 
trust. However, I will assume that a narrow definition of harm will allow these other values to 
be considered as distinct; in any case, one must discuss each value separately and how it can be 
harmed. In addition, on the flipside of harm, one ought to also consider the benefits of a 
particular option and weigh and balance all of these considerations. I agree with their analysis 
that deception (and coercion) ought to be used sparingly and only in cases where the benefits 
outweigh the harms. However, I object to their view that harm is the only consideration. As 
described above, I believe there are other important factors, including important caregiver-
patient relationships and factors such as trust and therapeutic alliance.  
Authors Jarrett, Bowers and Simpson performed a literature review on coercion and 
medication as part of treatment. Forced treatment is typically referred to as physically 
restraining the patient to administer medication, although some studies involved in the 
literature review included verbal persuasion, including threats to take away certain benefits, as 
well as deception. The authors provide three reasons for using coercive (or forced) medication: 
                                                
9. Bernard Gert, Charles M. Culver, and K. Danner Clouser, Bioethics: A Systematic Approach (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006). 
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(i) the patient was manually restrained and given medication in a psychiatric 
emergency (i.e. in a situation during which the patient was deemed at risk to 
themselves and/or others at that moment in time); (ii) the patient was manually 
restrained and given medication as part of their treatment (e.g. the patient had 
refused their monthly injection and this was administered under manual 
restraint); (iii) the patient was coerced into taking medication.10 
The first reason applies to emergency situations, where it is unlikely (though not impossible) 
that caregivers may use deception – the lack of time and potential harm resulting from the 
attempt would not likely justify its use. The second and third reasons for coercive medication 
involve a regular treatment plan to which an advance directive or a SDM provides consent, 
which the incapable patient is refusing. The second reason involves physical restraints, and the 
third involves another form of coercion, which is not clearly defined – I imagine it would 
include deception and offers of rewards/punishment. In their literature review, the authors 
discovered that although an incident (e.g. physical aggression) was often the cause of forced 
medication, there were other situations where medication was given through coerced 
medication as part of regular treatment.  
Greenberg and colleagues note that 43% of the patients they interviewed received 
forced medication as part of their regular treatment plan, as opposed to being from a unique 
incident.11 In a survey conducted by Raboch and colleagues across ten European countries 
regarding the use of coercive measures for inpatient psychiatric units, they discovered that 
some form of physical coercion was used among 21% to 59% of patients, although they do not 
clarify whether it was used for an incident or as part of regular treatment.12 Hence, forced 
                                                
10. Jarrett, Bowers, and Simpson, “Coerced Medication in Psychiatric Inpatient Care,” 540. 
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treatment is common for both incident-related events as well as for regular treatment of this 
patient population. 
In Chapter One, I discussed some of the major concerns and benefits associated with 
the use of deception in relation to the biomedical ethics principles advocated by Beauchamp 
and Childress. I additionally considered the various factors relevant to each principle and the 
importance of trust. I argued in Chapter One that there exists a moral conflict between different 
values for these kinds of cases. I will now discuss whether we can morally justify the use of 
physical restraints in relation to the biomedical ethics principles as an alternative to deception 
in the kinds of cases that I’ve described as a potential resolution for this dilemma. I will 
ultimately argue that deception can be a morally preferable alternative in certain cases. 
First, let us consider respect for autonomy and physical restraints. Many (if not most) 
patients who are physically restrained lack substantial autonomy; they are unable to understand 
and/or appreciate the proposed treatment. Whether physically restrained or deceived (e.g. 
through covert medication or lying), the aim is that this patient population could regain 
substantial autonomy, for those who require medication/treatment to do so, or be sustained and 
maintained at a good level. The method could vary to attain the objective, but the goal would 
be the same. Hence, this patient population would have the same ultimate aim regarding 
respect for autonomy and beneficence whether using physical restraints or deception.  
Nonetheless, there is an important difference between using physical restraints and 
using deception and this lies in the means for attaining the same goal or end. Using physical 
restraints takes away almost all autonomy. The patient is rendered completely powerless and 
unable to exercise most forms of autonomy (not only to make a decision around medication, 
but also to move and make other decisions) in this position, at least temporarily. As mentioned 
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above, there may be circumstances when an incident is occurring (such as the patient is violent 
and other methods to de-escalate have been unsuccessful) and it may be necessary as a last 
resort to use physical restraints. However, consider a non-aggressive patient who refuses 
medication and is physically restrained to have medication administered. There is often time to 
consider other methods to ensure that the patient takes her medication. When using covert 
medication, the patient retains much of her non-substantial autonomy, still being able to have 
the freedom to move around and complete other tasks.  
How does retaining non-substantial autonomy impact the patient? Having some 
autonomy gives the patient some power and a feeling of having some control over one’s self. 
At a time when patients are extremely vulnerable suffering from psychosis, retaining some 
autonomy empowers patients, if even to a small degree. Closely related to respecting autonomy 
is having dignity. Allowing patients the seeming small freedom to feed themselves and having 
the freedom to walk on the unit unhindered, treats patients in a dignified manner. Being 
physically strapped down and unable to fulfill basic needs oneself, arguably makes patients 
feel undignified.13 I will discuss this further when exploring non-maleficence.  
Regarding beneficence, using physical restraints has the ultimate goal of doing good for 
the patient – ensuring the patient takes medication that will allow the patient to regain 
substantial autonomy and no longer be in a psychotic state; when substantial autonomy is 
regained, the patient can once again meaningfully pursue her goals. Hence, one could argue 
that using physical restraints (if looking solely at the result of the patient receiving medication) 
is acting beneficently.  
                                                
13. Gwen Bonner et al., “Trauma for All: A Pilot Study of the Subjective Experience of Physical 
Restraint for Mental Health Inpatients and Staff in the UK,” Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing 9, 
no. 4 (August 2002): 465–473. 
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A study exploring views of nurses working on secure psychiatric units in England and 
Wales, reported that: “Whilst most nurses (n = 259, 96.3%) reported positive outcomes in so 
far that the incident was brought under control, the views of the aftereffects of the procedure 
were of concern and ambivalence.”14 What other effects of using the process of physical 
restraints cause concern? Does using restraints violate or accord with that of the biomedical 
ethics principle of non-maleficence (do no harm)?  
Let us consider the harms associated with physical restraints and whether they violate 
the principle of non-maleficence. The National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) produced a 
report in 1998 indicating the number and nature of events on recent and past abuses related to 
restraints and seclusion, including deaths, in the District of Columbia over the past five years.15 
Taxis remarks: 
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1992) estimates that at 
least 100 patients die each year in association with the use of restraints. In 1999 
the Hartford Courant, a newspaper in Hartford, Connecticut, printed a series of 
articles regarding the maltreatment and deaths resultant from patient restraint 
and seclusion.16 
This series of articles resulted in the NAMI report. The report includes incidents such as 
patients being left for hours, often urinating on and defecating themselves and receiving 
injuries through being unattended.17 These concerns may not be representative of the idea of 
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using restraints – for example, one might argue that if physical restraints are managed better, 
they might be more effective than other methods; these are perhaps isolated incidents that do 
not reflect the benefits of using restraints. Granted that these are possible outliers of physical 
restraints, let us explore general implications for using restraints. First, there are several 
guidelines from the Registered Nurses Association of Ontario in a comprehensive document to 
help guide nurses through considering the use of restraints and/ or seclusion.18 These kinds of 
standards are in place to reduce the risk of neglect, harm and even death associated with 
physical restraints; whether they can reasonably be managed due to limited healthcare 
resources is a challenge many organizations face.  
Let us further explore some general harms of using physical restraints. One 
consequence of using physical restraints is potential injury to either or both the patient and 
staff. 269 nurses in England and Wales completed a survey working on 63 randomly selected 
regular secure wards or psychiatric intensive care units on their perceptions of the use of 
physical restraints.19 13% of patients had sustained physical injuries, and 21.6% of staff had 
been hurt. Injuries included: “‘a black eye’, ‘injured back’, ‘bruised ribs’, ‘broken nose’ and 
‘dislocated arm’. Minor injuries included ‘mainly scratches’, ‘grazed skin’ and ‘bruises’.”20 
One might consider that these injuries and harms are proportionate in certain cases; consider 
for example the patient who is aggressive and no other measures will reasonably protect the 
patient and staff from harm in an immediate incident. 
                                                
18. Laura M. Wagner and Athina Perivolaris, “Promoting Safety: Alternative Approaches to the Use of 
Restraints” (Registered Nurses’ Association of Ontario, February 2012), 
http://www.abinetwork.ca/uploads/Image/8324_Promoting_Safety_-
_Alternative_Approaches_to_the_Use_of_Restraints.pdf. 
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20. Ibid., 426–427. 
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In another study by Bonner and colleagues, they examined six incidents that occurred 
on various psychiatric inpatient units in the UK.21 The researchers interviewed both patients 
and caregivers soon after the incident regarding their experiences before, during and after the 
incident. Patients are often extremely fearful and embarrassed after having been restrained.22 
Nurses expressed how physically restraining patients make them feel as if they had failed and 
it is only a last resort. Both patients and staff reported feeling distressed and uncomfortable 
with the incident, mainly from not being able to manage the event prior to it occurring. Both 
groups felt “low” and “degraded.”23 Staff also described this experience as being “unpleasant” 
and “undignified.”24 Some further issues included that patients were afraid to seek future 
medical attention after being discharged, in case they would be restrained again.  
Being restrained was also particularly difficult for patients who had experienced trauma 
in the past (in one incident a patient had formerly been raped and, in another, the patient had 
been abused); the harms associated with the use of physical restraints were intensified since 
this experience felt like reliving the past trauma.25 Smith interviewed several patients who had 
been victims of rape, who were placed into physical restraints. She remarks: “Each person in 
the case examples speaks of experiencing a betrayal of trust, as well as a determination to 
never again seek help, preferring to face death rather than the possibility of restraints.”26 These 
negative feelings and interactions inevitably impact the level of trust between the caregivers 
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and patients. Patients are reluctant to seek future treatment due to the fear of being humiliated 
and feeling undignified, as well as the risk of reliving traumatic past experiences.  
Several other patients experienced physical restraints as follows: 
As one 72-year-old man recounted, ‘I felt like I was nobody, that I was dirt. It 
makes me cry to talk about it’. The feeling of belittlement and shame was 
echoed in the account of an 84-year-old woman who said: ‘I was embarrassed, 
like a child placed in a corner for being bad – I haven't forgotten the pain and 
the indignity of being tied [down]’.27  
Hence, there are many physical and psychological harms associated with the use of physical 
restraints, which is why healthcare organizations across Ontario are implementing least 
restraints policies. 
A further consideration when comparing physical restraints is that of justice. Justice, as 
described in Chapter One, concerns providing opportunities to those who are vulnerable. In 
both cases of physical restraints and deception the aim, as mentioned above, is to restore 
substantial autonomy through providing medication and treatment (with the consent given 
from the SDM) or to prevent grave suffering of the patient whose autonomy cannot be 
restored. 
Another way to consider justice in these cases is through proportionality. Does the 
means used to achieve restored autonomy justify the ends? The response to this question will 
depend heavily on the situation; I argued above that in some cases physical restraints is a 
proportionate response to an aggressive patient, after all forms of de-escalation and alternatives 
have been exhausted or if there is simply not enough time to try other methods. In other cases, 
however, the risks associated with deception may be significantly less than the benefits, and 
deception could be a morally justifiable and appropriate response, again, once other 
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alternatives are also explored. It is plausible to consider that there may be situations when 
deception is more morally defensible than physical restraints. The decision frameworks I 
present in Chapter Four will help to determine in each specific case which alternative is most 
morally justified. The populations that I examine are also extremely vulnerable and treating 
these patients with careful consideration and compassion is also important. 
I have argued that substantial autonomy can ultimately be increased for both deception 
and physical restraints, yet deception allows for non-substantial autonomy to be exercised 
during this process, while physical restraints takes away almost all forms of autonomy. I 
further argued that both deception and physical restraints have the same result of acting in the 
patient’s good, to have patients restore substantial autonomy such that they can create and 
hopefully attain meaningful goals.  
Nonetheless, acting in the patient’s good in such a way that reduces the amount of harm 
experienced, obliges us to choose the method that results in the least harm of the patient. For 
example, will using physical restraints or using deception have a significant impact on the 
patient returning for care in future? How does each of the options impact the trust relations 
between the patient and the caregiver? I also argued that the kind of harm (including harm to 
trust) that results from the physical restraints can be disproportionate to the immediate benefits 
of taking medication – this may also be the case with using deception. It is important to explore 
for each case which alternative would likely produce the greatest benefit compared to the 
harms endured.  
One must also consider the long-term impact of using physical restraints versus using 
deception. Would a patient likely be harmed more from the physical administration of 
treatment (losing complete autonomy), or from knowing that she was psychologically deceived 
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into taking the medication (the feeling of being tricked by the caregiver)? There is a strong 
emphasis on the impact of each alternative on each specific patient. There also exists an 
epistemological question of: how do we know how the patient will react to the specific 
method? This may be easily determined given a long-standing relationship with a patient or 
perhaps given clearly written advance care directives. However, in other cases, one might 
argue that the risk would be much higher if the reaction of the patient can be less likely 
estimated. Deception involves estimating risk of future harm to the patient – I will return to 
this concept in Chapter Four, when I discuss how one weighs and balances the morally relevant 
features. 
I advocate for a patient-centered approach; this means that the history and the 
circumstances of the specific patient will influence the degree to which each factor matters 
when balancing and weighing what one ought to do. Lipkin and colleagues were one of the 
first to define patient-centeredness; they describe that a patient-centeredness interview:  
…approaches the patient as a unique human being with his own story to tell, 
promotes trust and confidence, clarifies and characterizes the patient’s 
symptoms and concerns, generates and tests many hypotheses that may include 
biological and psychosocial dimensions of illness, and creates the basis for an 
ongoing relationship.28 
For example, if a patient has formerly been a victim of rape, then caregivers need to be much 
more sensitive when determining whether physical restraints or deception is the best course of 
action – it is also important to note that this information is not always readily available to 
caregivers, as described above, being an epistemological concern.29 McWhinney similarly 
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summarizes the notion of patient-centeredness such that a: “physician tries to enter the 
patient’s world, to see the illness through the patient’s eyes.”30 Much of the concepts of harm, 
values, benefits and so forth ought to be viewed from a particular position – given the context 
from which a patient comes.31 
Physical restraints may also be used for patients whose autonomy will not be restored, 
such as patients who suffer from advanced Alzheimer’s disease. As described earlier in this 
chapter, the use of physical restraints is quite prevalent in nursing homes in Canada. The 
Alzheimer’s patient population often has the following symptoms associated with the disease: 
“muscular weakness; history of falls; visual, gait, and balance deficits; impaired functioning; 
depression; and cognitive impairment.”32  These symptoms increase the risks and harms 
associated with this patient population especially for both falls and wandering; additionally, 
these symptoms also increase the risk of physical harms that can occur from physically 
restraining a patient in this condition. 
In some cases, being on locked units and being environmentally restrained does not 
cause patients distress. However, sometimes this process can be extremely traumatizing to the 
patient, feeling like a prisoner and having less control over one’s autonomy and self. Hamers 
and Huizing conducted a literature review on the prevalence of the use of forms of physical 
restraints for elderly populations and concluded that: “Physical restraints are still highly 
prevalent in health care settings in many countries. Between 1999 and 2004 reported 
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prevalence numbers range from 41–64% in nursing homes and 33–68% in hospitals.”33 The 
main reason for using physical restraints is patient safety – to prevent falls, patients from 
interfering with medical equipment (e.g. if the patient is cognitively impaired) and patients 
from wandering.34 
In some cases, the degree to which the patient suffers from Alzheimer’s disease may be 
so severe that deception is not an option. As described in Chapter One, if a patient is unable to 
hold a true or false belief, then deception does not occur. In these cases, the use of physical 
restraints and its alternatives may be warranted – although there are current developments 
regarding less-restrictive alternatives, such as patch alarms that monitor patient movement and 
the alarm sounds when the patient is likely to harm his/herself, for example with excessive 
movement increasing the likelihood of falls. Often when the alarm sounds, the patient refrains 
from continuing to move. A significant concern, however, to keep in mind is that with limited 
healthcare resources, in healthcare organizations the response time for a room call may 
increase as staffing issues become more prevalent. 
The Registered Nurses Association of Ontario discusses several strategies for nurses, 
which focuses on prevention and alternative approaches, deescalating and crisis management 
to finally considering restraints (and other forms of coercion) as a last resort.35 Several 
examples of alternatives include: explanation and reminders, distraction and diversion, 
                                                
33. Jan Hamers and Anna R. Huizing, “Why Do We Use Physical Restraints in the Elderly?,” Zeitschrift 
Für Gerontologie Und Geriatrie 38, no. 1 (February 2005): 22. 
34. Ibid. 
35. Registered Nurses Association of Ontario, “Promoting Safety: Alternative Approaches to the Use of 
Restraints,” February 2012, 20, http://rnao.ca/sites/rnao-ca/files/Promoting_Safety_-
_Alternative_Approaches_to_the_Use_of_Restraints_0.pdf. 
  80 
camouflage, comfort and positioning, technologic reduction and environment. 36  Other 
alternative methods include encouraging family members or volunteers to spend time with the 
patient during “high risk” times and having large “stop” or “exit” signs at each exit to remind 
patients to not leave, for example.37 
Consider the cases where a patient can hold true and false beliefs. For how long can the 
patient hold these beliefs? If the patient can only hold these beliefs for an hour, then will 
continue to wander or be at risk again for a fall, it may be unreasonable for a caregiver to 
return to the patient every hour and restate the deceptive claim. This is again why I advocate a 
patient-centered approach, being sensitive to each unique patient’s situation, since each patient 
will have different needs based on numerous factors, including the level of his/her cognitive 
impairment, his/her background of trust with healthcare institutions (and perhaps their 
physician) and so forth. Hence, it is not clear that either physical restraints or deception is 
clearly the most morally defensible option, and each case ought to be explored carefully. I will 
further outline these specific factors in Chapter Four. 
For patients who are able to hold true and false beliefs for a reasonable period of time, 
deception could be considered a treatment option. In what cases would deception be morally 
defensible, and the use of physical restraints unwarranted? I have argued above that there are 
significant risks associated with the use of physical restraints that deception does not incur, or 
incurs to a lesser degree than physical restraints. In cases where deception is possible (e.g. 
cognitively and due to available time), it could be considered as an alternative to physical 
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restraints, but should endure the framework I develop in Chapter Four to determine which 
alternative is most morally defensible in this patient-centred model.  
In the cases of patients who suffer from advanced Alzheimer’s disease, substantial 
autonomy will not be restored, contrary to those cases where patients can take medication to do 
so. How might deception be more conducive to respect for autonomy than physical restraints? 
Deception allows patients to still conduct much of their daily activities as usual, for example, 
being able to easily pick up a book or reach for a drink; physical restraints place enormous 
restrictions on most daily activities of this patient population. I do not argue that deception 
ought always be used rather than physical restraints, but deception can be morally defensible 
compared to physical restraints in certain cases.  
The principle of beneficence aims at acting in the patient’s best interests. As argued 
above, both physical restraints and deception have the goal of benefitting the patient and 
enabling the patient to live a fulfilling life. Is one more conducive to acting in the patient’s 
good than the other? If one method can achieve this goal better than the other, of encouraging 
patients who suffer from advanced Alzheimer’s disease to take their medication when they 
refuse to, then this method ought to be used. For example, causing a patient less distress in the 
process is better than increasing potential harm while achieving the desired end. 
I have discussed extensively the harms associated with physical restraints; the harms 
that stem from deception are often considered to be damaged trust. Although there is not too 
much evidence or research on the effects of deception, the study on out-patients in Chennai 
that I presented in Chapter One, reveals that although trust was damaged between caregivers 
and patients, patients continued to take their medication after discovering that deception 
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occurred.38 Deception can impede trust relations if the patient is aware that she has been 
deceived. Once trust is broken, it is difficult to rebuild. The same can be argued for physical 
restraints, except that trust is perhaps more likely to be broken in these cases, since the patient 
is completely aware that she is being restrained, whereas deception is much more subtle and 
disclosure of what happened occurs when the patient is more stable – such as once he or she 
regains mental capacity, for those who can. 
I have discussed the alternative of physical restraints in great detail, and how each of 
the biomedical ethics principles, as well as trust, can be applied when using this method. I 
argued that the use of deception can be a morally preferable method to physical restraints in 
certain cases, when considering non-substantial autonomy enhancement, increased trust, non-
maleficence, beneficence and justice. Each of these factors is an important consideration and I 
do not argue for solely a harm-reduction approach more broadly, but rather build on several 
different factors to enhance autonomy, well-being and the caregiver-patient relationship. The 
circumstances will greatly inform whether the situation requires and provides moral 
justification for either physical restraints or deception and I will return to this notion in Chapter 
Four; however, I have argued that deception may be more morally justifiable compared to the 
alternative of physical restraints on some occasions. 
Advance Care Planning 
Another alternative to deception is participating in advance care planning (ACP) regarding the 
kind of treatment one would want for future medical situations. ACP involves considering 
one’s values, wishes and beliefs in light of medical decisions that may arise in future. ACP can 
                                                
38. Stroup, Swartz, and Appelbaum, “Concealed Medicines for People with Schizophrenia,” 537–542. 
For the original study see Srinivasan and Thara, “At Issue,” 531–535. 
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be as simple as discussing one’s preferences with family members and friends, to creating a 
formal advance care directive. Palliative Care Australia describes ACP as: 
…a process to help people to formulate and communicate their preferences 
regarding care during future incapacity. Advance care planning gives the person 
the opportunity to determine the likely scenarios coming towards the end of 
their lives, including the treatment they receive and the way they would like to 
be cared for.39  
The Canadian Hospice Palliative Care Association created a campaign called “Speak Up” that 
illuminates the process of ACP.40 The kinds of questions present in an ACP can include: “If 
possible, would I prefer to die at home, in a hospice or in the hospital? What might change my 
mind about my choice?” and “Do I have any fears about dying (e.g. I’ll be in pain, I won’t be 
able to breathe)? Is there someone that I can talk to about these fears, such as my doctor?”41 
Ideally, ACP is a way of communicating one’s wishes such that when a person loses mental 
capacity and at the time of difficult situations and decisions, the substitute decision-maker(s) 
has a good idea of what the patient would want. ACP has many different facets, which may 
include discussing one’s values, wishes and personal care choices and choosing a substitute-
decision maker. Choosing a substitute decision-maker in Ontario is completed through a Power 
of Attorney for Personal Care document. However, I will focus on the values, wishes and 
beliefs indicated in an ACP and the various forms that this can take.  
One method of ACP is creating an advance directive (AD), which includes general 
guidelines for a substitute decision-maker to interpret around future decisions when a person is 
no longer capable to make decisions for his/herself. ADs are often vague and brief, and still 
                                                
39. Palliative Care Australia, “Advance Care Planning: Interim Position Statement,” December 2008, 
http://www.palliativecare.org.au/Portals/46/Policy/PCA%20Advance%20Care%20Planning%20Position%20State
ment.pdf. 
40. Canadian Hospice Palliative Care Association, Speak Up, 2015, http://www.advancecareplanning.ca. 
41. Ibid. 
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require input from SDMs. A Ulysses contract, a kind of AD, is based on the ancient Greek 
story of the great warrior and captain Ulysses (or Odysseus). During his journey home from a 
quest, Ulysses and his crew pass through a sea where they encounter beautiful Sirens; these 
mythical creatures have remarkable singing voices that lure sailors such that they no longer 
have any thinking or reasoning abilities. The sailors hence crash their ships on the rocks and 
the Sirens consume their bodies. Ulysses is aware of the influence of the Sirens and he forms a 
contract with his crew. He orders them to place wax in their ears such that they cannot hear the 
Sirens’ songs, and to tie him to the mast. Ulysses anticipates that he will lose his reasoning 
abilities once he hears the Sirens’ song and tells his crew to not untie him during their voyage 
through the sea, despite him pleading and ordering them to do so. Essentially the contract 
represents his wishes when he has a sound mind, in anticipation for when he no longer has 
mental capacity, such that his wishes will continue to be fulfilled. Ulysses’ prediction was 
correct, and the crew did not untie him, saving his life and that of the crew by following his 
previously expressed wishes.42 
In healthcare, some forms of ACP adopt the name Ulysses Contract based on this story. 
Individuals who suffer from persistent or chronic mental illnesses form these kinds of contracts 
in advance, during moments of lucidity, when one has substantial autonomy; Macklin 
describes when a Ulysses contract is appropriate:  
A Ulysses contract is considered appropriate for individuals who suffer from a 
psychotic disorder that is characterized by intervals of “normalcy” alternating 
with bouts of acute psychosis. This pattern would establish the utility of the 
contract and would also ensure periods of lucidity during which a competent 
consent to the contract could be obtained. The disorder must be relatively 
                                                
42. Aaron J. Atsma, “Seirenes,” Theoi Project Company (New Zealand, 2011 2010), 
http://www.theoi.com/Pontios/Seirenes.html. 
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serious (i.e., manic depression, schizophrenia, depression) and must also be 
amenable to treatment.43 
When a person relapses, the Ulysses contract invokes certain guidelines and directions as to 
how to proceed. These contracts could involve discussing whether to allow covert medication 
during times of mental incapacity.44  
Similar to a Ulysses contract is a Community Treatment Order (CTO) which is a legal 
contract under the Ontario Mental Health Act (OMHA); a CTO encourages patients who have 
persistent mental disorders to return to the community, while having a plan in place to ensure 
that they receive the treatment that they need and want when unable to make these decisions.45 
These plans help to reduce acute-care facility admissions, as well as to prevent patients from 
serious relapse. A CTO, like a Ulysses contract, also imposes certain consequences (a CTO is a 
legal contract) for not conforming to the plan, such as re-admittance to a healthcare facility or 
forced medication if not complying to the agreed contract. Often local police services are 
utilized to help enforce these contracts when they are not being followed.  
As an alternative to deception, one might argue that ACP could replace the need to 
consider whether to use deception or other alternatives at the time of a crisis or treatment 
decision. Patients, during moments of lucidity, could plan in advance the kind of treatment 
they would want during moments when they lack mental capacity. These kinds of contracts 
would not require that caregivers decide what is in the best interests of the patient, as the 
autonomous wishes of patients would be known. A common argument that I have heard 
                                                
43. Audrey Macklin, “Bound to Freedom: The Ulysses Contract and the Psychiatric Will,” University of 
Toronto Faculty of Law Review 45, no. 1 (Spring 1987): 39. 
44. K. S. Latha, “The Noncompliant Patient in Psychiatry: The Case For and Against 
Covert/Surreptitious Medication,” Mens Sana Monographs 8, no. 1 (2010): 96–121. 
45. A CTO is also referred to as an Involuntary Outpatient Commitment (OPC), or assisted outpatient 
treatment. 
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through anecdotal evidence is that if the patients’ prior expressed wishes were known, then we 
would know exactly what to do and there would be no conflict. If we know that they want 
medication, we provide it, and so forth. However, I will argue that this does not render the 
dilemma as a non-issue, as ACP may not be a reliable source, can often be very vague and 
must be interpreted by a substitute decision-maker. Additionally, from a practical standpoint, 
ACP is currently not often completed. 
In this section, I will first argue that ACP itself is controversial as a source of decision-
making authority. In addition, if even ACP were to be used to help guide decision-making, one 
ought to still tackle the dilemma of deception, following the same principles and decision-
making procedure as if one were currently deciding to use deception. Hence, I argue that ACP 
can be an alternative to deception, but may often still require that caregivers either consider 
deception as part of future care planning or address questions of deception where ACP is 
simply impracticable or impossible.  
I will now discuss some concerns with ACP. First, ACP is not well known and poorly 
implemented. “Less than 50 percent of the severely or terminally ill patients studied had an 
advance directive in their medical record,” according to Kass-Bartelmes and Hughes.46 Also, 
“Between 65 and 76 percent of physicians whose patients had an advance directive were not 
aware that it existed,” which indicates that even though they may have been completed, they 
are not being implemented appropriately.47 In addition, when creating the ACD, only 12% of 
patients did so in consultation with a physician.48 Without having appropriate consultation with 
                                                
46. Barbara L. Kass-Bartelmes and Ronda Hughes, “Advance Care Planning: Preferences for Care at the 
End of Life,” Research in Action, no. 12 (March 2003): 2. 
47. Ibid. 
48. Ibid., 2. 
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a physician or other relevant specialists, one may not be fully aware of the medical 
implications for refusing or consenting to specific procedures and other available alternatives. 
For example, depending on one’s condition, cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) can result 
in broken ribs and significant organ damage.  
As with the use of physical restraints, one could argue that if ACP were done more 
appropriately and more frequently with each patient, then ACP would be the best option. 
However, ACP is probably a step in the right direction, but there are nevertheless several major 
concerns associated with ACP – not only with completing ACP, but also the feasibility and 
logistics of its implementation. I will discuss concerns related to both arms. The former, I will 
call the inherent problem and the latter, the implementation problem. Regarding the 
implementation problem, I think there are more possibilities for resolving these concerns, 
whereas the inherent problems are less likely to be resolved. In addition, I will note that when 
applicable, ACP cannot be completed without having a discussion about deception and its 
future use as a genuine option for treatment when lacking mental capacity; the use of deception 
is likely a necessary part of the discussion. 
First, let me address the inherent problem. One significant concern with ACP is that it 
does not cover the vast range of situations that arise; even for those situations that do actually 
occur, one can only vaguely anticipate what it is like to actually experience that situation. It is 
extremely difficult to imagine oneself in a position of mental incapacity, and to understand the 
side effects that actually result from taking certain medications (since this is often subjective); 
it is also challenging to imagine whether one would rather take a medication or not experience 
these side effects. One patient population where creating an ACP would be most applicable is 
where they are aware of relapse and how it feels to both be on medication/receiving treatment 
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including experiencing the side-effects, as well as those times when they are not receiving any 
form of treatment.  
The specific condition and the predicted outcomes associated with each treatment 
option are highly dependent on the individual when actually in this situation – not to mention 
co-morbidities and their combined effects on patients. It would be ideal to have these kinds of 
detailed contracts, but in reality they cannot capture the complexity of situations that arise. 
Realistically, anticipating and predicting the full range of situations is impossible – we can 
have a rough sense of a person’s values, but be unable to determine precisely what he/she 
would want in every situation. ACP ought to be interpreted by a SDM as it relates to a current 
medical situation.  
Judith Wahl describes the challenges of ACP in contrast to making decisions about 
likely events occurring. For example, in an acute setting, CPR (cardiopulmonary resuscitation) 
is more likely to be a proposed treatment option with specific consequences and associated 
harms/benefits, whereas, before one becomes ill, CPR is much more vague and does indicate 
what kinds of proposed treatments, benefits and risks would arise under various kinds of 
circumstances. Wahl remarks: “advance care planning is usually much broader in scope and a 
great deal more speculative as the patient is expressing wishes about future care without full 
knowledge of his or her present health condition or full knowledge of his or her possible 
treatment options.”49 I am not arguing the ACP is ineffective or valueless – I believe it has 
significant value for assisting with making decisions for patients who lack mental capacity. 
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http://demo.swpalliativecare.ca/infonetwork_docs/AdvanceCarePlanning_Legal.pdf. 
  89 
However, I think ACP needs to be evaluated with a number of other factors, including changes 
in the patient’s wishes in light of how situations actually unfold.  
A clear analogy of concerns associated with ACP is that of epidural anaesthesia. Often 
pregnant women, who describe their preference to not receive an epidural, actually change 
their minds at the time of giving birth.50 They were previously unable to anticipate the intensity 
of the pain when making this advanced choice. Some might argue that the pain of giving birth 
is not an appropriate time to provide informed consent due to a “change of mind” since the 
pain disables rational decision-making, rendering a woman incapable of making this decision. 
However, even though I do agree that pain can interfere with autonomous decision-making, I 
think at childbirth a woman can still reflect on what she would want given her values and 
current experience – I don’t think childbirth renders a woman significantly incapable of this 
ability.  
Trial periods and taking time to adjust values and goals can be extremely effective in 
helping those who are struggling with significant changes in their lives to consider a different 
way of finding meaning and value– this presents a challenge to ACP, unless ACP continuously 
updated. Furthermore, it highlights that ACP cannot capture the vast array of changes that 
arise. A study was conducted from a rehabilitation unit in northwest England.51 Twelve former 
patients who had suffered from strokes were initially interviewed upon admission, and again 
after twelve months. The researchers aimed to explore whether the rehab goals of recovery 
were appropriate considering the patient’s experience after leaving the healthcare institution. 
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The researchers discovered that rehab goals are extremely fluid and dependent on the patient’s 
specific values and how the patients find meaning throughout his or her changing and lived 
experience. The author writes: “This study suggests that stroke is an intensely personal 
experience, involving the rebuilding and restructuring of an individual's world.”52 Hence, ACP 
ought to be a guideline, but also fluid enough to represent the changes that can occur in 
meaning and value of life over time. For example, other patients may initially indicate that they 
would not want to live in a particular state, whereas upon finding different kinds of meaning 
(when possible) they are able to continue to find a good quality of life in a different way from 
previously anticipated.  
I will now turn to the implementation problem. First, when completing ACP, wishes are 
often quite vague. A concern with ACP is that one might say “I would never want X,” but 
actually unpacking what X means might result in a different wish. For example, it is common 
for patients to say “I would never want to live in long-term care (LTC)” and/or “I just want to 
return home.” If a caregiver, however, was to have a deeper discussion with the patient, such as 
“what does home mean to you?” his/her choice to not go to a LTC might actually change. 
Home might mean a place that has a certain degree of privacy, a sense of community, access to 
one’s religious center and so forth, as opposed to a particular location. Wahl remarks:  
Some lawyers use stock phrases such as “I don’t want extraordinary measures to 
be used on me” in drafting a written advance care plan, but fail to discuss what 
the particular client means by that phrase. They don’t include the interpretation 
of that phrase in the drafted document so the document doesn’t communicate 
what the client wanted, or didn’t want, in a practical way.53 
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When participating in ACP, it is important to capture the patient’s values and wishes at a deep 
level, and to do one’s best to not merely accept superficial or unpacked wishes. ACP can have 
difficulty capturing these kinds of wishes, especially in a check-box form of ACP.  
Wahl also describes the challenges of scientific changes that alter the effects and 
outcomes of certain treatments, perhaps making them acceptable to someone who would have 
previously refused this kind of treatment.54 For example, a treatment that would have formerly 
had much associated pain, may now actually be relatively painless. At the time of participating 
in ACP, the new procedure simply may have not existed. Hence, ACP needs to be updated 
regularly and consistently – whether healthcare providers and physicians can realistically do 
this is a challenging question, as with limited healthcare resources, time and other resources are 
extremely constrained. Additionally, there is much misinformation in the media and through 
other social sources that misconstrue and distort our understanding of technology, procedures, 
practices and also of healthcare more broadly. Consider for example the movie One Flew Over 
the Cuckoo’s Nest (1975);55 this film has negatively influenced the way that many perceive of 
ECT (Electroconvulsive Therapy) and being a mental health patient in an acute or post-acute 
setting. However, ECT has changed significantly over the past three decades, being now 
recognized as an effective form of treatment, with few side effects.56 Another example is Jenny 
McCarthy and her opinion that vaccines cause autism.57 This media sensation has caused much 
misinformation to be spread in various forms. Without having the appropriate people at the 
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table for these conversations, ACP may not actually be completed in an informed manner and 
could lead to unanticipated harms compared to benefits.  
Realistically, another concern with ACP is that caregivers, especially those in a hospital 
setting, often see individuals when they already lack capacity, which is beyond being able to 
have these kinds of discussions. Many medical events occur unexpectedly prior to having an 
in-depth discussion surrounding ACP. Additionally, many Canadians do not have a family 
doctor and do not have access to someone who can provide the time to have the kind of 
detailed and informative discussions needed when making ACPs.58 
I have now discussed several major concerns with ACP and argued that these concerns 
do not make ACP a clear alternative to using deception, as some may argue. Rather, ACP has 
significant issues both relating to the inherent and implementation problems. I think that due to 
the implementation problem, reflection on what one ought to do in these kinds of cases 
requires an in-depth discussion regarding deception. Additionally, ACP has inherent concerns 
with being able to accurately predict complex medical situations and the possibility of adapting 
and changing one’s mind. Hence, ACP is not a clear or morally better alternative to deception. 
Nonetheless, if ACP can be done well, deception ought to be a component of ACP, when 
possible. When ACP has not been completed, which is the majority of cases due to the inability 
of resources to make ACP feasible, deception ought to be considered in light of weighing and 
balancing the bioethics principles, which I will discuss in chapter four. I believe that ACP can 
be useful, but judgment is necessary for the SDM(s) and the caregiver at the time of the 
decision to truly capture what the patient would want. 
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One might argue that in cases of ACP, the dilemma between the various biomedical 
ethics principles is simply dissolved because a person is able to clearly indicate which set of 
principles or principle one would rather choose. However, as I have argued above, ACP does 
not fully capture what a patient would want in not only unanticipated, but also often in 
anticipated, circumstances. 
Let us now explore ACP and the role of deception in ACP through the lens of the 
bioethics principles. First, one might argue that ACP is superior to deception regarding respect 
for autonomy. ACP involves clear discussions with a person in advance to ensure that his or 
her wishes are being respected. However, as described above, respect for autonomy involves 
accurately representing and respecting the wishes of a person. The concerns raised about ACP 
show that respect for autonomy may actually be a false sense of respecting autonomy, since 
ACP often does not adequately capture a person’s values and wishes, as it is unreasonable to 
be able to anticipate what it is actually like to be a patient experiencing a particular situation. 
When considering using deception, one ought to think about what the person would want given 
her previous wishes and values – which can be captured in ACP, but has significant 
limitations. Discussion surrounding deception can involve considering the restoration of 
autonomy, when possible, and respected any previous wishes that a patient may have 
expressed. ACP can certainly be a starting point for discussion, but the specific details of 
potentially using deception and how it would impact autonomy should be considered at the 
time of the decision, when the details of the case are best known; it is at this point when ACP 
could be interpreted and further examined with the assistance of the SDM. Hence, regarding 
autonomy, ACP is not clearly a plausible alternative to the use of deception. These intricate 
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discussions ought to occur when considering what the patient would actually want given the 
circumstances and interpretation of ACP. 
One could argue, contrary to my claim that deception is something that ought to be 
determined at the time of the actual decision, that someone who loses mental capacity would 
be exhibiting false wishes, values and desires at the time the decision needs to be made; 
following these false values and wishes would certainly not be respecting the authentic or 
substantial autonomy of the patient. Rather, ACP would be a much more accurate impression 
of what the patient would actually want during these times. 
In response to this objection, I would argue that ACP is useful as being part of this 
decision to have an indication of what the person would have wanted. Nonetheless, I do 
believe that having a discussion with the SDM(s) and healthcare team in light of the bioethics 
principles and as well as the current circumstances would illuminate what the patient would 
actually want given the new circumstances, as values and wishes may change – incapacity is 
not a good indication of new values and wishes, but relying rigidly on ACP will also fail to 
capture changed wishes over time and in new circumstances. ACP helps to inform whether a 
particular patient might have wanted to use deception for care. Nonetheless, the specifics of 
each case would also inform whether deception is the morally correct course of action, 
especially given that ACP is often incomplete and requires further discussion in order to fully 
capture a patient’s wishes given new circumstances and a better understanding of what it is like 
to be in the current situation. This is not to say that one ought to reject ACP, but rather that it is 
useful as a starting point, and can in some cases actually be an accurate representation of the 
patient’s wishes regarding what one ought to do.  
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The second major bioethics principle is beneficence. Beneficence aims at acting in the 
patient’s clinical best interests to promote flourishing; beneficence aims at encouraging 
increased capabilities based on a general consensus of well-being. ACP focuses heavily on 
patient autonomy, and less so on beneficence in this traditional sense. How does each ACP and 
deception align with beneficence? First, the nature of autonomy is that it might conflict with 
clinical and general shared best interests. Autonomy represents much more nuanced interests, 
values and beliefs based on more specific persons and context, including social, ethnic, cultural 
and religious influences, to name a few, than those more general interests considered in 
beneficent best interests.  
When considering ACP as a source of moral justification or considering deception as a 
treatment option on its own, how is beneficence involved in each alternative? ACP focuses 
primarily on the autonomous wishes of a patient and arguably does not allow for a broad 
discussion of the benefits and harms associated with a particular treatment and its alternatives. 
One would hope that these discussions would occur at the time of ACP with the appropriate 
people involved; however, as described above, given the lack of resources and given certain 
patient populations, it is unlikely that ACP is completed in this manner. The use of deception 
aims not only to satisfy respect for autonomy, but also beneficence and the other bioethics 
principles; each of the bioethics principles are considered and applied to the case – I will 
discuss how one weighs and balances the principles in Chapter Four. Also, I believe that 
beneficence allows for a richer discussion of alternatives and perspectives that the patient may 
actually share, rather than focusing too narrowly on simply what the patient would have 
wanted. Sometimes, introducing ideas of what others might choose, can help to reveal new 
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alternatives and beliefs that may more accurately represent the patient’s wishes, but may have 
just not been verbalized.  
That being said, if ACP could be completed more effectively, for example, if we had 
more healthcare resources to be able to allow patients to make more informed choices 
(although I do believe that being in a particular situation provides the best insight, when 
possible), then clinical best interests would be more useful at the time of participating in ACP; 
this would at least better inform ACP. Nonetheless, I have described above the difficulties 
associated with ACP regarding allowing for a change of mind and the specifics apparent at the 
time of the actual decision whether to treat or not. Hence, the discussion related to the use of 
deception (perhaps informed by ACP) ought to occur more rigorously at the time of the 
decision given the patient’s specific situation.59  
The third major bioethics principle is non-maleficence. I have described above in detail 
many of the concerns associated with ACP, and those associated with deception. When 
considering non-maleficence, one ought to think about the harms associated with each option 
and whether the benefits outweigh those harms. One harm associated with ACP includes 
creating uninformed plans that ultimately do not align with one’s values and wishes when one 
loses mental capacity, while still being relatively binding; this could mean completing ACP 
without being fully aware of various options, and how those options will actually unfold. 
Another harm that could result from ACP is being locked in to particular choices that can 
change; for example, as described above, when one actually experiences certain medical 
procedures or a change in one’s health, one’s perspective can often change as well, causing a 
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genuine adjustment of values, beliefs and oftentimes life goals. ACP can be harmful in each of 
these cases, as one is forced to abide by these wishes, without having the judgment necessary 
to allow for new information to influence a decision or a genuine change of values.  
The use of deception can also have significant harms. I argue that these potential harms 
inform whether or not one ought to proceed with deception in light of balancing and weighing 
them with respect for autonomy, beneficence, justice and trust. The harms one can experience 
with deception are related to, but not exclusive to, trust – deception can damage the important 
fiduciary relationship between a patient and caregiver. This damage can include refusal for the 
patient to return to healthcare organizations in future, and noncompliance with future medical 
treatment.60 In these situations, enormous sources of medical and emotional support are 
destroyed. Other harms that can stem from deception include patients believing (in cases where 
medication/treatment is provided) that they got better on their own and no longer need these 
kinds of healthcare services – this reveals the importance of disclosing that the patient was 
given medication surreptitiously once he or she is in a capable state, when possible. I have 
discussed the negative impact of trust on patient populations when using deception. There can 
be some positive implications for trust when using deception – these include trust as reliability 
and trust as maintaining a therapeutic relationship. Other harms will be discussed further in 
Chapter Three. 
At face value, deception appears to have many harms associated with its use, but it is 
important to keep in mind that these harms are contingent on the particular patient and that 
patient’s experience – hence, supporting my patient-centered position on the use of deception. 
Choosing to use deception may be morally indefensible for certain patients, but extremely 
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beneficial and useful for others, again, dependent on the specific patient and his/her situation 
(not exclusive to autonomy).  
Justice is also a key factor when comparing both ACP and deception. As described in 
Chapter One, one important component of justice is providing opportunities for vulnerable 
populations to be able to live the kind of life where one can make goals and decisions for 
oneself. To be in this position, one can have mental capacity restored, when possible, or at least 
restored to a functional state. Justice also includes protecting the interests of those vulnerable 
populations who are unable to do so for themselves. One of the main reasons for completing 
ACP is precisely to protect loved ones and their interests in times when they are no longer 
capable of doing so for themselves. Can ACP reasonably and practically achieve this goal? I 
have argued above that realistically it cannot, on its own. ACP provides only a piece of the 
puzzle that is ever expanding and changing when new life experiences occur – hence, ACP is 
perhaps a good starting point to have further discussions based on a specific situation.  
One of the goals of deception is similarly to protect vulnerable populations. Its aim is to 
restore mental capacity such that vulnerable populations have the kinds of opportunities 
available to others – fundamental to the notion of justice in bioethics. For patients who cannot 
have restored mental capacity, justice requires that the interests of those who can no longer do 
so for themselves be protected. Deception can include protecting these patient populations and 
their interests, including substantial autonomous values and wishes, as well as beneficent 
interests. A patient-centered approach to deception promotes justice because, when 
appropriate, deception aims at providing opportunities to vulnerable populations who would 
otherwise not have these opportunities, or have these opportunities at a high cost (such as in 
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the case of physical restraints). It also takes into consideration when deception is indefensible, 
depending on each unique case and the variables that occur with each case. 
I argued in the previous section that there is no clear morally preferable option between 
ACP and using deception but rather that deception can likely be an inevitable part of ACP, 
even when ACP is completed well. In addition, the practicality and application of ACP has 
many concerns and risks and ACP is not extremely reliable on its own. However, ACP can 
provide some insights into the wishes of an individual, which ought to be discussed and further 
qualified through conversations with SDMs. 
I am not fundamentally against either the use of physical restraints or ACP, but I have 
argued that they have significant limitations, as does the use of deception in caregiving. 
Arguing that one or the other is always the best alternative compared to the use of deception is 
not a feasible position. Instead, the context and each specific situation have moral variables and 
morally relevant factors that make one position more morally justifiable than another.  
Absolute Truth-telling 
The final alternative to deception that I will examine in this chapter is absolute truth-telling, 
which is being fully honest with patients who lack mental capacity regarding taking medication 
and personal circumstances. One example could involve reminding a patient with advanced 
Alzheimer’s disease that her husband passed away many years ago, when she asks for him. 
Absolute truth-telling ensures decision-making is systematic and simple, and leaves caregivers 
with clear guidance. Caregivers also avoid the negative feelings associated with deceiving 
patients.  
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Truth-telling is often raised in the context of informed consent and the duty of 
healthcare providers to present full information to patients when making healthcare decisions. 
This empowers patients and promotes their autonomy to make decisions for themselves. Truth-
telling also promotes trust, as I described earlier. Truth-telling can foster a good therapeutic 
relationship with caregivers. On the surface, truth-telling appears to be a clear morally 
defensible alternative to deception. Let us look in depth at truth-telling in relation to the 
biomedical ethics principles to determine whether it is a morally plausible alternative to 
deception.61 
It is important to note that absolute truth-telling may need to be used in conjunction 
with the other alternatives discussed, including physical restraints. For example, absolute truth-
telling may also involve using physical restraints if a patient’s behaviour has escalated and 
cannot be deescalated using other methods. More recently, an adopted approach is to clearly 
notify patients that they must either take a medication or force will be used to administer the 
medication.62 However, this is often in times of crisis as opposed to regular medication 
routines. This kind of direct coercion is anecdotally quite effective for patients taking their 
medication. Nonetheless, there are concerns with its perhaps overly paternalistic and coercive 
nature, especially regarding trust. On the one hand, it is respectful to offer a choice to patients. 
On the other hand, this choice is not a free one, but is rather a firm and authoritarian approach. 
As a different example, absolute truth-telling for a patient who asks where her deceased 
                                                
61. An analogous case to truth-telling and deception would be that of truth-telling and hope. In some 
cases, family members request that they not be given pertinent information regarding their diagnoses because 
hope is something that allows the patient to keep trying and stay positive during challenging times – even though 
the patient understands that it may not.  
62. McWhinney, “Are We on the Brink of a Major Transformation of Clinical Method?,” 2. 
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husband is, may not involve other alternatives. Hence, absolute truth-telling may not be distinct 
from other alternatives, but deserves its own analysis in light of cases such as the latter. 
One might argue that truth-telling respects autonomy. If patients are fully aware of the 
facts regarding their medication or whether their loved one is alive or has died, then they are 
able to make decisions for themselves by exercising their autonomy. As described earlier, 
however, the group of patients that I am interested in are those who lack substantial autonomy. 
It may also be argued that although this patient population lacks substantial autonomy, such as 
the autonomy to make treatment or placement decisions, they may be able to understand and 
appreciate other kinds of information, for example that their loved one died.  
Let me first examine deception and treatment cases, and then explore truth-telling in the 
kinds of cases where a patient has specific personal circumstances. In cases of treatment, does 
truth-telling enhance and/or respect autonomy more so than deception? In cases where a 
patient is able to understand and appreciate the full context of taking ones’ medication: the 
risks, benefits, consequences of not taking the medication and so forth, the patient should be 
provided the appropriate information to make a decision; this respects the patient’s autonomy 
and allows the patient to provide an informed consent or refusal.  
However, the kinds of cases that I discuss (those where a patient suffers from psychosis 
or the nature of his/her illness, for example), patient autonomy is lacking to a robust degree, 
and truth-telling can actually further impede restoration of autonomy. For example, if a patient 
is experiencing a psychotic episode, telling the patient the truth about medication and 
attempting to convince the patient to take the medication may or may not be successful. This 
will depend heavily on the relationship between the caregiver and the patient, including trust, 
as well as the kind of psychosis that the patient is experiencing. Sometimes the patient might 
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be willing to take the medication, and other times not. Again, the use of deception is dependent 
on numerous factors, including the substantive autonomous wishes of the patient when capable 
and the relationship between caregiver and patient. Deception, used in those cases where the 
patient would likely want autonomy restored, might be more supportive and conducive towards 
the enhancement and restoration of autonomy than truth-telling, if rational persuasion has been 
unsuccessful in the past or is unlikely.  
Let us now consider the kinds of cases where a patient suffers from advanced 
Alzheimer’s disease and is inquiring about a personal matter. For example, consider a patient 
asking after her husband who has deceased; does truth-telling respect autonomy? The patient 
may not be able to understand and appreciate complex treatment and placement decisions, but 
she may be fully capable of understanding what it means that her partner has passed away. If 
the patient does understand this information, then it would be worth discussing with her 
whether she would want to be informed the her husband has passed away when she asks in 
future, and in light of the effect it has on her mood, behaviours and quality of life more 
broadly. If this is not possible during moments of lucidity, then one ought to have a discussion 
with the patient’s SDM(s). Trying to determine the patient’s autonomous wishes would 
provide much insight into what she would want. Having these kinds of conversations would 
also permit caregivers to plan what one should do in future, such that this conversation need 
not occur every time the patient inquires.  
In those cases where a patient is incapable of understanding this information, it would 
again be important to determine the patient’s previous autonomous wishes. If the wishes are 
not clearly known, exploring the benefits and risks associated with disclosing are important to 
determine what would be in the patient’s best interests. Hence, in some circumstances 
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deception may respect autonomy more so than absolute truth-telling. Nonetheless, truth-telling 
would be ideal, if the situation arises such that it is possible to do so and to have the kind of 
desired effects.  
The second major biomedical ethics principle is beneficence – how do both truth-telling 
and deception compare when considering the best interests of patients and doing good for 
patients? As I have described in the earlier paragraphs of this section, acting in the best 
interests of the patient will depend heavily on the benefits and risks of the use of deception or 
of truth-telling for each specific patient. Some of the benefits of truth-telling include fostering 
important trust relations with one’s patient and being consistent in one’s interactions, to 
encourage and enforce reliability of treatment. However, I have described a patient population 
that may already have a significant distrust toward healthcare providers and the healthcare 
system, due to their illness. In these kinds of cases, acting in the patient’s best interests might 
include trying to restore autonomy, as we value autonomy, making decisions for ourselves and 
trying to improve trust relations through truth-telling and/or reliability.  
In cases where a patient suffers from advanced Alzheimer’s disease, acting in the 
patient’s best interests could mean deceiving the patient such that he/she will not experience 
the suffering associate with learning and re-learning the news that their loved one has passed 
away every time that he/she asks.63 Since the restoration of autonomy is not a viable option in 
these cases, reducing suffering and doing no further harm to the patient would be acting in the 
patient’s best interests, unless one has reason to act otherwise. 
                                                
63. Sean A. Spence et al., “A Cognitive Neurobiological Account of Deception: Evidence from 
Functional Neuroimaging.,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 359, no. 1451 
(November 29, 2004): 1755–62. 
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Non-maleficence requires caregivers to not place any undue harm on a patient, in 
relation to the potential benefits of an action. Hence, one weighs the risks and the benefits, and 
proceeds with the option in which the benefits outweigh the risks, more so than other 
alternatives. Again, I advocate a case-by-case analysis of each unique patient, as each patient 
will experience deception/truth-telling differently based on her past experiences, values, wishes 
and desires. In the case of deception and covert medication for incapable patients, one must 
examine the risks associated with covert medication. I have listed several of these risks 
previously, including medication interference, fear associated with side-effects when the 
patient is unaware why they are occurring, and loss of trust if the patient discovers medication 
is being hidden in her food and/or drink. These are significant concerns, and ought not be taken 
lightly.  
The benefits of taking the medication, however, may outweigh these concerns 
depending on the pertinence of these concerns and the results from taking the medication. 
Consider an incapable patient who suffers from psychosis who lives on the street and 
frequently uses recreational street drugs; also consider an incapable patient who is reclusive 
and stays at home all of the time and does not take any other drug or medication – one might 
infer that the risks associated with the drug interactions of the first patient are significantly 
higher than those of the second patient. Hence, one needs to explore carefully whether 
deception, truth-telling or another alternative would be most appropriate for each particular 
case. The decision framework I develop in Chapter Four will help frame this decision process.  
Similarly, consider cases of incapable patients who suffer from advanced Alzheimer’s 
disease. Consider two different patients. Upon hearing the news that her husband died, the first 
patient becomes extremely depressed, reclusive and spends all her time in her room crying and 
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not participating in the daily activities that normally bring her much comfort and happiness. 
The second patient generally cries for a short period of time upon hearing the news, and then 
she is able to continue her day participating in activities that she enjoys and finding comfort in 
spending time with her friends in the care facility. The first patient could benefit significantly 
from being deceived about her husband, whereas the second case would not significantly 
impact the patient. One must also consider the issue of trust if, for example, a family 
member/friend told her that her husband did die, whilst the staff lied. This could create 
significant risks that do not seemingly outweigh the benefits. There are of course other factors 
to consider, such as the authentic autonomous wishes and values of the patient prior to losing 
capacity; I will discuss these in more detail in the next chapter. 
I have briefly discussed the notion of trust and how it is impacted by deception or truth-
telling; let me expand on this further. Truth-telling fosters trust not only with those patients 
who have capacity, but also can do so with patients who lack capacity. Sometimes even a 
patient who is floridly psychotic can process information, but perhaps not in a meaningful way. 
For example, the patient in this condition may be able to point to inconsistencies in what the 
caregiver is saying, yet not have an appreciation for the consequences of not taking medication. 
Hence, truth-telling can enhance some forms of trust, even though it may be relatively small 
due to the patient’s condition. One must further consider the benefits and harms associated 
with the act of truth-telling in relation to each patient.  
Trust, as I have described above, can also take the form of reliability. Reliability often 
means consistency in what one says and does (with which truth-telling is conducive). In the 
context of healthcare, reliability also includes healthcare providers acting upon the 
expectations of patients and society. For example, when a patient suffering from psychosis is 
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threatening others, the healthcare system ensures that patient is held under observation and 
accordingly treated appropriately with the SDM’s informed consent. This ensures that not only 
the general community is safe, but also that the vulnerable patient is also protected and safe. 
Reliability often accords with truth-telling, but one can imagine the kinds of cases where being 
deceptive enhances this form of trust; for example, covert medication ensures that patients who 
require medication (and have consent via a SDM) have reliable access to treatment and 
medication. Hence, deception can enhance trust as a form of reliability regarding expectations 
of treatment when in a dire condition.  
Lastly, issues of justice arise in these cases. The patient populations that I explore are 
particularly vulnerable, those who lack capacity and require some additional assistance. The 
groups that I focus on are those with mental illness and dementia. These populations are often 
stigmatized and not considered as seriously as the more prominent and well-funded illnesses, 
such as cancer and diabetes. How do truth-telling and deception compare regarding issues of 
justice and healthcare? 
One might argue that truth-telling is one way to treat vulnerable populations with 
respect and to not marginalize these groups who already face much stigma and discrimination. 
Truth-telling involves being completely honest and allows full access to information – 
vulnerable populations are often denied this kind of treatment.64 Deception contrarily denies 
access to information and further creates barriers for vulnerable populations, feeding into the 
injustices that they already face.  
In cases where patients have capacity, the disclosure of the use of medication and its 
associated risks, benefits and so forth, is fundamental. Even though an incapable patient may 
                                                
64. Margaret S. Cashen, Patricia Dykes, and Ben Gerber, “eHealth Technology and Internet Resources: 
Barriers for Vulnerable Populations,” Journal of Cardiovascular Nursing 19, no. 2 (June 2004): 209–14. 
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not be able to understand and/or appreciate the discussion surrounding medication, the 
involvement of the patient can often provide insights into what ought to be done, as well as can 
foster trusting relationships with the patient, SDM(s) and healthcare providers. For example, if 
an incapable patient is refusing medication, involvement for decision-making with the patient 
could reveal the patient’s concerns with side-effects, which may lead to a change in the 
medication that the patient is on or whether the patient should be on any medication at all.  
I argue that there are, however, other cases when weighing and balancing risks and 
benefits associated with taking the medication could indicate that taking the medication is best 
for the patient, if even the patient refuses the medication. In these cases, covert medication 
might be appropriate and morally justified through protecting and advocating for vulnerable 
patients who cannot understand and/or appreciate risks and consequences; this involves not 
telling the truth at the outset of providing medication, but rather deceptively hiding the 
medication to restore autonomy or provide other significant benefits.  
Justice through providing vulnerable and often marginalized populations opportunities 
that they would otherwise be unable to receive can mean being deceptive in specific situations. 
As described above, I do believe that truth-telling in most cases is the appropriate course of 
action. However, if it is believed that by being deceptive there could be significant benefits in 
relation to risks through a thorough consideration (which will be described further in Chapter 
Four), then deception could be the morally justified course of action. 
It may be the case that a patient would value absolute truth-telling above the other 
bioethics principles, including autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, justice and trust. 
However, I think that these cases would likely be rare. In fact, studies such as the Chennai 
study reveal that in retrospect, most patients agreed that the use of deception was justified 
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under the circumstances when it was used.65 A further consideration is whether any of the other 
alternatives would be used given that truth-telling sometimes would require being paired with 
physical restraints, for example. In these kinds of cases, one ought to explore the bioethics 
principles and associated harms/benefits for both truth-telling and physical restraints in 
comparison with the use of deception.  
In this section, I explored whether absolute truth-telling or deception is the morally 
appropriate response for the kind of patient populations I am interested in examining. I have 
argued, as I did with the use of physical restraints, that the context of the case is extremely 
important; there are cases, perhaps the majority of cases, where the principles of biomedical 
ethics will favour and morally justify the use of truth-telling over deception. Nonetheless, one 
ought to consider that there may be other cases where deception may be the morally defensible 
alternative.  
Conclusions 
Despite there being alternatives to deception that are often cited, we may have more reasons to 
use deception in particular cases, and good moral justification for doing so. These reasons are 
grounded in beneficence, non-maleficence, respect for autonomy, justice and trust. The conflict 
that caregivers face cannot be resolved simply by using alternatives, but requires a detailed 
analysis and a moral defense of which option is more morally justifiable given the particular 
circumstances of each individual patient. 
                                                
65. It is also important to note that much of the literature on truth-telling for patient’s who suffer from 
advanced Alzheimer’s disease focuses on the disclosure of the diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease and dementia, 
and does not discuss disclosing other information such as when a patient requests information about a loved one 
who has died. 
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I have argued that each of physical restraints, ACP and absolute truth-telling are not 
definitive alternatives to the use of deception. Instead, there may be circumstances when one 
would be the more morally appropriate action over another; for example, when a patient is 
extremely aggressive and de-escalation strategies have not yet worked, and the use of physical 
restraints could be morally justified over the other options. I have also argued in this chapter 
that ACP ought to involve deception as a possibility for treatment in future – they are not 
mutually exclusive; however, there are also significant concerns with ACP and it ought to help 
guide difficult healthcare decisions, but not exclusively determine what providers and 
caregivers ought to do in particular situations. In addition, I argued that in cases where patients 
lack mental capacity, it is not evident that truth-telling is always the morally appropriate action. 
Although I do believe the truth-telling is morally appropriate in most cases, there are some 
cases where telling the truth (at least at the onset when considering and providing covert 
medication) could result in much more harm and risk than good compared to the benefit-risk 
ratio of using deception. 
When considering which alternative is the most morally defensible position, it is 
necessary to consider the patient’s personal and unique experiences and history. For example: 
What has been previously attempted? What kinds of responses have been effective or not 
effective and why? Are there any underlying reasons why the patient has been hesitant or 
resistant to take medication? The Sheffield Care Homes in the United Kingdom states that it is 
necessary to consider: “…reasons why the service user may not be taking the prescribed 
medication.”66 They list the following factors that might contribute to patients being resistant 
to taking medication: 
                                                
66. Sheffield Care Homes (NHS Foundation Trust), “Good Practice Guidance on Covert Administration 
of Medication,” 2013. 
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1. they do not understand what to do when presented with a pill or a spoonful 
of syrup; 
2. they find the medication unpalatable; 
3. they have difficulty swallowing the formulation; 
4. they lack understanding of what the medication is for; 
5. they do not understand in broad terms the consequences of refusal.67 
It is important to build relationships with patients and to foster good communication. This 
often requires time and patience. Nonetheless, the ultimate aim is to build trust with patients 
and to have a greater understanding of the person-focused or patient-centered needs of each 
patient. Additionally, consider other needs that can be addressed. For example does the patient 
have existential suffering regarding purpose at end-of-life and how can the caregivers best 
attend to these needs? Perhaps deception and these other alternatives can be avoided altogether. 
I will discuss the decision procedure in further in Chapter Four. 
To conclude, when considering the circumstances for each unique case, deception 
might be a plausible alternative, and can be the most morally defensible option for caregivers 
in certain situations. These situations occur when the benefits of using deception (based on 
specifying the principles to the specific case) outweigh the risks of its use, and provides greater 
overall ratio of benefits to risks than other alternatives. I will discuss how one judges and 
reflects on balancing and weighing risks and benefits in the fourth chapter, highlighting the 
importance of a patient-centered approach. In the following chapter I will elaborate on the 
reasons provided for and against the use of deception – I previously discussed those of the 
biomedical ethics principles as foundational ethical considerations, but will expand on other 
effects, consequences and important factors. 
                                                
67. Ibid. 
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Chapter 3  
Further Factors to Consider for Deception 
In the two preceding chapters, I discussed the traditional major biomedical ethics principles 
and how they each apply to the kinds of deception cases that I explore; I discussed enhancing 
and respecting autonomy, justice, non-maleficence and beneficence, as well as fostering trust. 
What are other important considerations that should be weighed and balanced when 
determining what caregivers ought to do? In this chapter, I will further examine philosophical 
factors to consider in favour of and against deception for these cases; many of which build on 
the biomedical ethics principles. In Chapter Four, I will discuss how caregivers ought to weigh 
and balance the factors. 
In this chapter, I will first discuss the legal and professional constraints on healthcare 
providers (as a subset of caregivers). I will then explore further factors provided in favour and 
against the use of deception expanding on those provided in Chapter One, under the broad 
categories of deontology, consequentialism and virtue ethics. I believe that there is some 
overlap between these categories and I will discuss various theoretical perspectives for each 
factor provided. Additionally, I believe that these factors are not distinct from the categories 
argued for by Beauchamp and Childress, but need to be addressed beyond their traditional 
principlist approach. I will divide each section into two parts: (1) factors to be weighed in 
Chapter Four; and (2) considerations that I will be setting aside. I will argue why each 
consideration fits into each category. This chapter will help to organize and defend why certain 
factors ought to be weighed and balanced, and in Chapter Four I will explain how one ought to 
do so. 
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Legal and Professional Constraints 
In this next section, I will focus on several important duties of professionals towards their 
patients/clients as well as to society at large. This section focuses on several deontological, or 
duty-based, constraints on deciding whether to use deception. Patients in Canada have certain 
rights, and caregivers have duties, including professional, legal and ethical duties, to uphold 
these corresponding rights.  
Informed Consent 
Under the Health Care Consent Act (1996), no treatment will be administered without 
informed consent provided. A capable patient usually gives informed consent for her 
healthcare decisions, and capacity is always presumed, unless proven otherwise. If a patient is 
found to be incapable for a particular treatment or placement decision, then a substitute 
decision-maker (SDM) is responsible for making decisions on behalf of the patient. The 
information provided in the consent discussion is as follows: “(i) the nature of the treatment, 
(ii) the expected benefits of the treatment, (ii) the material risks of the treatment, (iv) the 
material side effects of the treatment, (v) alternative courses of action, and (vi) the likely 
consequences of not having the treatment.”1  Patients have a right to know all of this 
information and decide whether they would want to proceed with a particular treatment 
decision or not. 
It is often encouraged that incapable patients participate in the decision-making 
process, as they can add valuable insight into what they would want, despite not being able to 
                                                
1. Health Care Consent Act. 
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be the ultimate decision-maker.2 It may also be the case that incapable patients are able to 
describe the treatment goals they wish, depending on their condition. They may however not 
be able to understand or appreciate how to achieve this goal and find it challenging to consent 
to a plan of care given their condition; this is when a SDM would assist with the decision. 
Nonetheless, although it is highly encouraged that caregivers and SDMs involve incapable 
patients in the decision-making process, this is not a requirement. 
For cases of deception, it is essential to receive consent from either the patient (when 
capable, during moments of lucidity) or the SDM(s) for incapable patients. As described 
above, in Ontario, Canada this is a legal and professional duty. It is also an ethical duty that 
healthcare providers respect the autonomy of their patients – their values, wishes and beliefs. 
Deception in the kinds of cases that I describe aims at doing precisely this – respecting (and 
restoring when possible) the autonomy of each patient. In the process of deciding whether or 
not to use deception, it is important and absolutely necessary to involve the appropriate 
decision-maker(s), and to obtain an informed consent from the decision-maker(s). Hence, 
deception does not violate one’s legal, professional and ethical obligation of informed consent 
if it is obtained from the appropriate decision-maker.  
Right to Choose / Right to Treatment 
Patients have the right to make decisions that are seemingly in conflict with what healthcare 
providers may determine and feel is in their best medical interests. Patients can refuse 
treatment (for example one that might save their lives) if they are capable. Capability means 
that they have the ability to understand and to appreciate all of the information provided 
                                                
2. Johannes Hamann et al., “Shared Decision Making for In-Patients with Schizophrenia,” Acta 
Psychiatrica Scandinavica 114, no. 4 (2006): 265–273. 
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through the informed consent process, and have had a thorough opportunity to ask questions 
and discuss the decision with those appropriate. The American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists’ Committee on Professional Liability write:  
In spite of a physician’s medical advice or recommendation, a patient who is 
informed of the material risks and benefits of a particular treatment, test, or 
procedure, may elect to forgo all or some of these or may decline a procedure or 
test that might be recommended or become necessary during treatment.3 
An informed refusal is based on respecting the patient’s values, wishes and beliefs. This choice 
can of course cause much distress among staff and physicians, but is nonetheless a patient’s 
right.4 
Patients may choose to refuse treatments for various reasons, including religious and 
cultural values and personal preferences. Consider a patient who is a Jehovah’s Witness and 
chooses to not have a leg amputation (which would save her life) because it would require a 
blood transfusion (often prohibited in her religion), assuming she has full capacity to make this 
decision. Another example of an informed refusal could be due to the preference to not 
experience particular symptoms from taking medication. An example of this kind of refusal is 
reported for patients who have bipolar disorder and would rather experience the creativity 
during the manic or high stages of the illness along with the low experiences, than to be on 
medication.5 Additionally, some anti-psychotic medication (especially those used in the past) 
have had the side effect of random body spasms and compulsions; patients may chose to not 
                                                
3. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, “ACOG Committee Opinion: Informed 
Refusal,” International Journal of Gynecology and Obstetrics 74, no. 1 (July 2001): 68. 
4. Constitution Act: Part 1. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1982, http://laws-
lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/const/page-15.html. 
5. Francesc Colom et al., “Identifying and Improving Non-Adherence in Bipolar Disorders,” Bipolar 
Disorders 7, no. s5 (2005): 24–31. 
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experience these side effects and rather experience the symptoms of the illness.6 Similarly, 
patients who have depression will often not take medications due to the side effects of gaining 
significant weight. Hence, there are a wide variety of reasons why someone may rationally 
choose, against medical advice, to refuse a treatment. 
If a healthcare provider were to force a patient to take treatment contrary to her capable 
values and wishes, this would constitute assault and battery under Canadian law. Schloendorff 
v. Society of New York Hospital, 1914, was the first American case where a judge ruled in the 
favour of a patient against physicians who had acted against the patient’s prior expressed 
capable wishes. Green and MacKenzie write: “…the Schloendorff case is rooted in the 
principle of autonomy: ‘every human being of adult years and sound mind shall have the right 
to determine what shall be done with his own body… .’”7 The latter quotation is the infamous 
words of Justice Benjamin Cardozo, the judge responsible for the ruling.  
The Canadian Medical Protective Agency further writes: 
A physician may be liable in assault and battery when no consent was given at 
all or when the treatment went beyond or deviated significantly from that for 
which the consent was given. Allegations of assault and battery might also be 
made if consent to treatment was obtained through serious or fraudulent 
misrepresentation in what was explained to the patient.8 
In this quotation one can see why deception may have very serious consequences if a physician 
or healthcare provider misrepresents information to a patient against her capable prior 
expressed wishes and values. 
                                                
6. National Institute of Mental Health, “Mental Health Medications” (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, 2015), http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/mental-health-medications/index.shtml. 
7. Douglas S.T. Green and C. Ronald MacKenzie, “Nuances of Informed Consent: The Paradigm of 
Regional Anesthesia,” HSS Journal 3, no. 1 (February 2007): 115–118. 
8. Kenneth G. Evans and Gowling Lafleur Henderson, Consent: A Guide for Canadian Physicians, 4th 
ed. (The Canadian Medical Protective Agency, 2006), http://www.cmpa-
acpm.ca/cmpapd04/docs/resource_files/ml_guides/consent_guide/pdf/com_consent-e.pdf. 
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On the flip side, a physician may not provide a treatment to a patient that she believes is 
medically inappropriate or would cause excessive risks in relation to the benefits. There is 
much debate at the moment regarding the difference between withdrawing treatment and 
withholding treatment given a physician’s determination of what is medically futile. The 
HCCA (1996) requires consent to withdraw any treatment, whereas if a physician decides not 
to offer a treatment (withhold a treatment) patients and SDMs can request a second opinion, 
but not require that a physician provide the treatment. Hence, if a treatment were already 
started, the physician would require consent to remove it.9 The discussion of medical futility is 
unfortunately beyond the scope of my thesis. The point that I am raising in this context is that 
patients have a right to refuse treatment, but also have limitations on what they can request 
from physicians and healthcare providers, if a treatment has not already commenced. Capable 
patients who are fully informed have a right to refuse to take certain medications and to refuse 
particular treatments – this is their legal right, and healthcare professionals have a duty to 
respect that decision.  
Patients also have the reverse right to basic healthcare in Canada.10 Canadian citizens 
are covered by provincial health insurance for many basic treatments and medications and, 
when sick, physicians have a duty to provide reasonable basic healthcare options to their 
patients.11 Not providing treatment and not seeking appropriate healthcare alternatives for their 
                                                
9. See for example Cuthbertson v. Rasouli, 3 SCR 341 (SCC 2013).. 
10. By “basic” healthcare, I refer to the Canada Health Act, which defines basic healthcare as those 
treatments that are medically necessary, such as many medications, treatments and surgeries. Some, however, are 
not considered necessary, and will be paid for by private insurance and/or out of pocket, such as dentistry and 
optometry (Canada Health Act, RSC 1985, C. C-6, 1985, http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-6/page-1.html.). 
11. Ibid. 
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patients constitutes medical negligence. The Canadian Medical Protective Agency defines 
medical negligence based on Chief Justice Mathers’ definition from his ruling:  
The definition I gave you was that the defendant would not be liable for 
negligence unless he did something that an ordinary, reasonable practitioner, in 
his branch of the profession, would not have done, or that he omitted to do 
something which an ordinary practitioner in his branch of the profession would 
have done.12 
Hence, negligence relies heavily on standard practice – what other physicians with similar 
qualifications would do in the same situation. Patients ought not be denied basic healthcare, 
unless the treatment and/or medications do not adhere to standard practice or appropriate care. 
Weijer et al. remark: “‘Appropriate care’ is most productively understood as treatment that 
falls within the bounds of standard medical practice, that is, medical interventions used by at 
least a ‘respectable minority’ of expert practitioners.” 13  These concepts rely on what 
professional physicians would consider as regular care. Of course, certain exceptions can be 
made based on cultural and religious grounds, often only if there is not significant burden in 
relation to benefit to the patient and other stakeholders. Boundaries between appropriate and 
inappropriate care can become blurred surrounding cases where there is dispute when defining 
quality of life and best interests of the patient.14 Medical negligence occurs when substandard 
care is provided. In this thesis, I argue that deception, under the limitations that I provide, 
should be part of standard of care for certain cases.  
                                                
12. William D.S. Thomas, A Physician’s Foresight, a Profession’s Pride: A History of the Canadian 
Medical Protective Association (Ottawa, ON: Canadian Medical Protective Agency, 2001). 
13. Charles Weijer et al., “Bioethics for Clinicians: 16. Dealing with Demands for Inappropriate 
Treatment,” Canadian Medical Association Journal 159, no. 7 (October 6, 1998): 818. 
14. Ibid., 820. 
  118 
Another similar concept is therapeutic abandonment. This occurs when there is an 
unreasonable termination of the physician-patient relationship (or healthcare provider-patient 
relationship). The Rheumatology Network defines abandonment as the following: 
…the termination of a professional relationship between physician and patient 
at an unreasonable time and without giving the patient the chance to find an 
equally qualified replacement. There must be some harm from the 
abandonment. The plaintiff must prove that the physician ended the relationship 
at a critical stage of the patient's treatment without good reason or sufficient 
notice to allow the patient to find another physician, and the patient was injured 
as a result. Usually, expert evidence is required to establish whether termination 
happened at a critical stage of treatment.15  
Clinical judgment is certainly important in determining whether a patient is at risk of 
suffering a significant injury if the healthcare provider were to end the therapeutic relationship. 
Therapeutic abandonment is generally considered in terms of the entire healthcare provider-
patient relationship, whereas negligence is applied to a specific act. If the use of deception 
were ethically defensible for a particular case and is standard practice, then not incorporating it 
as part of the plan of care could constitute negligence. If a healthcare provider felt that it were 
not ethically defensible to use deception in the treatment plan of the patient, then one ought to 
have another alternative available for the patient’s treatment. 
Right to Personal Health Information (PHIPA) 
If a patient, whom the healthcare team and/or caregiver believe would benefit significantly 
from the use of deception in healthcare, asks whether they are receiving a particular medication 
or treatment, do healthcare providers have a duty to disclose this information? When ought 
they, and when should they not? 
                                                
15. Martin Merritt, “Ethics on Ending the Patient-Physician Relationship | Rheumatology Network,” 
UBM Medica, LLC, Rheumatology Network, (October 27, 2013), 
http://www.rheumatologynetwork.com/blog/ethics-ending-patient-physician-relationship. 
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Under the Personal Health Information Protection Act of Ontario of 2004 (PHIPA), 
every patient has a right to health information about himself or herself. This information 
includes, but is not limited to, “the physical and mental health of the individual,” 
“identification of a person as a provider of health care to the individual” and so forth.16 The act 
describes healthcare providers and organizations as “health information custodians” charged 
with taking care of this information on behalf of patients; this includes only disclosing 
information to those required by law to do so, and providing information when requested by 
patients.17 The main purpose of this act is to protect patient information, such that it is not 
accessible to those outside of the circle of care, the patient and those required for legal 
purposes. There is also an Information and Privacy Commissioner, to whom someone may 
complain if they feel their right to information has been denied. 
An important clause in PHIPA is under the “Individual’s Right of Access” section, 
which describes when information may not be disclosed: 
52. (1) Subject to this Part, an individual has a right of access to a record of 
personal health information about the individual that is in the custody or under 
the control of a health information custodian unless, …  
(e) granting the access could reasonably be expected to, 
(i) result in a risk of serious harm to the treatment or recovery of the individual 
or a risk of serious bodily harm to the individual or another person, 
(ii) lead to the identification of a person who was required by law to provide 
information in the record to the custodian, or 
(iii) lead to the identification of a person who provided information in the 
record to the custodian explicitly or implicitly in confidence if the custodian 
                                                
16. Personal Health Information Protection Act, SO 2004, C. 3, Sched. A; 2010, C. 11, S. 128, 2004, 
http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/html/statutes/english/elaws_statutes_04p03_e.htm. 
17. Ibid. 
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considers it appropriate in the circumstances that the identity of the person be 
kept confidential; or…18 
The first part of this section discusses when information would be withheld from a patient 
when there are legal requirements to do so (e.g. a court order prohibits the information being 
disclosed, or a proceeding has not yet concluded regarding the information, etc.). In this 
quotation, it reveals that sometimes information ought to be withheld from an individual if 
there is a serious risk of harm regarding treatment or recovery of the individual him- or her-self 
and/or to others.  
In the case of deception and covert medication, one ought to assess whether there is 
serious risk to the patient and/or others by disclosing this information. If a patient is having a 
severe psychotic episode and will wander off in the freezing winter weather, then there would 
likely be a serious risk to the patient. Additionally, if a patient has significantly increased 
aggression and poses a risk of harming others and herself then the information should not be 
disclosed, unless not doing so would be of greater harm. For example, if it were likely that the 
patient would discover that she has medication hidden in her food/drink she would likely 
become even more aggressive. 
On the other hand, for cases of severe dementia, a patient would likely not question 
whether it were true, as the deterioration of cognitive abilities often make more complex 
thoughts and connections between thoughts less probable. Nonetheless, if a patient were to ask 
and question either covert medication or the truth of statements about events that would cause 
her much distress, the same principle would apply as above – does the disclosure have the 
potential to cause serious harm for the treatment and/or recovery of the patient? Of course the 
evaluation or judgment of harm will depend heavily on one’s definition of harm and how 
                                                
18. Ibid. 
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serious it is perceived to be. From one point of view, not taking medication to prevent blood 
clot formation is a serious risk of harm; from another point of view, perhaps at a particular 
stage in one’s life and given one’s condition, this may not be considered as serious. It would be 
reasonable to consider what the standard of care is – what would other physicians and 
healthcare providers define as serious harm in a case – and this ought to be considered in light 
of the patient’s wishes and values as well. 
Along a similar line of thought, therapeutic privilege is a highly controversial topic in 
healthcare. Fried and Perlis describe therapeutic privilege as follows: 
Therapeutic privilege is the concept that a physician may sometimes deceive or 
lie to a patient for the patient’s own good. One example could include out- right 
lying about a poor prognosis in an attempt to minimize a patient’s associated 
psychological stress. More subtle examples could include providing limited or 
incomplete information in order to steer a patient toward a preferred treatment. 
Therapeutic privilege may attempt to “preserve the patient’s hope, and 
psychological and moral integrity, as well as his self-image and dignity.”19 
Therapeutic privilege is the idea that it is appropriate for healthcare providers to withhold 
information from patients because it is likely to cause significant distress to patients. This 
concept is typically used for patients who have mental capacity to make decisions for 
themselves and is not often applied to patients who lack mental capacity.  
This concept uses a paternalistic method for determining whether a patient ought to 
receive information about her treatment. The healthcare provider, as gatekeeper instead of 
steward, has clinical and professional judgment to determine if the information would be 
harmful to the patient. For example, consider a patient who expresses suicidal ideations from 
chronic depression – this patient is being treated in a healthcare facility and, tragically, her 
parents are killed in a car accident during her treatment at the facility. It may be appropriate, 
                                                
19. Richard G. Fried and Clifford Perlis, “Therapeutic Privilege: If, When, and How to Lie to Patients,” 
in Dermatoethics, ed. Lionel Bercovitch and Clifford Perlis (Springer London, 2012), 33. 
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when possible, to delay providing that information to the patient if the healthcare provider 
genuinely believed that the information would increase her severe risk of suicide, and it may 
not be necessary (e.g. for specific decisions) to disclose the information. When the patient is in 
a safer mental space, it would be appropriate to disclose this information in a sensitive 
manner.20 
Truth-telling 
An invaluable duty of healthcare providers is to tell the truth. I have already discussed in great 
deal the moral importance of truth-telling in both Chapter One and Chapter Two. I will now 
discuss truth-telling in the context of professional duties.  
Many different professional colleges and organizations across Canada have practice 
standards that discuss the importance and requirement of truthfulness. The College of Nurses 
of Ontario (CNO) includes truthfulness as one of their practice standards. The CNO remarks: 
“Health care professionals now believe that clients have the right to and will benefit from full 
disclosure. Honesty builds trust, which is essential to the therapeutic relationship between 
nurses and clients.”21 The CNO further remarks how there are behavioural directives to assist 
nurses with deciding how much information is provided and advocating for a patient’s right to 
know this personal information.22 One can immediately see a stark opposition between 
deceptive practices and truthfulness, the latter being a clear practice standard for nurses. 
                                                
20. Franklin G. Miller and Luana Colloca, “The Placebo Phenomenon and Medical Ethics: Rethinking 
the Relationship Between Informed Consent and Risk–Benefit Assessment,” Journal of Theoretical Medicine and 
Bioethics 32, no. 4 (August 2011): 229–233. Along a similar vein, the nocebo effect is a phenomenon that has 
only recently been explored. This phenomenon extends beyond the scope of this thesis, but aims to highlight how 
patients can unintentionally develop side effects and/or symptoms explained to them by their healthcare provider, 
that they would not have developed had they been unaware of them. 
21. College of Nurses of Ontario, “Practice Standard: Ethics,” 2009, 17, 
http://www.cno.org/Global/docs/prac/41034_Ethics.pdf. 
22. Ibid., 18. 
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A major issue in healthcare more broadly is that guidelines often pertain to and are 
relevant only to those patients who have decision-making capacity, and often neglect patient 
populations who lack mental capacity. These guidelines focus on those patient populations 
who can both understand and appreciate their treatment and other decisions. For those patients 
who cannot understand and/or appreciate, discussing the truth may, in particular cases, cause 
increased harm and not be the authentic wishes of the patient. As described in the introduction, 
however, there are some professional groups in Canada who strongly discourage deception, 
without comprehensive moral discussions or justifications for this position. 
The Registered Psychiatric Nurses of Canada Code of Ethics does not state anything 
specific about deception or covert medication, but does indicate that a nurse in this capacity 
ought to conduct oneself in an honest manner.23 Standards and guidelines, as with general 
principles, can come into conflict, such as with the principle do no harm; in these cases, one 
ought to weigh and balance what one should do. These standards are essentially prima facie 
duties, especially when one experiences conflicting principles. 
Further Ethical Factors in Favour and Against Deception 
Deontological Factors 
I will now discuss and address some traditional deontological concerns regarding deception. I 
will not provide an exhaustive consideration of all types of deontological approaches, but will 
focus on certain deontological ideas that are framed in bioethics, such as the concept of 
dignity. I will present a thorough discussion of deontological concepts as related to deception 
in caregiving regarding concerns for human dignity, the intrinsic value of truth and 
                                                
23. Registered Psychiatric Nurses of Canada, “Code of Ethics & Standards of Psychiatric Nursing 
Practice,” March 2010, http://www.crpnbc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/2010_Code_Standards.pdf. 
  124 
universality. In this section and the remaining sections, I will divide each into two parts: (1) 
factors that will be weighed in Chapter Four; and (2) considerations that I will be setting aside. 
As mentioned above, I will argue why each consideration fits into each category. 
Factors to be Weighed 
Concerns for Human Dignity 
Human dignity can be a vague expression that many will advance as a factor either in favour of 
or against deception in caregiving. In this section, I will discuss various definitions of dignity, 
its merits and why we ought to include dignity in deciding what one ought to do.  
Some, such as Ruth Macklin, however, argue that the concept of human dignity is 
useless; she argues that it simply gets used without significant content. 24  Dignity is a 
catchword that people use to defend all kinds of positions, some of which are opposing. Is 
dignity such a useless concept, or does it provide something unique and special as opposed to 
merely representing other bioethics-related concepts, such as respect for autonomy, respect for 
persons or some other fundamental right that we each have? 
Others argue that dignity is unique.25 In Killmister’s article, she describes dignity as 
being able to abide by one’s personal standards. For example, consider a patient who has 
strong religious convictions, including having one’s body fully covered, except for her face 
and hands. The patient has ALS (amyotrophic lateral sclerosis) and, as a result, she is 
paralyzed from her neck and below. During a hospital stay she is bathed, and her legs are left 
partially exposed. This would be a case where her dignity has been negatively affected. 
                                                
24. See, for example, Ruth Macklin, “Dignity Is a Useless Concept: It Means No More than Respect for 
Persons or Their Autonomy,” BMJ 327, no. 7429 (December 2003): 1419–1420. 
25. See, for example, Suzy Killmister, “Dignity: Not Such a Useless Concept,” Journal of Medical Ethics 
36, no. 3 (March 2010): 160–64. 
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Killmister also associates a loss of dignity with humiliation and shame; however, one can 
experience a loss of dignity and have different associated feelings, such as anger or hurt, as 
opposed to shame and humiliation. 
Dignity as an inability to abide by one’s personal standards is different from respect for 
persons or autonomy. The concept does not mean respecting the wishes of someone in virtue of 
being a person, but rather reflects the self-ascribed standards that the person holds. Killmister 
makes the distinction between autonomy (as self-governance) and dignity (as adhering to one’s 
standards).26 However, having control over the decisions that impact one’s body and life (the 
standards one lives according to), very much involves autonomy; respecting autonomy is not 
just the degree of control, but rather naming the standards and having them respected by 
others.  
A feeling of worth, associated with having personal standards, is important for 
dignity.27 When one’s ability to live up to one’s standards has been impaired (whether that is 
caused by others, an illness, oneself, etc.), one often has a feeling of loss of worth or self-value. 
When one experiences vulnerability, one is more prone to a loss of dignity. Hence, here we can 
see the distinction between dignity and autonomy – when the autonomous wishes (leading to 
personal standards) are not being upheld, and one has a feeling of loss of worth, one’s dignity 
is negatively impacted. Dignity does not just relate to respecting autonomy, but also to the 
feeling associated with a lack of respect for autonomy. In the case described above, one may 
still be able to decide what one’s standards are and what one values (self-directed autonomy), 
but be unable to act on those standards (dignity) or have those standards somehow infringed 
                                                
26. Ibid. 
27. Jane Haddock, “Towards Further Clarification of the Concept of ‘Dignity,’” Journal of Advanced 
Nursing 24, no. 5 (1996): 924–931. 
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and hence feel a sense of lessened value or worth. The difference is subtle, yet I think is 
significant enough to consider each concept distinctly.28 
Is dignity something that is completely subjective, based on a personal experience of 
standards and convictions? Dignity as described above, focuses on personal standards and 
convictions, whereas others have argued that we not only have this ascribed dignity, but also 
an intrinsic sense of dignity.29 This concept of dignity is less clear than the ascribed sense, but 
allows each person to have intrinsic worth, in virtue of being a person (often used in a religious 
context) – this intrinsic dignity may collapse into respect for persons. Kant describes this sense 
of dignity as follows: “i.e., a worth which has no price, no equivalent for which the object of 
valuation (aestimii) could be exchanged.”30 Sulmasy further describes intrinsic dignity:  
By intrinsic dignity, I mean that worth or value that people have simply because 
they are human, not by virtue of any social standing, ability to evoke 
admiration, or any particular set of talents, skills, or powers. Intrinsic dignity is 
the value that human beings have simply by virtue of the fact that they are 
human beings. Thus we say that racism is an offense against human dignity. 
Used this way, dignity designates a value not conferred or created by human 
choices, individual or collective, but is prior to human attribution.31 
Sulmasy describes the ascribed/attributed form of dignity as follows: 
By attributed dignity, I mean that worth or value that human beings confer upon 
others by acts of attribution. The act of conferring this worth or value may be 
accomplished individually or communally, but it always involves a choice. 
                                                
28. Some might argue that autonomy is not only reflecting on and deciding on one’s values, wishes and 
beliefs, as often described in bioethics. It could also include the freedom to act on these values, wishes and beliefs. 
This wider definition of autonomy can ultimately include dignity as I have described above, and can be violated 
leading to a feeling of lessened worth. As long as this concept is captured in the framework regarding deception, I 
am content with either interpretation.  
29. See, for example, Daniel P. Sulmasy, “Dignity and Bioethics: History, Theory, and Selected 
Applications,” in Human Dignity and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President’s Council on Bioethics 
(Washington D.C.: The President’s Council on Bioethics, 2008), 
http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/human_dignity/chapter18.html. 
30. Immanuel Kant, “The Metaphysics of Morals, Part II: The Metaphysical Principles of Virtue,” in 
Ethical Philosophy, trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett, 1983), 80–81. 
31. Sulmasy, “Dignity and Bioethics.” 
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Attributed dignity is, in a sense, created. It constitutes a conventional form of 
value. Thus, we attribute worth or value to those we consider to be dignitaries, 
those we admire, those who carry themselves in a particular way, or those who 
have certain talents, skills, or powers. We can even attribute worth or value to 
ourselves using this word.32 
Hence, ascribed dignity is something that can be positively or negatively influenced; it can be 
fostered or harmed. Ascribed dignity can also be impacted by others, and affected or changed 
by oneself. In this quotation, Sulmasy discusses not only the dignity that we ascribe to 
ourselves, but also the dignity that is ascribed to us by others – for example, consider a 
dignitary, or someone who is given a special dignified status in virtue of one’s position. I 
believe that these two notions still require an individual to have some idea of his or her worth, 
which can be impacted by others, as opposed to completely prescribed or dictated by others. It 
is also important to note that even though a patient’s condition may improve with the use of 
deception, her dignity can still be harmed if she would not feel worthy being treated in this 
kind of way. The patient in this case is not harmed in the sense that she declines or perhaps 
ever discovers that deception occurred, but is nonetheless harmed through a disrespect of her 
dignity.33  
Dignity and Deception 
For this section of Chapter Three, I will refer to dignity as the ascribed or attributed sense of 
dignity, as opposed to the intrinsic form, because this is the kind of dignity that can be 
influenced or affected; intrinsic dignity, however, is static and cannot be harmed or promoted. 
How does the concept of ascribed dignity apply to deception cases in healthcare? 
                                                
32. Ibid. 
33. It is also important to note that there is a practical limit to upholding ascribed dignity in the 
healthcare system, due to scarce allocation of resources. Healthcare practitioners can do their best to respect the 
dignity and standards of a patient, yet it may be impossible to respect and be able to fulfill all standards due to 
resource limitations. However, I believe that healthcare providers are generally able to fulfill personal standards, 
and are quite accommodating for patients, when possible. 
  128 
Deception of a patient who has mental capacity can negatively impact her ability to 
uphold her own standards and her feeling of self-worth dependent on this standard. There may 
be other cases where deception, for example, in jest with friends, does not allow one to live up 
to one’s self-ascribed standards but one does not experience a feeling of lessened self-worth 
and, hence, no loss of dignity. 
Deceiving patients who don’t have capacity often has the goal of allowing the patient to 
live up to his or her standards in order to regain or continue to have the feeling of satisfaction 
of doing so. Since dignity involves a personal recognition of one’s standards and being able to 
live up to these standards, then this ascribed sense of dignity reflects a patient-centered 
approach to addressing healthcare (and other) needs. The patient’s experience or perceived 
lack of respect for one’s standards has an enormous impact on her dignity. One must take into 
account, what are the patient’s values and standards and would using deception, for example 
through covert medication, likely allow this patient to achieve these standards. Not only the 
outcome is important, but also the means and the methodology used when deceiving and how 
each unique patient considers the use of deception.  
There are of course acts in healthcare where a patient will no longer be able to live up 
to one’s former or previous standards (for example after a severe stroke). In these cases, a 
patient may have a loss of dignity if the patient experiences these circumstances as a loss of 
worth, which is completely understandable under these circumstances. As caregivers and 
healthcare providers, one ought to do one’s best under the particular circumstances, to promote 
(and where possible, restore) dignity. This can often be in the form of helping patients to 
develop new personal standards and goals after a catastrophic event, such as a stroke.  
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There are certainly circumstantial barriers to fostering dignity, but regarding deception, 
what can be done to promote dignity? Understanding the values and standards of the specific 
patient is important to recognize what one can do to promote dignity. This requires, in cases 
where patients lack mental capacity, to try to understand the authentic values of the patient – 
what standards would the patient subscribe to? What would the patient have wanted? Not only 
does it matter what the patient’s standards are, but also how the patient would feel if 
able/unable to live up to those standards. If a patient’s wishes were unknown, then caregivers 
would apply the best interests standard. Understanding the kinds of standards that a patient 
would want to subscribe to helps to determine how one can respect those standards – and 
determine the goal(s) of deception.  
Considerations Set Aside  
Intrinsic Value of Truth 
Michael Lynch in “Deception and the Nature of Truth” argues that we simply prefer the truth, 
if even it only has “psychological value,” such that it is comforting.34 Lynch first agrees with 
Frankfurt’s assessment of deception; we generally have a strong dislike of deception because it 
interferes with our ability to function within the world.35 Lynch remarks: “But if even it is not 
overtly dangerous, it is likely to interfere with one’s plans, to change them, or to simply make 
them go awry. Either way, we are less likely to get what we want.”36 In order to achieve our 
goals and ends, we want to be connected to the world so we can navigate it; cases of mental 
                                                
34. Michael Lynch, “Deception and the Nature of Truth,” in The Philosophy of Deception, ed. Clancy 
Martin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 188–200. 
35. Harry Frankfurt, “On Truth, Lies, and Bullshit,” in The Philosophy of Deception, ed. Clancy Martin 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 37–48. 
36. Lynch, “Deception and the Nature of Truth,” 197. 
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incapacity rob individuals of reality orientation and often of this ability to attain our ends. I 
have argued that using deception as a means can be useful to re-establish the connection with 
reality and assist an individual with achieving his or her authentic goals.  
Lynch’s argument extends beyond the idea of deception as being a negative concept 
because it interferes with practical consequences. Lynch introduces the following scenario: 
You are presented with two doors. Behind one door, life continues as normal. However, behind 
the other door, life would seemingly continue as normal, although your friends and lover 
actually despise you. They are extremely good at deception, and you will never know which 
door leads to which life.37 Lynch argues that nobody would prefer the life of a “fool,” if even 
the appearances of relationships were the same through each door. He remarks that with the 
choice of door, some may be ambivalent and others would prefer truthful relationships, but 
doubts that anyone would prefer the life of deception. This argument aims at revealing that we 
have an intrinsic value for truthful relationships, despite deception preventing us from 
achieving particular goals or aims. 
Hence, one might argue that it is wrong to deceive others, since we value truth 
intrinsically. Lynch, however, makes an interesting final remark, “Sometimes other things 
matter more than truth. Thus, more of us would be willing to be deceived, or to deceive 
ourselves, if we thought that more good than bad would come of it overall, or that the matter 
was so trivial that the point was essentially moot.”38Although we value truth intrinsically, such 
as it is not attached to any other end, this is one value (among many) that guides decision-
making, which can be overridden dependent on the situation.  
                                                
37. Ibid. 
38. Ibid., 198. 
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This is an important consideration with respect to patients who will likely not recover 
significantly; consider, for example, patients suffering from severe Alzheimer’s disease. In 
these cases, one must examine whether the patient would have preferred to be re-oriented to 
the truth (e.g. in cases where the patient’s spouse died, and a reminder of this event causes the 
patient tremendous pain and suffering; often in the mornings she spends hours agonizing over 
the death of her loved one, once reminded) and the benefits and risks of doing so. A caregiver 
ought to consider whether a patient living a life with less angst is more appropriate based on 
his or her authentic desires, wishes and quality of life experiences. 
With respect to patients who lack mental capacity, one’s ability to discern between 
what is true and not true is often severely impeded. As Lynch argues, we care deeply about the 
truth and would want cognitive abilities restored such that we could once again understand and 
appreciate the truth. If truth matters to us intrinsically, and mental impairment significantly 
hampers our ability to attain truth, and if a small amount of deception in the short-term could 
restore the patient’s long-term ability to appreciate and understand the truth, then deception 
could be morally justifiable. I will return to this argument in the consequentialist section. 
Hence, it may be acceptable to use deception in order to be in a state in which one is capable of 
appreciating the truth and general perceived reality. One major aim of general medicine and 
psychiatry is to treat individuals such that they are able to achieve their own goals in 
accordance with their values and beliefs. Perpetuating a misinformed and distorted reality can 
harm our intrinsic value of truth much more than a short-term and well-meaning act of 
deception. Truth is something that we deeply value and for these reasons it often is and feels 
wrong to use deception. However, in cases of deceiving individuals suffering from mental 
impairment, the act itself can lead to increased correspondence with truth, if the goal is to 
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restore cognitive abilities and meaningful or substantial autonomy. Arguably, deception is 
justifiable under specific circumstances, which I will describe in further detail in the next 
chapter. Hence, we can set aside this notion, as it can either be incorporated in the autonomous 
wishes of a patient or other competing morally relevant features can override it.  
Universality and Deception  
Universality is often considered as Kant’s first formulation of the categorical imperative: “act 
only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it 
become a universal law.”39 One formulates a maxim according to reason, and wills that this 
maxim is how every rational person ought to act. If this law can be rationally applicable to all 
persons, then it is morally required of us. 
Having universal laws prevents people from merely acting on desires or intuitions. It 
requires that moral agents are consistent in both applying their standards to themselves and to 
others. Universality aims at thwarting selfishness, favouritism and capricious actions. It further 
aims at generalizability and moving from a specific case to being able to apply one’s standards 
and principles to all like-cases.  
When considering universality in contemporary bioethics, the term is often used in the 
context of justice in global bioethics – how we ought to treat others beyond the limits of 
national borders. Universality addresses the uneven distributions of goods and questions of 
global social justice, for example.40 
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Ruth Macklin is a strong proponent of universalism applied to biomedical ethics. She 
makes the distinction between universalism and absolutism. Absolutism involves strong 
binding rules that do not have exceptions, such as “do not lie” and “always keep promises.”41 
Whereas universalist ethics maintains that there exist fundamental ethical principles, for which 
exceptions can be made.42 In Chapter Five, I will argue why the principlist approach (also 
considered a universalist approach) is currently the best approach to biomedical ethics, as well 
as provide a critique of its present form, with suggestions for improvement. 
These general ethical principles need not be applied and strictly followed in every case. 
Rather, the principles can come into conflict and one ought to weigh and balance the principles 
to determine what one should do.43 The principles are prima facie rules that can be privileged 
over one another, depending on the specific case. In Chapter Four, I will discuss how we can 
weigh and balance the competing values and principles in a non-arbitrary way. For example, 
coherence is a method that aims at consistency among morally relevant features, while not 
rigidly appealing to former cases. 
In light of these remarks on universality, what can be said of deception and 
universality? Ensuring consistency regarding decision-making is important, but consistency of 
what? In the next chapter I will argue that consistency between morally relevant features across 
cases is what matters. 
From a strict orthodox Kantian perspective, any kind of deception in any case would 
not pass the logical consistency test. If we apply a universal standard to all, then nobody would 
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believe anyone else, and deception would not be logically consistent or likely possible due to a 
general scepticism and distrust among people. 
Applying this concept to healthcare and deception, I have already discussed at great 
length the concerns with deception and trust. If patients realized that deception was being used 
in healthcare, then patients would be more reluctant to seek care. An example where deceptive 
healthcare practices have caused patient populations to be afraid and extremely reluctant to 
seek future care includes the great syphilis scandal in health research – the Tuskegee Syphilis 
Study.44 In this study from 1932-1972, African American men thought that they were receiving 
free healthcare, whereas they were injected with syphilis in the name of clinical research to 
study the natural progression of the disease without treatment.  
Other experiments and historical atrocities in healthcare include experimentation on 
prison inmates throughout the twentieth century, including injecting inmates with cancerous 
cells to determine their prognostic trajectory.45 These healthcare experiments were based on 
the intention to increase knowledge about deadly conditions and to improve overall healthcare 
through deceptive and morally atrocious means – essentially sacrificing a few members of 
society (members who were perceived to have less value) for the greater good.  
As you may note, the practice of deception in healthcare that I propose is quite 
different. The act of deception is aimed at increasing the quality of life for each unique patient, 
given his or her personal values and reducing the risks of harms (including to trust). Especially 
given the patient population to which my research applies, those who lack mental capacity 
often suffer from mental illnesses that can cause significant delusions, whereby acts of 
                                                
44. Vicki S. Freimuth et al., “African Americans’ Views on Research and the Tuskegee Syphilis Study,” 
Social Science and Medicine 52, no. 5 (n.d.): 797–808. 
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deception may cause further scepticism and even alienation of these groups. One might argue, 
however, that if the practice were transparent and the reasons and process for when deception 
is morally acceptable is made clear to patients and the public at large, then there would be less 
concern with its use. It would also be important to ensure that there are checks and balances 
used when employing deception to ensure that deception is not being used inappropriately. 
It is unreasonable to think that we can abide by all duties, all the time. There are 
instances when following autonomy will cause harm, for example. I will not discuss 
universality in the rigid Kantian sense, but rather focus on consistency between like cases in 
Chapter Four and also in Chapter Five. I am setting aside universality in its strictest form, as 
my aim to create a policy and decision making-framework must be practical in order to be 
employed. Hence, I reject the orthodox Kantian perspective, as I believe that there are 
situations where deception can be morally justified when balancing the relevant moral 
principles. Nonetheless, I do believe that it is important to be transparent about the process 
used, to avoid the kind of scepticism of the healthcare system that can occur if deception 
continues to be a secretive process without better guidelines around its use. 
Consequentialist Factors 
As with the deontological section in this chapter, I will not be taking a particular 
consequentialist position, but I will instead discuss several factors, commonly considered 
consequentialist, relevant to deception in caregiving. These factors will help to enrich the 
discussion of when deception in caregiving is a morally defensible or indefensible alternative 
for caregivers. The third section in this chapter will consider factors regarding virtue ethics and 
character. 
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Factors to be Weighed 
Pressures on Healthcare Providers and Other Caregivers  
Realistically, healthcare providers face greater and greater cutbacks in resources and staffing, 
resulting in more duties to be performed in less time. Their roles have also changed 
significantly from spending direct face-to-face time with patients providing holistic care to 
fulfilling standardized organizational requirements, such as completing more paperwork.46 
Studies show that with increasing workload, patient safety becomes a higher risk as staff are 
more prone to making mistakes and are simply unable to keep up with all of their duties.47 
Increased time and workload pressures on staff make deception an appealing option to 
caregivers, since it alleviates the need to spend time negotiating with patients, watching 
patients to ensure medication is taken, utilizing more aggressive means like physical restraints 
and so forth.  
Healthcare providers must assist a significant number of patients on any given shift, 
and their realistic duty is to all of their patients, as opposed to spending all their time with one 
or just a few patient(s); deception may be justifiable given a utilitarian consideration of 
increasing the overall well-being of the greatest number, as opposed to doing one’s best for one 
patient, especially given the potential burnout associated with constantly trying to negotiate 
with patients who would benefit significantly from the medication.48 Further burnout and 
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distress may be observed when reminding patients with advanced Alzheimer’s about a loved 
one who has died.  
Distributive justice might also require one to spend one’s time assisting more than one 
patient if resources are limited. It would be easy to say that one ought to increase resources, but 
an ethical theory needs to be practical to actually require action from us, and increasing 
resources is not currently feasible. Being realistic and efficient is important, but it is dangerous 
to “cut corners” simply for efficiency. Due process is important and respecting each patient is 
necessary, especially given Canadian healthcare’s commitment to patient- or client-centered 
care. In Chapter Four, I will also discuss the relevant features important for an ethical theory, 
and the importance of practicality. 
There simply is not enough time available to negotiate with patients to take their 
medication in every instance. Other alternatives to deception include, as I have described in 
Chapter Two, restraints to administer medication, full disclosure of the truth and completing an 
advance care planning about these issues during moments of lucidity. If a patient is clearly 
resolved to not take medication, for example, caregivers ought to ask a series of questions. The 
most significant question is trying to determine why the patient is refusing medication. The 
following list of questions might assist with determining this, for example: Why do you not 
want to take your medication and do you experience any side effects from the medication; how 
does this make you feel?  
A caregiver should explore whether any of these questions and perhaps others can be 
addressed, still allowing the patient to take the medication and experience the positive 
outcomes from doing so. As described earlier from the Sheffield Care Homes Organization, 
there are many other considerations to first explore in terms of the patient, for example, not 
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understanding what to do with medication, finding medication unpleasant to tasted and so 
forth.49 
It may seem that asking these questions will take just as much time as negotiating with 
a patient to just take the medication – but this is not so. In asking these questions, and 
addressing these concerns, hopefully a patient will feel better about taking the medication 
without having to, for example, feel unwanted side-effects. The patient may still refuse the 
medication because of delirium, psychosis etc. and, at this point, covert medication may be 
ethically defensible, but at least due process has occurred and a reasonable attempt has been 
made to try to address any concerns or discomfort with taking the medication. Frequent re-
evaluation of capacity, side-effects and the need for covert medication ought to occur.  
Additional Pressures on Non-Healthcare Provider Caregivers 
I will now address the kinds of issues that this sub-group of caregivers experience, most often 
family members and friends/neighbours. To put caregiving in Canada into perspective, from 
the most recent Statistics Canada data from 2012, approximately 8.1 million Canadians are 
considered to be caregivers of a family member or loved one. Statistics Canada defines a 
caregiver as: “those aged 15 years and older providing help or care within the past 12 months 
to either: 1) someone with a long-term health condition or a physical or mental disability, or 2) 
someone with problems related to aging.”50 
Caregiver burden is a common occurrence for those who look after another person with 
either or both a physical/mental illness. I personally find this expression troublesome, as the 
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word burden has many negative connotations, which can actually lead to guilt for those who 
are being looked after.51 Nonetheless, this is the commonly held expression in healthcare, and I 
will use it for consistency.  
First, there is much literature on caregiver burnout and distress for caregivers in the 
community who look after a loved one with dementia. Gitlin et al. remark:  
Caring for individuals suffering from dementia has profound consequences for 
family caregivers. Potential stressors associated with family caregiving are 
numerous and may include managing behavioral disturbances, attending to 
physical needs, and providing seemingly constant vigilance.52 
Looking after someone who suffers from dementia requires much time and personal energy. 
Gitlin et al. further remark: 
The effects of these stressors on family caregivers can be catastrophic. Family 
caregiving has been associated with increased levels of depression and anxiety 
as well as higher use of psychoactive medications, poorer self-reported physical 
health, compromised immune function, and increased mortality.53 
Caregivers have enormous pressures to look after not only the person with dementia, but also 
themselves and others who are under their care. Caregivers are often those looking after a 
parent, as well as providing for children.54  
In a web-based survey completed by 398 individuals between September 15 and 
November 5 of 2006, the Canadian Alzheimer’s Society collected data on burnout associated 
with caregivers looking after a person with Alzheimer’s disease.55 Caregivers are often family 
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members (most often women) and face many different emotional, psychological, physical and 
financial stresses when caring for someone with dementia. Caregivers often struggle with 
depression, reaching rates of approximately 83%, whereas the general population over the age 
of 65 has a rate of approximately 7%.56 Caregivers are also more socially isolated and 
physically restricted when constantly caring for someone with dementia, which can lead to 
depression.57 This also places caregivers at a higher risk for health concerns, as they are 
restricted and again more prone to depression. 
There are some supports available to caregivers in the community, such as respite 
programs, including adult day programs and support groups, which assist caregivers 
substantially and often increase quality of life for patients and for caregivers. Other options 
include placing the person with dementia in a nursing home or long-term care facility, when 
appropriate. Although, these processes can involve significant financial contributions, as well 
as lengthy wait-lists given the demand for long-term care with a shortage of beds, as well as 
the Ontario Government’s focus on keeping patients at home as long as possible.58 Hence, with 
a growing elderly population and limited healthcare resources, caregiver burden is a significant 
concern.  
As with caregivers of people with dementia, caregivers of people with mental illness 
(and other illnesses) face similar pressures. In a survey completed by 697 caregivers and 439 
patients who have schizophrenia, the following list of negative impacts of the illness on the 
patient and caregiver(s) were disclosed: 
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(a) a decline in family social outings and activities; 
(b) increase in disagreements, disputes or fights  among family members;  
(c) depression in other family members;  
(d) embarrassment of other family members;  
(e) economic difficulties;  
(f) delay or cancellation of vacation plans;  
(g) loss of self-esteem or confidence in other family  members;  
(h) decline in the work or school performance of  other family members;  
(i) increase in alcohol use;  
(j) separation from a spouse.59 
Awad and Lakshmi further remark on the difficulty of addressing caregiver burden: 
The complexity of the ‘burden of care’ concept and many of its components that 
sometimes defy accurate enumeration may have discouraged researchers from 
investigating such important subjects. While it is possible to cost tangible 
components of family expenses such as time lost, transportation, food, clothing, 
housing, recreation, medical care, insurance, debts, etc., it is difficult to put a 
monetary value on psychological and emotional issues such as anguish, distress, 
feelings of loss, stigma, low self- esteem and absence of a productive and self-
fulfilling role.60 
These various consequences create enormous pressures on caregivers. Caregivers are under 
significant stress from financial, psychological and emotional pressures, in situations when 
they are trying to do the best they can for their loved one.61 
The pressures that I have listed and discussed in this section consider factors why one 
might be inclined to use deception as a tempting option for making caregiving more practical 
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and effective. This occurs especially in light of a caregiver’s ability to continue to care for a 
loved one, likely resulting in the potential consequences listed above. For example, a caregiver 
whose patient constantly asks after her partner’s death will not have to spend the time and 
energy negotiating with and comforting her, when this time can be spent assisting others and 
fulfilling other important duties. 
In exploring the reasons why one might feel justified to use deception as opposed to 
other means, I have discussed several consequentialist arguments about pressures on both 
healthcare workers and on caregivers more broadly. There are competing interests in society 
(including the interests of all patients, rather than just one or a few) and if other alternatives 
were to be employed, such as negotiation, then caregivers may not be able to continue to 
provide and care for others under their care and/or for themselves. 
I have not provided clear responses as to what one can do about these kinds of 
pressures, which can ultimately be reasons why caregivers would find deception an ethically 
appealing position. In Chapter Four, I will consider all of these factors and provide a 
framework to help guide when it is morally defensible to deceive patients, and when it is 
morally indefensible to do so.  
Virtue Ethics Factors 
The final section of this chapter will address some virtue ethics concerns with deception in the 
caregiving environment. Begley remarks: 
The word ‘virtue’ is derived from the ancient Greek notion arete which differed 
significantly from a modern understanding of the concept. The Greek word 
arete (virtue) means excellence in relation to a skill or trait of character and is 
linked to function… This requires excellence in practical skills, in theoretical 
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knowledge and in moral virtue (excellence of character). Virtues can also be 
described as attributes, character traits or excellences of character.62 
First, the following are the virtues that Beauchamp and Childress describe as important 
for caregivers: compassion, discernment, trustworthiness, integrity and conscientiousness. I 
will briefly discuss these virtues and then discuss other virtues required of a healthcare 
professional. Lastly, I will relate the discussion of virtues to the topic of deception in 
caregiving. Note that many of the virtues espoused for healthcare providers and in this body of 
literature are virtues that one can argue are integral to the character of any caregiver more 
broadly.  
Factors to be Weighed 
I will briefly provide an overview for the type of character that Beauchamp and Childress 
encourage for healthcare providers. Compassion is the ability to care for and empathize with 
those for whom one is caring. Discernment is having good judgment and being able to reflect 
carefully on situations to assess, weigh and balance competing and various considerations; it 
involves understanding the principles and knowing how to apply them to particular situations – 
I will return to this idea in Chapter Four. Trustworthiness can have multiple meanings, as I’ve 
detailed in Chapter One and Chapter Two. Beauchamp and Childress refer to trustworthiness 
as believing that the healthcare provider will act in the best interests of the patient, and trust 
that the caregiver is competent and has good motivations and moral character – I have already 
argued that there are multiple meanings and ways that one can view the concept of trust in a 
therapeutic and care-giving relationship, including both truth-telling and acting in the patient’s 
best interests reliably – these notions can impact individual patients and also trust in the 
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healthcare system at large. Integrity is acting on particular standards, including personal, 
professional, legal, ethical and so forth. Often contrasted with integrity is hypocrisy, which is 
acting differently to the standards one claims to uphold. Finally, Beauchamp and Childress 
highlight conscientiousness as an important value for care-givers; conscientiousness is 
intending to do what is right and taking reasonable effort in order to do the right thing, 
including due diligence on behalf of the caregiver.63 
The Accreditation Council of Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) outlines the 
general competencies for US medical residents, and it focuses on what it means to be a good 
professional. This formal professionalism uses a virtue ethics framework to highlight the 
various virtues of physicians.64 Doukas further remarks that: “Hafferty more directly argues 
that the ‘hidden curriculum’ requires incorporation of virtue ethics as ‘necessary for the 
practice of ethical medicine.’”65  Doukas describes the hidden curriculum as helping to 
facilitate healthcare and caregiving, allowing the caregiver to conduct his or her art. These 
competencies include “fidelity to trust, self-effacement, and practical wisdom.”66 The choice of 
word fidelity is interesting, as it represents other concepts like loyalty, reliability, 
trustworthiness, faithfulness and dependability. As with the word trust, one needs to ask further 
questions, such as trust of (or based on) what and trust in whom (e.g. the physician, caregiver, 
healthcare system, etc.). It is also interesting to note the overlap between Beauchamp and 
Childress’ notion of discernment and conscientiousness and the ACGME standard of practical 
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wisdom, aimed at incorporating these notions. Other virtues outlined in this document include 
cultural sensitivity, respect, accountability, openness, confidentiality and responsiveness.67 
These additional virtues highlight the importance of maintaining relationships with patients, as 
well as being sensitive to their particular values and wishes.  
From both Beauchamp and Childress and the ACGME standards, the kind of character 
that is praised or seen as being ethically desirable in healthcare is evident. Given that these 
various virtues are commonly considered as important for caregivers, how might one approach 
the issue of deception? It is important to strive towards being this kind of caregiver, however, 
as with the principlist approach, one might not be able to be fully virtuous – to exhibit all 
virtues consistently and coherently. Similar to principlism, the virtues are prima facie 
important, and may practically come into conflict. The main virtue that is at risk of being 
violated in cases of deception is that of veracity or truthfulness. One can imagine that veracity 
will conflict with other virtues, such as being compassionate. Caregivers ought to consider the 
specific circumstances of each individual patient to weigh and balance which alternative is best 
for the patient and perhaps which alternative best represents a fulsome virtuous caregiver, 
striving to exhibit the most virtuous characteristics as coherently possible. This process also 
requires employing the virtues listed above, such as discernment and conscientiousness.  
Factors to Set Aside 
Two authors, Anthony Tuckett and Ann Begley each offer different virtue ethics approaches to 
deception in healthcare. These two articles specifically focus on a virtue ethics approach to 
healthcare in cases of deception, which is why I have raised them in this section. Both authors 
argue that the conflict in cases of deception occurs between truth-telling and compassion. 
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However, each has a different view on how the conflict ought to be resolved from a virtue 
ethics perspective. I will briefly discuss each argument and discuss why these factors can be set 
aside, in light of the comprehensive account of virtues that I discussed in the previous section.  
Tuckett argues that caregivers ought to take the Good Samaritan parable as exemplary 
of good action. The Good Samaritan aims to selflessly assist a man who was beaten and left for 
dead. The Samaritan defies traditional religious, cultural and political boundaries by aiding 
someone from a different (lower) class in society. The act is iconized as an act of pure 
compassion and care towards a complete stranger. Tuckett argues that the Good Samaritan 
parable is the ideal of caregivers, being compassionate towards others, including strangers, 
without expecting anything in return.68 The conflict in Tuckett’s case occurs between truth-
telling and compassion. The article emphasizes the importance of the prima facie nature of 
truth-telling. Tuckett focuses on truth-telling to patients who are dying and who have mental 
capacity – he remarks that we ought to be sensitive in disclosing information. He uses a 
titration analogy, referring to slowing disclosing information to understand and recognize how 
much the patient and family can actually handle; this approach encourages the use of 
euphemisms and half-truths to protect patients. 69 Tuckett ultimately argues that compassion 
should outweigh one’s duty of veracity.  
There is however, much literature that argues the use of euphemisms should be avoided 
in end-of-life and other kinds of care, and a direct, open approach is much more desirable, 
taking into consideration how much information each patient is able to understand and 
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appreciate at a given time.70 Nonetheless, I will first discuss the second account, Begley’s 
account, and then argue that these two analyses of virtue ethics and deception are inadequate.  
Begley similarly argues that compassion ought to outweigh the virtue of truth-telling. 
She first recognizes the challenge posed by many who hold a position contrary to virtue ethics 
– it lacks the kind of systematicity offered by other normative theories, such as utilitarianism 
and deontology. She then proceeds to remark that virtue ethics is based on experience, 
development through observation and working with mentors who espouse these virtues in daily 
practice while focusing on the complexity of circumstances.71  
Regarding character and deception in nursing practice, Begley highlights cases of 
deception regarding lying to patients about a diagnosis to relieve the stress and burden of fear 
of dying. She indicates that there exists a conflict between truth-telling 
(trustworthiness/honesty) and being compassionate. She remarks: 
Some health-care professionals consider withholding the truth from patients to 
be absolutely morally wrong in all circumstances. Others feel strongly that 
although deliberate lying cannot be justified, withholding the truth rather than 
destroy hope, which is precious and therapeutic, can be justified in the interests 
of compassion and without the arrogance or paternalism often associated with 
these decisions.72 
In her article, Begley describes the importance of exploring the values of each specific patient 
to determine what is best in each situation, guided by the virtues, which may conflict; the 
conflict is ultimately resolved through deep reflection and phronesis regarding what the patient 
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would want to be told or not told. Nonetheless, the focus is on being a present and 
compassionate caregiver.73   
Begley also reflects on the concern that a virtuous person ought to always be truthful 
and attempt to live each virtue to its fullest, as opposed to picking and choosing which virtue 
best relates to a specific situation. This concern relates to Aristotelian virtue ethics, which 
states that one cannot be truly virtuous without espousing all the virtues. Begley, however, 
argues that virtues will come into conflict and that a virtue ethics approach needs to be 
practical and allow for prima facie virtues to outweigh one another in specific instances.74 
I think that Begley is on the right track when arguing that an ethical theory or 
framework needs to be practical for real situations and circumstances, as well as arguing that 
taking into consideration the patient’s wishes and values may affect how one acts, especially in 
cases of truth-telling. However, both Tuckett and Begley focus mainly, and arguably too 
narrowly, on the two virtues of truth-telling (as honesty) and compassion. Begley does 
additionally briefly highlight some other virtues, including practical wisdom and discernment 
in these kinds of cases.75  
In the factors to be considered part of this section, I discussed a comprehensive list of 
virtues involved in caregiving more broadly, but also applicable to cases of deception. I believe 
that both Tuckett and Begley over-simplify the issue of deception in caregiving by seemingly 
choosing between one of two competing virtues – truth-telling and compassion. Although these 
virtues are important, discernment and one’s ability to practically reason through the morally 
relevant features are necessary. In Chapter Four I provide a framework to help caregivers to be 
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able to discern whether deception is morally defensible or indefensible. Discernment and 
prudence on their own are not entirely useful, unless one has constructed a framework to think 
through the morally relevant kinds of considerations. In the previous chapters and throughout 
this chapter, I provide many different morally relevant factors to consider through discernment. 
In Chapter Four I will also discuss how one can use discernment in a non-arbitrary way. 
Hence, the conflict is much more complex than presented by Tuckett and Begley.  
A final concern involves building character more generally, which these articles did not 
address – what kind of person would be willing to and actually participate in deceiving 
patients? What does this say about one’s broader character? Once one is willing to deceive 
patients, does this make it easier to deceive patients in future situations, and would this lead to 
a slippery slope of abuse of deception in healthcare? As I’ve discussed in detail in the 
introduction and Chapter One, the abuse of deception in healthcare is already a serious 
problem. Although I do not wish to argue for a harm reduction approach, I believe that having 
a clear framework to explain when deception is morally defensible and when it is indefensible 
is necessary to avoid snap judgments or malicious intentions for certain cases of deception.76 If 
even deception were used, at least through the framework it would be used for the right 
reasons, under the right circumstances. If caregivers are aware of the parameters when to use 
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deception and when to not use deception, then they are arguably more conscious of morality, 
as opposed to being more inclined to deceive more generally in other cases.  
Given all of these considerations, what can virtue ethics add to the discussion of the 
moral defensibility of deception in bioethics? Virtue ethics provides further strength to the 
values already discussed through the biomedical ethics principles – those of being 
compassionate through beneficence, and being truthful through trust (although I have described 
other forms of enhancing trust) and the need to be thoughtful and prudent in decision-making. 
In the next chapter, I will present a decision-making framework at both the organizational and 
clinical levels that includes the necessary morally relevant factors such that caregivers can be 
prudent when thinking through the dilemma of deception in caregiving.  
Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have argued that there are many different considerations and factors beyond 
Beauchamp and Childress’ traditional biomedical ethics principlist account that ought to be 
involved in the decision-making process for an ethically defensible position for deception in 
caregiving. These factors include deontological concepts, such as the intrinsic value of truth, 
dignity, universality and various duties and obligations of caregivers. I further discussed 
several important pressures and burdens faced by both healthcare providers and caregivers in 
the community more broadly, as consequentialist factors to support deception. I concluded this 
chapter with a discussion of commonly espoused virtues of caregivers, those encouraged by 
both Beauchamp and Childress and the ACGME, and how they might apply to cases of 
deception in caregiving. 
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It is my aim that my philosophical account will clearly articulate the morally relevant 
features for cases of deception and how we ought to weigh and balance these in particular 
cases; I will provide a detailed account of how this can be done in the proceeding chapter. My 
objective will be to support consistency between cases, but also to allow flexibility dependent 
on the specific moral features of each unique patient’s circumstances. 
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Chapter 4  
Weighing and Balancing Factors 
Before continuing with the next chapter, I will briefly summarize my thesis project thus far. In 
Chapter One, I explored the current academic landscape regarding the morality of deception in 
caregiving. I also provided statistics on the prevalence of deception in caregiving and 
caregivers’ self-articulated reasons for its use. I redefined the problem of deception as being 
more complex than weighing and balancing either only autonomy and beneficence or 
autonomy and trust. I outlined each of the traditional bioethics principles to consider as an 
alternative to the traditional debates surrounding the moral dilemma of deception in caregiving. 
In Chapter Two I discussed several alternatives to deception, including the use of restraints, 
advance care planning and absolute truth-telling. I argued that although these alternatives may 
be more appropriate than deception in certain circumstances, deception might be the morally 
preferable option in other circumstances, for which I will provide a framework in this chapter. 
However, before detailing the circumstances that allow for deception, I explored and discussed 
additional morally relevant factors when deciding whether or not to use deception in the third 
chapter. These factors include the legal and professional constraints on healthcare providers, 
and considerations that we should explore from different moral theories, including 
consequentialism, deontology and virtue ethics.  
In this chapter, I will respond to the following questions. What ought we do with these 
factors? How can we coherently specify them, then weigh and balance these considerations in 
a practical, justified and non-arbitrary manner? What is the appropriate follow-up regarding re-
assessing the use of deception and what kind of documentation is necessary? This chapter is 
divided in three sections. First, I will provide a comprehensive account at both the 
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organizational (policy) and clinical (patient-specific) levels on how to work through these 
ethical issues, followed by a methodological way of weighing and balancing the considerations 
associated with deception in caregiving. Lastly, I will discuss additional requirements for the 
implementation of deception as a treatment conduit. 
A Process for Specification, Weighing and Balancing 
In the following section, I will discuss how we can consider deception at both the 
organizational and the clinical levels. I will provide a decision-making framework to create and 
implement a policy and a clinical decision-making process for deciding which cases of 
deception are morally defensible or indefensible. I use the considerations and factors described 
in Chapter One and Chapter Three to weigh and balance factors why, in certain situations, 
deception is morally impermissible at the organizational level. I further argue that there are 
other conditions that ought to be met before proceeding to the next level – the clinical level. I 
specify the boarder principles and values described in previous chapters to cases of deception 
at the organizational level to develop broad cases when deception ought and ought not be used. 
The final section focuses on clinical conditions and on further specifications to analyze 
individual cases and to decide whether deception is ultimately morally defensible or 
indefensible in unique cases. 
Organizational Policy 
What would a policy look like at an organizational level regarding deception? Should 
deception be considered at all, given the grave risk of breaking trust within society if it were 
known that deceptive acts were occurring? Should an organization take the position that it is 
completely morally indefensible to use deception in any case?  
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In light of the various considerations throughout the preceding chapters, I have 
determined six major morally relevant factors to consider when deciding whether or not 
deception ought to be used at an organizational level. Even though the categories relate to 
specific patient experiences, we can use them to group together the kinds of situations when 
deception would be morally permissible and those when it would be morally indefensible. The 
categories are as follows: mental capacity, compliance with treatment (when applicable), 
substantive risk of distrust, significant chance of benefit, disclosure (if possible) and controlled 
environments. I will discuss each of these considerations as either a constraint or necessary 
condition on the use of deception, and argue why each is included in its respective category. It 
might be necessary to work through the clinical framework to help populate and specify 
whether the particular case fits within a moral constraint or necessary condition. For example, 
one might need to discuss the harms associated with a particular case to understand whether 
there will be a significant risk of distrust.  
In this section I will refer to morally impermissible/reprehensible/indefensible acts to 
mean those that one ought not perform. Morally permissible acts are those that are not 
prohibited, but are required to be considered further under the scrutiny of the clinical 
framework for assessing deception. After the assessment through the clinical framework, one 
can determine whether the act is morally defensible. I will argue under each category why each 
factor is either a constraint or a necessary condition referring back to the morally relevant 
factors I have gathered in preceding chapters. 
At the organizational or policy level, it is more evident that certain general constraints 
and necessary conditions can be clearly stated given the likely consequences of each. At the 
organizational level, certain factors tip the scale more clearly against the use of deception 
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given their significant negative consequences. As such, there are also necessary conditions 
when considering deception that ought to be met. Hence, under each constraint and necessary 
condition, I will argue why these factors make the use of deception either more evidently 
indefensible/ defensible. In the clinical decision-making framework, however, it is less clear 
how each morally relevant factor contributes to the moral indefensibility/defensibility until 
more information is gathered regarding each specific patient. Once the broader bioethics 
principles are further specified in the clinical decision-making process, then weighing and 
balancing are necessary.  
Constraints on Deception 
Constraints are non-negotiable excluding factors. If the act of deception could reasonably 
involve the constraint, then deception is morally impermissible. First, I will discuss having 
mental capacity to make treatment and other decisions as being another constraint for the use 
of deception in caregiving. I will then discuss compliance with treatment (when applicable) as 
being another constraint and lastly I will reflect on substantive risk of distrust as a third 
organizational constraint. 
For each case of deception, I would like to emphasize that there will be a minimal risk 
of distrust. However, in order for the category to be a constraint on deception, I would argue 
that there ought to be a substantive risk of distrust. I want to exclude situations where there is a 
small chance of distrust occurring, but rather focus on those cases where the risk is greater than 
minimal or rather a substantive risk of distrust. Determining the level of distrust will ultimately 
be based on the judgment of the healthcare team regarding weighting the risk and harm 
involved.  
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Mental Capacity 
If a patient has mental capacity (the ability to understand and appreciate multiple factors 
regarding her treatment/placement)1 then deception is morally indefensible. As described in 
earlier chapters, in order to have mental capacity patients must be able to understand and to 
appreciate the relevant information provided by health care providers.2 They are able to decide 
what they want and do not want in their current condition, given all the appropriate information 
to make an informed decision.  
When patients have mental capacity, deception is morally impermissible because it robs 
individuals of the ability to provide an informed consent or refusal, and it negatively impacts 
their autonomy to make decisions for themselves for reasons outlined in earlier chapters. As 
long as this decision is informed with the necessary information to make the decision, and a 
patient is able to understand and appreciate all necessary information, then a patient’s 
autonomous choice should be respected. I described earlier the legal constraint on decision-
making of informed consent and the legal requirement of healthcare providers to obtain an 
informed consent if a patient has mental capacity for that treatment. Hence, mental capacity is 
not only an ethical constraint given its relationship with respecting autonomy, but also a legal 
constraint due to legislative requirements to obtain informed consent from a person who has 
mental capacity. Deception would be in direct opposition to informed consent of mentally 
capable patients for these reasons and, is thus, an organizational constraint.  
                                                
1. Health Care Consent Act. 
2. The detailed information required to obtain an “informed” consent is outlined in the Health Care 
Consent Act (Ibid.). 
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Compliance with Treatment (when applicable) 
Another constraint on deception occurs if a patient is compliant with taking her medication 
and/or with her treatment and the medication/treatment is determined to be in the patient’s best 
interests, including her values, wishes and beliefs. When considering the risks and harms 
associated with deception, if the act can be avoided through a less intrusive means, then 
deception ought not be used. This constraint also addresses the character (referring back to 
virtue ethics) of a caregiver – the less often a caregiver deceives, the better it is for her 
character.  
Hence, one must only allow for deception in cases where a patient is not taking the 
medication or adhering to treatment on her own. However, as described earlier, it is important 
to discover why the patient is choosing not to take the medication and address any concerns 
relating to the administering of the medication prior to considering deception.3 
Substantive Risk of Distrust 
If the act of deception is likely to create substantive distrust, then deception ought not be used 
in these cases. Let us consider the types of cases for which this would be applicable.  
It is important to ascertain information about a patient’s previous experiences and 
expectations about her healthcare. In Chapter One, I discussed in great detail the role of 
expectations in trust, and how expectations are developed from patients’ former experiences 
and their understanding of healthcare. It may be difficult to determine whether a patient would 
have a particular expected reaction to deception and especially to disclosure if the caregivers 
do not have a long-standing relationship with the patient. This constraint is necessary for those 
                                                
3. Sheffield Care Homes (NHS Foundation Trust), “Good Practice Guidance on Covert Administration 
of Medication.” 
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patients where there is already a significant distrust in the system and in those cases where the 
healthcare team believes that there is future significant risk of distrust from using deception as 
a treatment or other means. 
Substantive risk of distrust is an organizational constraint because it profoundly 
impacts the caregiver-patient relationship. It makes it more difficult for patients to seek future 
healthcare services either from the specific caregiver or from healthcare institutions more 
broadly. This limits a patient’s future ability to exercise autonomy, as her health declines and 
she may not seek appropriate medical care in subsequent events. Deception could likely create 
significant harm to patients with a high risk of distrust as future healthcare conditions arise. 
Substantive risk of distrust further isolates and stigmatizes vulnerable populations, which in 
effect impacts access to healthcare, a concern for social justice.  
Gilson writes: “At a micro-level, trust benefits people by establishing stable 
relationships; indeed, without trust successful relationships are almost impossible.”4 Mohseni 
and Lindstrom further discuss the importance of social capital. Social capital can be defined 
as: “those features of social structures – such as levels of interpersonal trust, norms of 
reciprocity and mutual aid – which constitute resources which may facilitate interaction 
between individuals and groups of individuals to achieve collective action.”5 The authors 
provide several significant consequences of distrust, which include unwillingness to return for 
future care, reluctance to use additional services and non-compliance with treatments.6 
Mohseni and Lindstrom completed a survey in 2004 with residents in the Sweden city of 
                                                
4. Gilson, “Trust and the Development of Health Care as a Social Institution,” 1458. 
5. Mohabbat Mohseni and Martin Lindstrom, “Social Capital, Trust in the Health-Care System and Self-
Rated Health: The Role of Access to Health Care in a Population-Based Study,” Social Science & Medicine 64, 
no. 7 (April 2007): 4. 
6. Ibid., 6. 
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Scania. Several factors were assessed for 27,963 participants.7 “The results of this study 
indicate that individuals with low institutional trust in the health care system to a significantly 
higher extent have poor self-perceived health… If a person has trust in the health care system 
that person is more likely to seek help and receive adequate treatment.”8 Hence, when there is a 
perceived substantive risk of distrust, the negative impacts on autonomy, trust, non-
maleficence and other moral considerations can be so severe compared to any benefit that one 
ought to not deceive. Establishing a trusting relationship is important in the comprehensive 
holistic consideration of a patient’s care, rather than focusing on an immediate relief of 
symptoms, for example. The risk of harm associated with significant distrust and the patient 
not receiving future healthcare is so high that when weighing between benefit and harm, the 
harm would most almost certainly trump any benefit.  
It is important to note, perhaps, the difference between healthcare provider employed 
by a healthcare institution and caregivers more broadly, such as family members and friends in 
the community. On the one hand, caregivers often have a well-established relationship with 
patients and have a stronger foundation for trust. In the previously mentioned Stroup, Swartz, 
and Appelbaum research study, patients were upset that family members deceived them, but 
this did not significantly impact their relationship.9 On the other hand, healthcare providers 
often see patients for a small caption of their lives and cannot rely on a long-standing 
relationship to buffer the risk of distrust caused by the use of deception. I argue that it would 
be more acceptable for those who have strong trusting relationships to deceive than those who 
do not have an established trusting relationship. I will also note that those caregivers who have 
                                                
7. Ibid., 9. 
8. Ibid., 12–13. 
9. Stroup, Swartz, and Appelbaum, “Concealed Medicines for People with Schizophrenia,” 537–542. 
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long-standing relationships with someone in the community – consider a mother/adult child 
relationship – are much more prone to burnout from caring for another person over a long 
duration of time, whereas in-patient healthcare providers again only often see patients for a 
shorter duration of time. Nonetheless, some healthcare providers do have long-standing 
relationships with some patients, and perhaps more so that the patient’s family or friends 
depending on the situation. Hence, there is a need to understand the relationship of each patient 
with her caregiver(s). 
Consider, for example, a patient who has severe paranoia and who is already very 
hesitant to receive treatment from the healthcare organization given her distorted experiences 
of reality and her feelings of paranoia. Deception in this case could be morally impermissible if 
there is not an established relationship with the patient. Often with psychiatric medication, as 
well, patients need to continue to take the medication for a very long time, which requires that 
patients develop a trusting relationship with their caregiver to have medication modifications 
and adjustments.10 
On the other hand, a healthcare team may encounter a situation where there is a strong 
trust relationship already forged with the team. For example, consider a patient who often 
trusts that what the healthcare team decides is in her best interests. In this kind of case, 
deception would likely be morally permissible. However, one ought to use the clinical 
framework to determine whether deception is defensible in each specific case as there may be 
other reasons to not use deception for a specific patient.  
 I have already discussed in detail the different interpretations of trust. From an 
organizational/policy level it is hard to determine what expectations society and a particular 
                                                
10. National Institute of Mental Health, “Mental Health Medications.” 
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community expects of the healthcare organization given that the community members are so 
diverse. In general, truth-telling and reliability are important values and expectations of 
healthcare organizations and they should be fostered unless there would be significant benefit 
compared to harm for using deception, and there exists no other alternative with similar merits. 
Hence, if the deception were likely to cause substantial risk of distrust, then deception is 
morally indefensible. As I’ve argued earlier, the risk of distrust is often dependent on the kind 
of relationship a patient has with a caregiver and whether other forms of trust (aside from truth-
telling) have been and can be significantly fostered over time. 
To conclude, there are three significant organizational constraints on the use of 
deception in caregiving – mental capacity, compliance with treatment (when applicable) and a 
substantial risk of distrust.  
Necessary Conditions 
Necessary conditions are conditions that must be first met such that deception is considered 
morally permissible. They do not, by themselves, make deception morally defensible. Once 
these factors are explored, the clinical patient-centered clinical process (which I will describe 
in detail later in this chapter) determines whether deception ought to be used in each unique 
case. The three necessary conditions that I will discuss in this section are: significant chance of 
benefit, disclosure (if possible) and controlled environments. 
Significant Chance of Benefit 
A necessary condition for the permissibility of deception is the likelihood of benefit for each 
patient. This condition focuses on the best interests of the patient and her prognosis, for 
example, from taking the medication provided through deception. I see there being two broad 
categories of benefits for patients – recovery and sustainable. Recovery benefits are those 
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where a patient can make a relatively quick recovery and is not likely to relapse. Sustainable 
benefits are those associated with a chronic condition, for which restoration of full autonomy is 
unlikely and the patient’s current condition needs to be maintained as opposed to cured. Both 
recovery and sustainable benefits are closely related to beneficence and social justice and the 
various capabilities and opportunities that can be made available through taking covert 
medication or following a false belief. However, I want to emphasis that, essentially, deception 
in all its forms can be so damaging that there must be good reasons for its use (e.g. significant 
benefits).  
Consider, for example, a patient who has a very small chance of the proposed 
medication being effective. In this kind of case, the use of deception would likely be morally 
impermissible, as the risk of distrust and it associated harms could outweigh any kind of 
minimal benefits from the medication. Considering proportionality, the benefits would likely 
not outweigh the risks and concerns of deception. Since the therapeutic alliance and trust 
between a patient and caregiver are so incredibly important, the benefits of the deception must 
be significant when weighing and balancing the associated harms and risks.  
Another case may involve a patient who would either moderately or significantly 
benefit from the medication – for example, the medication would likely restore autonomy for 
the patient and she could continue to flourish and participate actively in her pre-psychotic 
lifestyle. For example, a brief psychotic episode is characterized by full recovery and the lack 
of reoccurrence and could be a situation where deception is permissible, if other alternatives 
are not effective.11 This is an example of a short-term or recovery benefit. In this case, the 
chance of psychosis occurring again is minimal and the risk of deception becoming ineffective 
                                                
11. Rashmi Nemade and Mark Dombeck, “Prognosis and Recovery Factors of Schizophrenia,” 
MentalHelp.net, August 7, 2009, http://www.mentalhelp.net/poc/view_doc.php?type=doc&id=8806. 
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due to patient knowledge after disclosure could be minimal. Nonetheless, it is hard to 
determine in advance whether a psychiatric illness will respond to medication, including the 
correct dosage and the type of medication. Caregivers simply may not be able to know what 
the benefits are until after a prolonged period of time. Consider the constraint that I described 
earlier – the risk of substantial distrust – and the importance of relationships and trust if 
considering using deception. Since it is difficult to determine in advance whether medication 
will be successful, and often in these cases no substantial relationship with the patient has been 
established, deception is likely indefensible. For these short-term interactions, a likely 
alternative would be to use coercive means if an incapable patient refuses medication, such as 
providing the option to either take the medication or to receive it forcibly. However, if over a 
period of time it is determined that a sustainable approach is needed, then deception might be 
considered an alternative given the likely risk/ benefit ratio.  
Consider a different example that involves long-term benefit. For example, consider the 
case of a patient who has advanced dementia, with no hope of recovery. In this case, the patient 
is similar to a chronic patient in the sense that she would continuously and repetitively have 
cognitive episodes. One difference is, however, a patient with advanced dementia would 
continuously decline. In these kinds of cases, one must also consider whether there is a 
substantive risk of distrust, which may override using deception. Even though the patient is not 
recovering, her condition can be maintained through deception, as long as the benefits of its 
use outweigh any small risk of distrust or harm. This must be continuously assessed.  
Let us further consider those patients for whom there is little chance of recovery, but 
for whom the illness/disease is chronic or progressive. Patients who have Alzheimer’s disease, 
for example, where the illness progressively causes cognitive decline, fall into this category. In 
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these kinds of cases, patients often decline rapidly. The need for deceptively providing 
medications and using deception in conversation (such as deceiving that a deceased spouse is 
alive) will likely increase as the disease progresses. Additionally, the ability to even hold any 
belief significantly decreases over time with diseases such as Alzheimer’s. Hence, there is a 
threshold when the risk of distrust is no longer a constraint on deception – when the disease 
process is so evolved that concerns regarding accessing future treatment and creating distrust 
no longer apply due to the severe cognitive decline of these patients. Hence, the reasons why 
deception is considered wrong, would eventually no longer apply in these situations. 
Nonetheless, if any other constraint is present, the act of deception is morally impermissible.  
Other illnesses such as schizophrenia, however, are often life-long illnesses, with a 
significant chance of an act of deception leading to distrust and other harmful consequences. It 
is estimated that about 50% of patients who experience schizophrenia will be independent over 
the course of ten years; however, much of their recovery depends on how early it is diagnosed. 
The remainder of the patient population with schizophrenia, however, will require continuous 
support and intervention throughout their lives.12 In cases where the illness is chronic, but not 
producing a rapid decline, the risk of distrust is much more significant and may place moral 
limits on the use of deception. In these cases, the use of deception ought to be used sparingly 
and extremely cautiously with patients for safety concerns, such as drug interactions and future 
resistance to taking medication if the patient starts to feel better. This patient population is not 
necessarily declining due to illness, but is often sustained, and can continue to hold beliefs for 
many years unlike the advanced Alzheimer’s population. I will further discuss being in a 
controlled environment as an important condition in the next section.  
                                                
12. Ibid. 
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It is important to note that for medication used for mental illness, it is often a difficult 
process to predict and to determine which medication works best and at what dose. This 
approach can be lengthy for chronic illness, trying to determine the most effective and 
appropriate dose and type of medication.13 Hence, it is unlikely that deception for regular 
treatment of psychiatric illnesses especially in the community at least in determining the 
medication type and dose initially, would be an effective method and should be avoided since 
it practically cannot be safely monitored and tested, or applied. Nonetheless, after determining 
the benefits compared to the risks (and this can of course change over time) one could consider 
deception as an alternative.  
I have also discussed in Chapter Two why it is unlikely that using deception would 
occur in an emergency situation, such as when a patient is aggressive and an immediate 
potential harm to herself and/or others. In these cases, the medication often must be given 
quickly without the time available to use deception. Nonetheless, given that patients often 
remember previous incidents of psychosis, cases of repeated attempted deception might 
significantly impact trust and even cause the patient to be more disturbed if deception is 
attempted again and the patient is suspicious of the healthcare team. Hence, it is morally 
impermissible in these cases to use deception, especially given that there are other more 
effective alternatives that actually foster trust in an emergency – such as providing the option 
to a patient of either taking the medication or the staff will have to physically provide it.14 
Hence, as a general guiding rule for organizational policy and procedure, if the illness 
is likely to have little benefit, then deception is morally impermissible due to its impact on 
                                                
13. National Institute of Mental Health, “Mental Health Medications.” 
14. Forcing a patient to take medication (e.g. through restraints and an injection) can only be used, 
however, when the physical means are present – such as a security team or a specially trained mental health team.  
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trust, the patient-caregiver relationship and its long-term effectiveness as a treatment conduit. 
The benefits must outweigh any of the possible risks and harms, which is why significant 
chance of benefit is a necessary condition. Given that psychiatric medication is often provided 
on a trial basis to determine what works best, deception should only be used after it is the dose 
and type of medication are established as being beneficial for the patient and the patient 
continues to refuse the medication. I have argued in this section that the benefit of a treatment 
of medication must not only be significant, but must also be established prior to being 
implemented deceptively, because of the extremely high stakes for the caregiver-patient trust 
relationship and other harms and risks associated with deception. 
Disclosure (when possible) 
It is necessary for greater trust in the healthcare system to disclose that deception was used 
after it has been implemented to those who may have short-term or recovery benefit. However, 
as I described above, these cases will likely be rare. Disclosure is often not possible for those 
patients whom require deception to sustain a chronic or progressive illness, and, in these cases, 
disclosure may not be necessary. However, I want to emphasis that if the patient’s condition 
changes and the patient is able to regain mental capacity and autonomous abilities, disclosure 
is required. Cases that are much more difficult are those where capacity fluctuates over time 
with pockets of regained autonomy. In these types of cases, it would be important to discuss an 
advance care plan and/or creating a community treatment order to involve the patient in 
deciding what to do when relapse occurs in future. 
It is important to disclose that deception has occurred after capacity is regained for the 
many reasons listed in Chapter One and Chapter Three. For example, if disclosure does not 
occur, patients may believe that they got better on their own. Additionally, if they continue to 
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take medication, they may not know why they are experiencing particular side effects and this 
can be a scary incident, perhaps even worsening paranoid or delusional beliefs. Another 
implication of non-disclosure is that patients may inadvertently experience potentially 
dangerous drug interactions if they are not aware that they should not be consuming alcohol or 
taking other medications and so forth while being on a particular anti-psychotic or other 
medication. Hence, it is important to disclose that deception was used in the treatment process 
due to the potential dangerous consequences of non-disclosure, as well as respecting patient 
autonomy if regained.  
An exception to disclosure is, described above, related to long-term or chronic illness. 
In these kinds of cases, the disease/illness has progressed so far that the reasons why we would 
not disclose would likely no longer apply. For example, under regular circumstances, 
disclosure is necessary because of the severe consequences listed above. Disclosure in the case 
of a patient with advanced Alzheimer’s disease would not likely encounter these same 
consequences (e.g. concerns of drug interactions and beliefs about getting better on one’s own) 
such as in the case of deceiving a patient regarding her deceased partner. I will discuss further 
in the clinical-based framework, however, that not all cases involving a patient who has 
Alzheimer’s disease grants deception being morally permissible – we ought to refine the 
conversation to be more patient-centered at the clinical level. Hence, disclosure is a necessary 
condition for short-term cases. 
Controlled Environments 
A final necessary condition is being in a controlled environment. I do not mean that only 
patients who are on secure units can be justifiably deceived. Rather, any patient who can 
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reasonably be monitored and observed frequently is considered to be in a controlled 
environment.  
There are several operative morally relevant factors to justify that a patient ought to be 
in a controlled environment in order to implement deception. First, there can be significant side 
effects from a medication provided, which can be frightening and worrisome for patients. 
Hence, side effects must be monitored very cautiously and the dose and the type of medication 
altered appropriately. Additionally, in a controlled environment, staff and other caregivers can 
also pay close attention to the other kinds of substances that the patient ingests to anticipate 
and to keep careful watch for any potential drug interactions. In a controlled environment, 
caregivers can also observe that the patient who requires the medication is ingesting the 
medication fully through drink or food, and not sharing this with any others.15 One can 
understand that there are significant harms associated with other patients ingesting medications 
that are not appropriate for them.  
The necessary condition of a controlled environment significantly reduces harms that 
can occur with deception. This factor aims at reducing the risks associated with deception – 
this idea is most closely linked to the bioethics principle of non-maleficence. By having a 
controlled environment, many of the concerns that I addressed in previous chapters are 
mitigated through careful monitoring. 
In this section, I have discussed in detail several constraints and several necessary 
conditions at the higher, organizational or policy level of moral decision-making for cases of 
deception in caregiving. To summarize, the constraints include: mental capacity, compliance 
with treatment (when applicable) and risk of substantive distrust. The necessary conditions 
                                                
15. Anirudh Kala, “Covert Medication; The Last Option: A Case for Taking It out of the Closet and 
Using It Selectively,” Indian Journal of Psychiatry 54, no. 3 (2012): 257–265. 
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include: significant chance of recovery, disclosure (when possible), and controlled 
environments. I used the considerations and factors described in earlier chapters to weigh and 
balance reasons why in certain situations deception is morally indefensible – those which 
involve the constraints listed above. I further used the considerations and factors to argue why 
there are other conditions that ought to be met before proceeding to the next level – the clinical 
level. Essentially, I specified the boarder principles and values to cases of deception at the 
organizational level. The next section will focus on further specifications to respect and to 
consider unique individual cases and to further decide whether deception is morally defensible 
or indefensible through a case-by-case analysis. 
In the next section, I will discuss in detail a decision-making framework that I will call 
embedded specified principlism (ESP) that ought to be used at the clinical decision-making 
level. For example, if there are no constraints present in the situation, and the consideration of 
deception also accords with the necessary conditions listed above, the act of deception can be 
considered morally permissible. However, this does not make the act of deception the morally 
correct course of action – one ought to work through the framework provided below to 
determine whether deception is morally justifiable, as there may be another more morally 
defensible alternative to deception. 
Clinical Decision-Making – Embedded Specified Principlism (ESP)  
In this section, I will discuss the clinical process for determining the moral defensibility of 
deception at the case patient-specific level. Such that this process is easier to follow, I have 
created a series of steps in the decision-making framework for caregivers to work through. I 
will discuss each step and what it discloses to caregivers about the morality of deceiving in 
caregiving.  
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The clinical decision-making framework is a method for weighing and balancing the 
factors that were described in detail in Chapter One and Chapter Three, while also taking into 
consideration the alternatives discussed in Chapter Two. The steps that I introduce bring 
together all of the morally relevant factors to be considered for deception in caregiving. I 
believe that this original framework for reflecting on the morality of deception in caregiving is 
practical, thorough and robust such that caregivers will be able to morally justify their decision 
to either use or not use deception in a particular case. The decision-making framework uses 
principlism broadly, while maintaining a very practical series of steps for caregivers to follow. 
I have created a series of questions to help guide caregivers through the decision of whether 
one ought to deceive in each unique patient’s case, with the aim that any significant red flags 
raised through this process will guide caregivers to not use deception. Later, I will further 
discuss general principles used to ensure non-arbitrariness during this process.  
Assess the Mental Capacity of the Patient for the Present Decision 
Although I have listed mental capacity above as a constraint at the organizational level, I 
believe it is important to reiterate that if a patient has capacity to make decisions for herself, 
deception is morally impermissible.  
Capacity is also treatment and time specific and cannot be assessed globally.16 Hence, 
the assessment must be regarding the specific use of deception – whether that is regarding 
covert medication or other forms of deception. Given that deception is also time specific, it is 
important to have discussions regarding deception during those moments of regained mental 
capacity, when possible, to respect a patient’s autonomy.  
                                                
16. Health Care Consent Act. 
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Bring all of the Appropriate Stakeholders Together 
This step requires that any member of the healthcare team and substitute decision-maker(s) 
should meet to discuss whether or not to use deception. Ideally, this would involve the 
substitute decision-maker(s), other family members, the most responsible physician, the social 
worker, the pharmacist, the SLP, the primary nursing staff, the community care access care 
coordinator (if applicable) and any others who are directly involved in the patient’s care. Of 
course not all of these members may be necessary, depending on the kind of deception that is 
being considered.  
Consider all Reasonable Alternatives to the Use of Deception 
Consider the list of alternatives provided in the second chapter. Would either restraints, 
creating a contract during moments of lucidity or truth-telling be plausible alternatives to 
deception? Have they been attempted in the past, why or why not? Are there any other 
alternatives that should be considered, such as reasons why the medication is being refused? 
Earlier in this chapter, I discussed how, on some mental health units, patients are offered a 
coercive choice to either take an anti-psychotic or to be given the medication forcefully as 
another option. Would this be a possibility given the circumstances? 
Once the reasonable alternatives have been explored and deception is still determined 
to be a plausible alternative given the patient’s specific history and previous experiences, 
caregivers must consider the legal, professional and ethical factors listed below. Any other 
plausible alternatives are to be kept in mind throughout this process and the alternative that 
ultimately has the greatest benefit to harm ratio in light of all the factors below would be the 
most morally defensible option.  
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Perform a Legal, Professional and Ethical Analysis 
Caregivers must consider each of the following sections carefully to determine whether the 
kind of deception they are considering would fit within their legal and professional constraints 
and whether the act of deception would be morally justifiable given the morally relevant 
factors discussed in Chapter Three.  
This process involves specification of the bioethics principles and other morally 
relevant factors to each unique case. All of the morally relevant factors are listed below the 
legal and professional constraints. These include, and are certainly not limited to, respect for 
autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, justice and trust, to name a few. These principles 
were thoroughly discussed in Chapter One. I further added consequentialist, deontological and 
virtue ethics factors to the list of ethical considerations and I discussed each morally relevant 
factor in comprehensive detail in Chapter Three. I will present each factor along with a series 
of questions to help guide the caregiver through this framework. I describe this process as 
patient-centered as it is requires that caregivers determine the specific values, needs and 
concerns related to each unique patient and her experiences.  
Legal and Professional Constraints 
Legal and Professional Duties and Obligations: 
(a) Informed Consent (Health Care Consent Act, 1996) 
• Right to Choose/Right to Refuse 
• Informed Consent must be provided by a patient or his/her SDM 
(b) Right to Personal Health Information (Personal Health Information Protection Act 
of Ontario, 2004) 
• Truth-telling  
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Morally Relevant Factors 
In this section, I list the traditional bioethics principles along with several integral questions 
related to their specification to each unique case. As one works through each of these sections, 
it is important to keep in mind any alternatives described in the first step of this process. It is 
necessary to review, during the process, if there are any other ways to provide medication or to 
reduce patient suffering that are more morally justifiable without using deception. For 
example, when considering respect for autonomy and what a patient would actually want, it is 
necessary to consider all plausible alternatives in light of what the patient would want. Some of 
the questions are specific to deception, but most can be applied to the alternatives as well. 
In this section I provide distinct questions under each morally relevant factor. The 
process of specification occurs at this point in the decision-making framework. Specification is 
“a process of reducing the indeterminate character of abstract norms and generating more 
specific, action-guiding content.”17 Richardson further adds that specification is completed by 
“spelling out where, when, why, how, by what means, to whom, or by whom the action is to be 
done or avoided.”18 Specification is supposed to add content to the general principles as 
applied to specific situations. In Chapter Five I will argue why specification as a sole theory to 
guide ethical decision-making is inadequate.  
According to Beauchamp, Childress and Richardson, specification involves taking a 
broad, general principle, and making it into another (or more than one) principle that is an off-
shoot, which is smaller in scope, yet still captures the spirit of the original principle. For 
example, when specifying respect for autonomy, one could articulate that an advance care plan 
                                                
17. Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 17. 
18. Richardson, “Specifying, Balancing and Interpreting Bioethical Principles,” 289. 
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clearly states one’s wishes that should be followed if possible. This specified-principle 
captures the spirit of respect for autonomy in a clear and tangible way, which we can use in the 
case of deception. 
Traditional Principlist Factors 
• Respect for autonomy 
o What are the patient’s wishes, values, goals (both substantive and experiential) 
and would deception align with these goals? 
o What would the patient want, if capable? 
o Has the patient ever expressed verbally how she feels about her medication, its 
side effects, etc.? 
o Does the patient have an advance care plan regarding medication and forms of 
administration? Can we create one, when the patient has lucidity? 
• Beneficence 
o What are the medical indications in this given case? (Consider: diagnosis, 
prognosis, probability of benefit of treatment/medication/deception)  
o Is this medication necessary and/or likely to significantly benefit the patient?19  
o What are in the medical best interests of the patient, given a generally shared 
list of aims and goals – e.g. what would a reasonable person in our society 
want?  
• Non-maleficence 
o What are the harms associated with covert medication/lying?  
                                                
19. Mental Health Commission for Scotland, “Good Practice Guide: Covert Medication,” November 
2013, http://www.mwcscot.org.uk/media/140485/covert_medication_finalnov_13.pdf. 
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o Are there any pharmaceutical concerns? (e.g. potential medication interactions, 
medication changes when administered in a different form, such as being 
crushed) 
o Are there any unknowns, given the patient’s condition and/or lifestyle that could 
lead to harm? (e.g. does the patient frequently use other substances in the 
community?)  
o Can the patient be easily monitored re: side-effects? Are there known side-
effects of the particular medication for this patient? 
o How will the caregivers disclose, if possible, that deception occurred after the 
medication has restored autonomy and are there any predicted harms from 
doing so? How can we mitigate these harms, if possible? 
o Who will be providing the medication to the patient?20 Is any additional training 
necessary? 
o Does any team member have additional concerns with the use of deception? 
Please describe.21 
o Are the harms proportionate to the benefits? What reasons can we offer for this? 
• Social justice 
o Is this patient a part of a particularly vulnerable 22 , under-represented 
population? How can we ensure the patient has adequate representation? 
                                                
20. Ibid. 
21. Ibid., 7. 
22. If the patient belongs to a more vulnerable population, especially if she does not have strong 
representation, then caregivers have a stronger duty to advocate for this patient population. As described above 
too, it is important to reduce stigma of these populations and promote the dignity of each patient. 
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o How can we maximize the opportunities and capabilities available for the 
patient given his/her values? (e.g. basic human needs, such as attaining food, 
shelter, companionship, other relationships, etc.) 
• Fostering Trust 
o How can we foster trust better with the patient? 
o What are the patient’s expectations of the healthcare system?  
o Are there any reasons we have that the patient may be more susceptible for 
distrust?  
Deontological Factors 
• Human dignity 
o How can we try to treat and to respect the patient as a person with intrinsic 
value and worth? 
o What are the patient’s personal standards and how can we best ensure these 
standards are being upheld? 
• (Set Aside: Intrinsic Value of Truth & Universality) 
Consequentialist Factors 
• Pressures on healthcare providers & non-healthcare providers 
o What are some avenues that healthcare providers can use to address resource 
concerns that would not jeopardize patient care? 
o Are there currently any programs that offer respite for healthcare providers and 
other caregivers to lessen caregiver burnout? 
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Virtue Ethics Factors 
• Character building (especially compassion and truth-telling) 
o What are the reasons for considering deception? Are they in keeping with the 
kind or type of caregiver the patient would want or, in society more generally, 
what a reasonable person would expect from a caregiver? 
 
I should make a brief note here to describe why I have used distinct categories for each 
of the deontological, consequentialist and virtue ethics factors, as opposed to reducing them to 
other principlist considerations. I do not believe that Beauchamp and Childress capture these 
equally important considerations in their traditional biomedical ethics principles. Concepts 
such as human dignity and character of the caregiver are addressed but not with the same 
significance as the traditional bioethics principles. Beauchamp and Childress do discuss the 
moral personality traits associated with a caregiver, but when considering a tool for caregivers 
to assist with decision-making, I believe including these morally relevant factors alongside the 
traditional principlist moral factors is necessary for a robust and practical framework. They are 
also important considerations for caregivers, which make the framework more accessible to 
everyday ethics. I will argue in further detail in Chapter Five for some important revisions to 
Beauchamp and Childress’ biomedical ethics principles.  
After carefully specifying these factors to each unique patient’s circumstances and into 
smaller principles, when possible, the healthcare team ought to consider together whether 
deception is morally permissible in the specific case presented through weighing and balancing 
these factors together in light of the alternatives. But how does one actually weigh and balance 
the information provided above? 
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First, Beauchamp and Childress describe specification as making general principles, 
such as respect for autonomy, relevant to the specific situation through more principles that are 
smaller in scope. For example, above, I specified respect for autonomy by asking a series of 
questions that relate autonomy directly to the use of deception in healthcare. Once we have 
responses to all of the questions and make smaller principles when possible, it is important to 
assign the principle a metaphorical “weight.” A weight is not a numerical value, such as in a 
utilitarian calculus. It is decided through judgment for each case and reflects the approximate 
value of each specified principle. For example, how important is the patient’s autonomy in this 
specific case relative to the harms that could come from deception? In one case, the harms may 
be significant to the patient as well as the community and would, relative to autonomy, 
outweigh the principle of respect for autonomy. In another case, the harms might not be 
significant, and autonomy might have a heavier associated weight. 
Once each specified principle is considered, one needs to explore which alternative the 
principle is supporting – for example, is it leaning towards the use of deception or not? After 
placing each principle with the decision to either deceive or not to deceiver, and noting that 
some principles can be placed in the middle, since they are not clearly either in favour of 
deception or not, one can determine the most morally defensible decision. The alternative that 
has the greatest overall support is the most morally defensible position. Note that I am not 
arguing that more principles that favour a particular alternative indicates that it is the right 
course of action. Instead, an alternative with fewer principles may be the morally defensible 
course of action if the overall balance of each specified principle is greater than the sum of 
more principles,. Additionally, it may be the case that the overall balance reveals that both 
alternative are morally defensible. In Chapter Five I will address how one ought to weigh and 
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balance factors in the most unbiased way possible – I will discuss several methods for making 
the weighing and balancing process as non-arbitrary as possible. 
When weighing and balancing competing principles, there are several different types of 
cases that I describe. First, if a patient is mentally capable of making the decision for herself, 
then there are several main considerations (in addition to the other morally relevant factors) 
that ought to be weighed and balanced, which include respect for autonomy, encompassing 
promoting a patient’s autonomy, harm to others and fairness to others when resources are 
limited. In the majority of cases, respect for autonomy would be weighted so strongly that the 
decision would be in accordance with the patient’s autonomous wishes.23 If, however, there 
may be harms to others and/or the healthcare or other resources are indeed scarce, then 
autonomy may be trumped by another (or other) competing principle(s).24 
The cases that I focus on, however, are those where a patient no longer has mental 
capacity and a SDM is called upon to assist with the decision to use deception. There are three 
main types of cases that this would apply to, broadly conceived as: patients who are not likely 
to recover (but rather be stabilized consistently), patients who are declining due to disease 
progression (Alzheimer’s disease) and patients who are likely to regain mental capacity but 
who may have moments of regression.  
Let us explore how weighing and balancing may contribute to the decision to use 
deception in each of these types of cases. For each case, the procedure listed above should be 
followed, including exploring the list of morally relevant factors. Weighing and balancing 
                                                
23. There is also a legal requirement in Ontario and many other jurisdictions to obtain an informed 
consent, which would otherwise constitute battery and assault.  
24. An example of this might include 24/7 individualized care in a hospital setting. Although it could 
potentially significantly promote a patient’s autonomy, given limited resources and the duty to provide care to 
other patients, this is likely not feasible.   
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these factors is similar to determining the risks and benefits (based on each morally relevant 
factor) and ultimately making explicit which alternative is most morally defensible.  
Principlism, however, not only considers the consequences of each alternative, but also 
the intentions of the caregiver as well as the value of dignity to patients (as listed in the 
decision procedure and discussed in previous chapters). Consider the example of a caregiver’s 
character and the type of caregiver she should aim to be. From a consequentialist perspective, 
we would want to minimize future morally unjustified acts of deception especially if the act of 
deception makes a caregiver more inclined to deceive in other unjustified cases. However, the 
intentions of a caregiver to be trustworthy, honest and truthful are important considerations 
too. They create the kind of healthcare system that people generally value and are often what 
draws caregivers to caregiving and healthcare roles.25 Principlism, and especially ESP, is 
inclusive of both the intentions and value of dignity (as described in earlier chapters) as well as 
the list of potential consequences of each alternative to various stakeholders, expanding 
beyond traditional consequentialist considerations. 
Let us return to the examples listed above for incapable patients. I will discuss them 
briefly with a few broad examples. For the first example, which includes those patients who 
require sustained intervention/ medication, the principlist position would place an emphasis on 
the patient’s autonomous wishes (if known and informed), but would also consider the 
patient’s well-being from a beneficent viewpoint, harm to others and to the patient herself, and 
so forth. The previous autonomous wishes may be overridden based on the current state of the 
patient in addition to the other factors listed and their intensity in the specific case. An example 
of this situation could involve a patient who formerly expressed the desire to take a medication 
                                                
25. M. E. Miers, “Career Choices in Health Care: Is Nursing a Special Case? A Content Analysis of 
Survey Data,” International Journal of Nursing Studies 44, no. 7 (n.d.): 1196–1209. 
  181 
when capable, even covertly if necessary. As the patient’s condition worsens and becomes a 
chronic illness, she becomes incapable. She is evicted from her former apartment and is now 
living in a neighbourhood where she participates in occasional illegal drug consumption that 
could interact negatively with the medication. Her circumstances have changed such that it 
would be harmful for her to take the medication, especially if given covertly. Monitoring the 
use of covert medication could no longer be possible in her current circumstances. Although 
she is not thriving, as she would be on the medication, she seems to have an acceptable quality 
of life given her new circumstances. Hence, weighing and balancing could involve overriding 
previous autonomous wishes for the reasons listed above.  
The second kind of case involves a patient with Alzheimer’s disease and she frequently 
asks after her deceased child, for example. Disclosing the truth depends on the circumstances 
of the case. Taking into consideration all of the morally relevant factors includes considering 
what the patient’s values were prior to becoming incapable (the autonomous wishes) as well as 
the experiential or current incapable wishes of the patient in her current state, as examples of 
specified factors. Often, many people do not have wishes already established in advance about 
this kind of issue, however caregivers can try to have a greater understanding of the overall 
values a person espoused. Most people would generally want to know if their loved one 
deceased, however, whether or not this is disclosed when incapable will depend on previous 
wishes and values and the patient’s overall current experience, including quality of life. 
Consider for example, a patient could receive the information about the death if it involves a 
deeply held value (such as the patient holds strong religious values that she must pray for her 
son to provide him blessings in the afterlife), if even it may decrease her overall current quality 
of life. In a different case however, if the value isn’t as strongly held and quality of life is 
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deeply impacted, then it could be morally defensible to deceive the patient. Hence, the 
weighing and balancing of morally relevant factors will most often depend on each patient’s 
unique narrative and incapable experiences. 
For the last kind of case, where a patient is likely to regain autonomy but may have a 
relapse, weighing and balancing are also important. Again, all factors should be considered for 
each unique case. In some cases, the act of deception could so profoundly impact the 
caregiver-patient relationship that a different alternative should be considered. Consider a 
patient who has a strong history of paranoia and even though she regains autonomy after 
receiving medication, she will sometimes lapse again and have some recollection of being 
mislead in the hospital environment so as not to return to the hospital for future concerns. The 
decision to deceive will take into consideration the harms associated with not returning for 
future treatment for other kinds of health issues – this may negatively impact the patient and 
others involved in the patient’s life. Alternatively, the patient may continue to return for future 
healthcare, but also be deeply dissatisfied with the service and future services given the 
damaged trust relationship. Although there are no tangible harms to the patient or her 
autonomy for future healthcare, there has been an affront to the patient’s dignity and feeling of 
worth.26 For a different kind of case where this kind of history with paranoia does not exist and 
a patient has a good rapport with the healthcare team, concerns related to returning for future 
care may not be weighted as heavily, which could influence the decision to deceive.  
The kinds of case examples I present above are very brief sketches, and actual cases are 
much more complex with multiple factors involved. Ultimately, the decision to deceive will 
rest on the metaphorical value of each factor in each case and which alternative they support. 
                                                
26. Hence, there could be a mix of utilitarian and deontological or other impacts from the act of 
deception, which is why I think the inclusivity of principlist account is most feasible.  
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Although autonomy (previously known wishes and values) is an important factor for incapable 
patients, there may be other factors in the current state of the incapable patient’s life experience 
that will influence which alternative is most morally defensible. 
Continuous Revisiting the Use of Deception 
Once it has been decided that deception is morally defensible through the ESP clinical 
decision-making procedure, it is important to continue to monitor and address the use of 
deception. It is useful to consider an analogous case of the use of restraints and the process for 
continuously monitoring restraints, since it is prima facie undesirable to use restraints, but may 
be necessary in rare situations. 
From an organizational level, it is always important to review policies in light of new 
evidence-based practices and standards that are adopted across the globe. Hence, as technology 
and medical practices evolve, the use of deception may need further thought given other 
plausible alternatives in healthcare. 
At a clinical level, once the decision to implement deception has been made, it is 
important to constantly revisit this decision in order to determine whether it is morally 
acceptable to continue its use. These on-going considerations include: clear documentation, 
careful monitoring of side effects, frequent reflection on the need for deception and disclosure. 
I have already discussed the importance of disclosure, when possible, earlier in this chapter, as 
well as the need to very closely monitor side effects, most notably in a controlled environment. 
I will briefly discuss the need to document deception, in addition to constant revisiting the need 
for its use.  
  184 
Documentation is essential. If the process described in this chapter has been carefully 
followed, then staff can feel justified in coming to the decision to use deception. This decision 
needs to be documented, as it is part of the care plan for the patient and requires that all staff is 
aware of the plan to ensure consistency, transparency and accountability in the chart and 
throughout the patient’s experience. If one staff member or caregiver uses deception and others 
do not, then this may defeat the purpose of deception if the patient prematurely discovers that 
this is occurring, not to mention causing significant distrust of that team member and 
ultimately the full team. Documentation should also include justification for the use of 
deception as well as how and the frequency with which it is being monitored, given the 
particular patient’s situation and the length of time required to regain capacity and so forth. For 
cases when deception is used where patients will not regain capacity (e.g. for a patient who has 
advanced dementia), the frequency of revisiting the use of deception would be much less than 
for someone who is taking antipsychotic medication, for example.  
The analogous cases of the use of restraints requires that staff check-in with the patient 
almost every hour and review the use of restraints every 24-48 hours to ensure that the least 
restrictive method of treatment is being provided and that the safety of the patient is 
guaranteed.27 Constantly revisiting the use of deception ensures that staff is fully aware that its 
use is only temporary and that deception as a conduit for treatment is not common practice, but 
rather only used in extreme situations – similar to the use of restraints in healthcare. 
                                                
27. For an excellent example of a least restraints policy see, Centre for Addiction and Mental Health, 
“Emergency Use of Chemical Restraint, Seclusion, and Mechanical Restraint,” 2009, 
http://www.mountsinai.on.ca/care/psych/on-call-resources/on-call-
resources/emergency_use_of_restraint_policy_final_may_21_09.doc. 
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Conclusions 
In this chapter, I provided further contributions to the issue of deception in healthcare. First, I 
discussed an organizational framework through listing several keys conditions within a policy 
that one could adopt to justify when deception is morally defensible or indefensible. I 
introduced novel distinctions of constraints and necessary conditions on the use of deception. 
Constraints place limitations on the use of deception. Included as constraints are: mental 
capacity, compliance with treatment (when applicable) and risk of substantive distrust. 
Necessary conditions are those that are required in order to use deception. Included as 
necessary conditions are: significant chance of recovery, disclosure (when possible) and 
controlled environments. The second contribution I made in section two is a clinical decision-
making process for specific cases where deception is being considered as a morally justifiable 
treatment conduit. I called this clinical framework embedded specified principlism (ESP). I 
listed all of the morally relevant factors including traditional principlist and other important 
ethical considerations, as well as professional and legal duties and obligations. The morally 
relevant factors are discussed in detail in both Chapter One and Chapter Three, and are 
provided in the decision-making procedure with relevant questions to help guide caregivers 
assess the moral justification and practicality of the use of deception in caregiving.  
In the final section of this chapter, I discussed further reflections on the use of 
deception once the decision has been made to implement deception as the treatment conduit. 
These considerations include: clear documentation, careful monitoring of side effects, frequent 
reflection on the need for deception and disclosure. It is important to note that if the 
organization or caregiver has access to a clinical ethicist or other ethics related service, one 
should contact this individual or service for help through this decision-making procedure.  
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In the proceeding four chapters, I have established a comprehensive account to help 
guide the decision for when deception ought and ought not be used in caregiving. In Chapter 
Five, I will provide a theoretical defense of my modified version of specified principlism 
(ESP) as an additional contribution more broadly to bioethics, which stems from my analysis 
of the issue of deception in caregiving. 
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Chapter 5  
A Consideration of Methodological Objections 
I will first discuss the importance of this chapter with regards to my general thesis project – 
why have I chosen specified principlism as my underlying methodological approach? I will 
then discuss three objections to specified principlism and will respond to each in light of the 
embedded specified principlism (ESP) I presented in the Chapter Four. The objections are 
related to the following issues: non-arbitrariness, systematicity and casuistry. Lastly, I will 
conclude with a summary as to why I believe that ESP is appropriate in this context, and I will 
provide some ways in which we can further enhance and modify specified principlism (SP) 
based on my thesis analysis. 
Chapter Relevance to Thesis Project 
This chapter situates my thesis argument within the broader bioethics literature. Despite 
modifying the principles that Beauchamp and Childress espouse, I nonetheless use the model 
of specified principlism and weighing and balancing of these principles to provide a moral 
framework for the use of deception in caregiving.  
In Chapter One I described the dilemma caused by deception in caregiving as being one 
that can be framed in terms of competing traditional bioethics principles. Not only are the 
traditional ways of describing the problem relevant – autonomy versus beneficence and trust 
versus beneficence – but there are multiple principles and values that ought to be weighed and 
balanced when determining: “what ought I do?” I will argue that is useful in the context of my 
thesis to use principles to articulate and name what caregivers struggle with.  
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I will be defending the method embedded-SP (ESP). In Chapter Four, I offered a 
framework within which specified principlism can be applied. ESP uses specified principlism 
within the context of a decision procedure that I created specifically for cases of deception. I 
described ESP in detail in Chapter Four. Throughout this chapter, I will discuss further 
criticisms of standard SP and how they can be used to enhance and modify ESP even further to 
create a comprehensive moral framework. 
There are other methods used in bioethics to explore this issue, but through providing 
objections and modifications I will argue that ESP is the most comprehensive and practical 
method for considering the issue of deception in caregiving. Other methods, such as narrative 
bioethics and feminist bioethics are useful and provide significant value, but I will argue that 
they can and ought to be used within ESP. On their own, they are not adequate as action-
guiding and practical methods. 
First, I will describe narrative bioethics and its potential role within ESP. Dubiel writes 
that Katrin Bentele first coined the term narrative bioethics in 2007.1 Her dissertation is based 
on narratives and the stories of patients who had Parkinson’s disease. Dubiel explores the need 
for narration in bioethics, as he argues that traditional principlism does not supply bioethicists 
and others with a concrete situated understanding of issues. The principles are too abstract, 
according to the field of narrative bioethics. Dubiel writes: “We have to keep in our mind, 
however, that the project of a narrative bioethics is not in competition with traditional forms of 
ethical justification. The necessity of an alternative ethical concept results from the blind spots 
                                                
1. Katrin Bentele, Ethische Aspekte Der Regenerativen Medizin. Das Beispiel Morbus Parkinson (Berlin: 
LIT Verlag, 2007). As cited in Helmut Dubiel, “What Is ‘Narrative Bioethics,’” Frontiers in Integrative 
Neuroscience. 5, no. 10 (May 4, 2011): 1–2. 
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of an ethics based on principles alone.”2 Narrative ethics aims to fill some of these blind spots.3 
Dubiel adds: “Biography is a strange genre, because its constitutive features – the beginning 
and the end of a life – are concealed to the respective person.”4 It is this biography of each 
unique person that aims to inform the principles during specification. I think that this concept 
helps to respond to several of the questions that I pose in Chapter Four regarding a specific 
patient’s values, wishes, beliefs. Additionally, the way in which we describe harm or benefit 
for each patient is informed by that patient’s experiences and surroundings, essentially – her 
narrative. Even our specification of social justice is partially contingent on the vulnerability 
and capabilities of each unique patient. For example, having a history of trauma may result in a 
significant vulnerability regarding the use of restraints. Hence, I believe that narrative and fully 
understanding the patient perspective and story is necessary in order to specify principles. 
Narrative bioethics can be and should be incorporated directly into ESP. I do not argue that we 
ought to be completely subjective in deciding what one ought to do. I believe that each 
situation is extremely complex and that to determine the weights accorded to each specified 
principles requires examining the narrative and unique circumstances and history of each 
patient.5 I will respond to the objection of arbitrariness in this process later in this chapter. 
A second major method that is often discussed in bioethics is feminist bioethics. 
Feminist bioethics is an extremely important discipline in bioethics. Feminist bioethics has a 
                                                
2. Dubiel, “What Is ‘Narrative Bioethics,’” 1–2. 
3. Another interpretation of narrative ethics is a more extreme position. For example, Jonathon Dancy 
argues that narrative ethics is about relying on the general feelings of the situation, as opposed to referring to or 
filling in the general bioethics principles. See Jonathan Dancy, Ethics Without Principles, 1 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004). 
4. Dubiel, “What Is ‘Narrative Bioethics,’” 2. 
5. I do believe, however, that the organizational and policy constraints and necessary conditions provide 
general guidelines for when it is morally impermissible/permissible to use deception more broadly.  
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strong focus on issues of social justice, marginalized and vulnerable populations, as well as 
highlighting the importance of relationships. Autonomy need not represent the traditionally 
exclusive individualistic and liberal concept of autonomy, but can and should also include 
these other kinds of concepts. This can be captured within ESP, given that discussions of 
autonomy can and should include important notions such as relationships and caring. The focus 
on trust (a modification that I have made to ESP) also stresses the importance of relationships 
in bioethics. I discussed autonomy and its variations in Chapter One in more detail. Trust has 
also been a significant focus of previous chapters and how it relates to decision-making 
regarding deception. Feminist bioethics is an important method, and it can and should be used 
with the ESP framework when exploring deception in caregiving.  
Additionally, within the principles of bioethics, justice represents the consideration of 
the specific vulnerabilities of each patient and how they relate to weighing and balancing 
potential harms associated with alternatives. Hence, I believe that similar to narrative ethics, 
feminist bioethics can help to inform the bioethics principles through specification and 
highlighting the variation that can occur within each principle itself. 
I will now address three methodological objections and responses regarding the 
following: non-arbitrariness, systematicity and casuistry. As described above, the goal of this 
chapter is to argue that my intentional use of Beauchamp and Childress’ SP is the best 
methodological way of exploring the issue of deception in caregiving, with the framework that 
I’ve discussed in Chapter Four, ESP.  
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Methodological Objection 1: Arbitrariness in Weighing and Balancing 
Being as non-arbitrary as possible is invaluable in health care decision-making. Accountability 
and transparency regarding the decision-making process are two key foundations for building 
trust in the therapeutic relationship with healthcare providers and in the healthcare system 
more broadly. In this section, I will discuss important guidelines and considerations to use 
when weighing and balancing specified principles to make this process non-arbitrary. I will 
first consider a list of principles that Beauchamp and Childress present to reduce arbitrariness 
in weighing and balancing. I will then discuss Sisela Bok’s test of publicity to provide a further 
check and balance in the decision making-process. 
Reducing Arbitrariness  
In The Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Beauchamp and Childress, present several different 
considerations when deciding which alternative is the most morally defensible, given the range 
of morally relevant factors in each case. They list the following conditions to be considered 
when weighing and balancing factors (or as they state, “norms”) and for choosing one 
alternative over another for treatment and care:  
(1) Good reasons can be offered to act on the overriding norm rather than on the 
infringed norm; 
(2) The moral objective justifying the infringement has a realistic prospect of 
achievement; 
(3) No morally preferable alternative actions are available; 
(4) The lowest level of infringement, commensurate with achieving the primary goal of 
the action, has been selected; 
(5) Any negative effects of the infringement have been minimized; 
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(6) All affected parties have been treated impartially.6 
The focus of these conditions aims at which method will be the least intrusive in order to 
achieve the primary goal (which is dependent on the patient’s wishes and values). They also 
aim to minimize risk and harms for patients and other stakeholders. These reasons consider the 
proportionality of the case – do the overall benefits of deception outweigh the risks, all things 
considered, and have we considered all possible alternatives? 
Opponents to traditional principlism, such as Gert, Culver, and Clouser (2011), state 
that balancing endorsed by Beauchamp and Childress is not guided by any over-arching 
principle to help organize the factors/principles considered in deception.7 In response to this 
criticism, another method for organizing the principles is through a general guiding meta-
principle, as described by Gordon, Rauprich, and Vollmann (2009). This meta-principle is 
common morality.8 I will briefly argue why this method is inadequate, and that we should use 
Beauchamp and Childress’ guidelines to guide decision-making.  
Gordon, Rauprich, and Vollmann use Beauchamp and Childress’ definition of common 
morality, which is: “The common morality is the set of norms shared by all persons committed 
to morality… The common morality is applicable to all persons in all places, and we rightly 
judge all human conduct by its standards.”9 Gordon, Rauprich, and Vollmann describe: 
Of course, we do not hold the view that common morality is able to provide a 
unique correct answer, but it can be seen as a constraining framework that, first, 
separates ethical from unethical answers, and secondly, indicates which ethical 
                                                
6. Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 
7. I will discuss their criticisms and alternative approach in further detail in Chapter Five.  
8. John-Stewart Gordon, Oliver Rauprich, and Jochen Vollmann, “Applying the Four-Principle 
Approach,” Bioethics 25, no. 6 (July 2011): 298. 
9. Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 3. 
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answer seems more appropriate with regard to the ideal of common morality 
without saying that this is the only correct available answer.10 
Gordon, Rauprich, and Vollmann argue that common morality, which is what a reasonable 
person who is morally inclined would do in society, helps to guide these kinds of decisions. 
They argue that we can balance principles in this way. For example, they use the example of a 
woman who autonomously wishes to have life sustaining treatment withdrawn at end of life, 
while her physician autonomously wishes to exercise his professional judgment to keep 
providing the patient nutrition and hydration, while removing other life sustaining treatment. 
The physician’s rationale is such that the patient does not ultimately die of 
starvation/dehydration, but rather the underlying illness.11 In this case, the authors argue that it 
is reasonable to balance the principles such that we respect patient autonomy and the patient’s 
wish to not receive artificial nutrition and hydration because this is what common morality 
would dictate; common morality would want for physicians to follow the patient’s wishes and 
values in these kinds of cases. Hence, according to Gordon, Rauprich, and Vollmann, common 
morality provides a clear response to which principle we ought to follow when we have 
competing principles. The idea of a common morality does not take into consider each 
individual patient’s values and wishes, but rather considers what all persons committed to 
morality would want.  
I think Gordon, Rauprich, and Vollmann believe that we would know what rational 
people in society would agree upon, but I don’t believe this quick picking of a principle based 
on a shared intuition is adequate. Even though one can imagine that an average person in 
North-American society would want X, this does not mean that it is the morally defensible 
                                                
10. Gordon, Rauprich, and Vollmann, “Applying the Four-Principle Approach,” July 2011, 299. 
11. Gordon, Rauprich, and Vollmann, “Applying the Four-Principle Approach,” July 2011. 
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course of action. I think that in cases of treatment options and plans of care, we need to be 
sensitive to the differences in values and preferences of non-common morality persons – this is 
not to say that we should do everything that is wished, as there are some necessary limitations 
given scarce resources and legal and professional duties. Additionally, caregivers may also 
weigh and balance decisions differently based on their understanding of what a reasonable 
person in society would desire. I think it is important to focus on the process of decision-
making, which includes considering all alternatives. In the example that Gordon, Rauprich, and 
Vollmann provide, can we consider a reduction in feeding rather than a full stop? What 
medications is the patient on and should we allow natural death from withholding any of these 
medications instead? I think that SP and my decision-process introduced in Chapter Four, 
provide a robust and reflective decision-making rather than focusing on a quick solution.12 
I believe that their analysis of applying the bioethics principles in a systematic way, 
such as to reduce the principles to a meta-principle is problematic. Rather, the use of multiple 
meta-principles or conditions, as described by Beauchamp and Childress provide some 
concrete and robust guidance rather than trying to consider what morally inclined individuals 
of a particular society would do more generally. The conditions presented by Beauchamp and 
Childress is a patient-centered approach, by not limiting the decision to what an average 
morally inclined person would deliberate to be the right course of action. Rather, the principles 
provided by Beauchamp and Childress are more inclusive of differing alternatives, 
perspectives and values. 
                                                
12. Of course if the decision were one that ought to be made rapidly, we may not have as much time to 
discuss alternatives. In my experience, however, for end-of-life decisions and discussions regarding palliative 
care, we usually have some time to stop, pause and consider what are all alternatives and which is the most 
morally defensible. 
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In addition, Marino argues that systematicity, or reducing multiple principles to one 
principle, is not necessary for a non-arbitrary approach to principle pluralism.13 In her article, 
Marino argues that what matters for non-arbitrariness is case consistency between morally 
relevant factors. This is a similar moral argument to casuistry, which argues that we ought to 
base our current cases on previous or precedent cases. In case consistency, there is coherence 
between morally relevant factors across cases under the same circumstances. Case consistency 
involves prioritizing, in a principled way, such that cases with similar morally relevant factors 
are judged the same way, and those that have morally relevant differences are judged 
differently. This method of coherence denies that there ought to be one overriding principle, 
such as claimed by Gordon, Rauprich, and Vollmann, and rather allows there to continue to be 
multiple competing principles. 
Weighing and balancing requires a methodological way to determine what one ought to 
do given multiple, often competing values and principles. I believe that using the conditions 
provided by Beauchamp and Childress provides some guidance to make the overall decision as 
to what one ought to do, given all of the values and principles considered, and the alternatives 
provided to deception.14 
The Publicity Test  
The second method that we can use to consider the alternatives and reduce arbitrariness when 
weighing and balancing the principles is the publicity test. Bok argues that the publicity test 
                                                
13. Patricia Marino, “Moral Coherence and Principle Pluralism,” SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: 
Social Science Research Network, August 14, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2296907. 
14. It is important to note that ethics does not always provide absolutely clear responses – for example, 
Beauchamp and Childress’ first condition of having good reasons for overriding one principle over another, can 
likely be interpreted in different ways. However, a plausible response is that others in the moral community, such 
as reasonably minded individuals, would agree upon these reasons as being good ones.
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appeals to justification along similar lines to Gordon Rauprich, and Vollmann: reasonable 
persons would agree to the decision. Bok argues that generally, the world is better off for 
people telling the truth, since this fosters trust and less energy is expended on trying to figure 
out what is true and what is false. On this account, one is more productive in the sense that one 
can participate in the world with less barriers by having a trusting relationship with others: 
scepticism and uncertainty requires lots of energy and time.15 
Bok argues for an egalitarian moral view, such that we benefit from one another by 
adopting a general Principle of Veracity, or truth-telling. Similar to the principle of universality 
articulated by Kant, lying only works if there is the possibility that others will believe the lie. 
Hence, if there is a general scepticism in society and people are reluctant to believe what others 
say, lying will at the very least be very difficult and certainly make it much harder for others to 
achieve their ends, including the liar. Hence, Bok argues that through a mutual contract, we 
agree to trust one another through truth-telling in order for everyone, including all individuals, 
to benefit.16  
Procedure for the Publicity Test 
Bok does not argue that lying is wrong in every case. Rather, she defends the position that 
there may be situations when the use of a lie is justified. She discusses the analogous case for 
using force. Generally, we argue that using force against someone else is wrong. For example, 
punching another person is on most occasions considered wrong. However, if someone is 
                                                
15. Robert K. Fullinwider, “Sissela Bok on Lying and Moral Choice in Private and Public Life – an 
Amplification,” Infed.org, 2007, http://infed.org/mobi/sissela-bok-on-lying-and-moral-choice-in-private-and-
public-life-an-amplification/. 
16. Ibid. 
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attacking you, one could argue that punching that person may be necessary if other alternatives 
either have not worked or are simply implausible given the circumstances.17  
Bok uses a procedure and standard method for determining whether the lie is morally 
justified.18 The Publicity Test asks which lies, if any, would survive the appeal for justification 
to reasonable persons.19 Bok describes some of the advantages of publicity: “Such a test 
counters the self-deception and bias inherent in the liar’s perspective. It challenges privately 
held assumptions and hasty calculations.”20 There are several questions to consider in this 
process, each of which are discussed by Bok: 
(1) Are there alternatives to using the lie, which are truthful? 
(2) What are the reasons and justifications presented in favor and against the lie? 
(3) How would a public jury of reasonable persons react to the lie?21 
As one can see, the first condition is similar to step four in my clinical decision-making 
procedure – it relates to the alternatives that can be considered or attempted prior to utilizing 
deception as the most plausible alternative. The second question is also captured in my clinical 
decision-making procedure, which systematically takes caregivers through a step-by-step 
process of exploring each of the morally relevant factors – the reasons and justifications in 
                                                
17. Ibid., 41. 
18. Ibid., 91. 
19. Other philosophers writing on bioethics issues similarly discuss the publicity test, including Gert, 
Culver, and Clouser (Gert, Culver, and Clouser, Bioethics; Danner Clouser and Bernard Gert, “Concerning 
Principlism and Its Defenders: Reply to Beauchamp and Veatch,” in Building Bioethics, ed. Loretta M. Kopelman 
[Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999]). For these authors, impartial, rational agents estimate the harms 
of both proceeding with the moral rule violation and not proceeding with it, if the violation were publicly known. 
If every rational person agrees that the harms are less by proceeding with the violation, then the violation is 
deemed morally obligatory. I will discuss Gert, Culver, and Clouser’s moral approach and defend Beauchamp and 
Childress’ principlism in the final chapter.  
20. Fullinwider, “Sissela Bok on Lying and Moral Choice in Private and Public Life – an Amplification,” 
92. 
21. Ibid., 90–106. 
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favour and against the act of deception. Lastly, the third question takes into account conditions 
one and two, and analyzes what a public jury would say about the decision to deceive or to not 
deceive, given the particular circumstances and specifications of the case.  
Bok argues that most lies would fail the publicity test and that we could plausibly find 
other truthful alternatives for the dilemma. However, she does provide the moral space to 
consider and, in some cases to allow, justified deception. Not only is it important to 
introspectively consider these questions and to perform a hypothetical publicity test, but also 
Bok discusses the importance of discussing the dilemmas with peers and others in order to 
obtain an inter-subjective approach to resolving the dilemma. With greater perspectives around 
the table, one can often consider more alternatives and provide greater insights into issues, 
including challenging personal biases. In deception in healthcare situations, one could 
plausibly bring the relevant members of the team to the table to discuss options and the various 
morally relevant factors for each unique case. Hence, both the guidelines proposed by 
Beauchamp and Childress and the publicity test forwarded by Bok are effective ways to reduce 
arbitrariness in weighing and balancing specified principles. 
Methodological Objection 2: Systematicity  
The second objection to the methodological procedure of ESP is systematicity. Systematicity 
supports the idea that an ethical theory is a good one if we can simplify decision-making 
through a unified and complete theory.22 An example of systematicity would be to have the 
least number of steps or principles required to make a decision. Gert, Culver, and Clouser 
argue that the principles of bioethics can be systematized through what I will call the Moral 
                                                
22. Marino, “Moral Coherence and Principle Pluralism.” 
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System Approach (MSA). They offer their account as a simple, practical method to resolve 
bioethics dilemmas, and they argue that their method is more systematic than SP. In this 
section of Chapter Five, I will discuss the MSA and why I believe that their version of 
systematicity does not make a better moral approach than my expanded framework, ESP, 
regarding deception in caregiving. Beauchamp and Childress further state: 
Advocates of systematic theory may have aspirations of decisively settling 
applied questions, but they are no better positioned to do so than pluralistic 
accounts. Proponents of the same type of general theory commonly disagree 
about its commitments, how to apply it, and how to address specific issues (for 
which we do not fault them, given our earlier arguments that such disagreement 
is ineliminable).23  
When we consider unified theories, such as utilitarianism, Beauchamp and Childress argue that 
these theories suffer from the same kinds of problems as pluralistic theories. They both require 
interpretation in specific situations, and in terms of the meaning of words such as harm and 
interests. Their pluralistic SP theory contains more principles than just harm that require 
interpreting and application, but Beauchamp and Childress argue that this does not necessarily 
mean their theory is flawed or less morally defensible than a systematic theory. Instead, they 
argue that pluralism more accurately represents the kinds of values and decisions that common 
morality is faced with and the complex factors that one ought to consider.24 
Gert, Culver, and Clouser present MSA as a systematic alternative to SP in an effort to 
provide a clear method for attempting to resolve bioethics dilemmas. I have already described 
above how SP can respond to the criticism of arbitrariness with respect to weighing and 
balancing. In this section, I will focus on the question of systematicity. First, I will describe 
MSA and then I will discuss my objections to the systematicity argument.  
                                                
23. Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 388–389. 
24. Ibid., 389. 
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The MSA is comprised of four major parts. First, there are moral ideals. These ideals 
are virtues or principles that we ought to strive towards. However, they are not obligatory and 
not acting upon a moral ideal would constitute as no moral wrongdoing. On the flip side, if one 
were to follow through with an ideal, it would be considered supererogatory or beyond what is 
morally defensible. An example of a moral ideal could be helping someone carry their 
shopping to the car when they seem to be struggling. This act is not a moral imperative, but 
rather an act that is above and beyond regular moral duties.25  
Moral rules, however, are directives or principles that ought to be followed, unless a 
person has good reason to override the rule. The MSA rules include the following: “(1) Do not 
kill. (2) Do not cause pain. (3) Do not disable. (4) Do not deprive of freedom. (5) Do not 
deprive of pleasure. (6) Do not deceive. (7) Keep your promise. (8) Do not cheat. (9) Obey the 
law. (10) Do your duty.”26 The moral rules are generated by appealing to reasonable morally-
inclined persons in common morality. Gert, Culver, and Clouser describe these rules as being 
derived by an agreement between every impartial rational person. 
The third component of the MSA is the morally relevant features. Similar to 
specification, the MSA requires that the decision-maker(s) respond to a number of questions 
regarding the morally relevant features of the specific situation. These can include, but are not 
limited to: the harms that would be caused, prevented and avoided, the relevant beliefs and 
desires of the people who are affected by the rule violation and what benefits would stem from 
the rule violation, to name a few.27 It is the responses to these questions that help to decide 
whether or not a rule violation is morally justified, according to Gert, Culver, and Clouser. 
                                                
25. Gert, Culver, and Clouser, Bioethics, 43. 
26. Ibid., 36. 
27. Ibid., 39–40. 
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The final part of the MSA is the two-step decision-making procedure. The first step 
involves articulating the justification as to how the morally relevant features either support or 
oppose a moral rule violation. This step is important for the justification of the decision to 
choose one alternative (or multiple alternatives) over another. The second step of the decision-
making procedure is what has been described earlier as the publicity test. During the second 
step, impartial, rational agents estimate the harms of both proceeding and not proceeding with 
the moral rule violation if the violation were publicly known. If every rational person agrees 
that the harms are less by proceeding with the violation, then the violation is deemed morally 
obligatory.28 
Gert, Culver, and Clouser argue that these steps provide justification for the alternative 
chosen, as well as practicality given the publicity test and clear steps given in the process. The 
MSA is supposed to be a systematic alternative to SP, proving to have greater justificatory 
power and practicality than SP. In “Bioethics as Methodological Case Resolution: 
Specification, Specified Principlism and Casuistry” Anne Iltis defends these two criteria as 
being the main contemporary goals of bioethics. I will discuss briefly these two criteria in more 
detail.29  
I believe that for an ethical theory to be a good one, a person should be able to explain 
or justify why she chooses one alternative over another. The theory that is used to help work 
through a challenging situation should allow a person to articulate the reasons why she chose 
one alternative over another, and these reasons should be convincing at least to most 
reasonable people. Along similar lines, an ethical theory ought not only provide a list of 
                                                
28. Clouser and Gert, “Concerning Principlism and Its Defenders,” 186. 
29. Ana Smith Iltis, “Bioethics as Methodological Case Resolution: Specification, Specified Principlism 
and Casuistry,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 25, no. 3 (2000): 271–284. 
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alternatives, but the alternative chosen also should be action-guiding. Working through an 
ethical framework or theory to help decide why one should pick a specific alternative over 
another should produce a response or more that can be justified. Beauchamp and Childress 
discuss eight criteria for a moral theory, and these include: clarity, coherence, 
comprehensiveness, simplicity, explanatory power, justificatory power, output and 
practicability.30 
An ethical theory, when being applied to a medical situation that requires action, needs 
to be practical. The action-guiding component must include alternatives that can tangibly be 
achieved or aimed towards, such that a person can actually act upon the alternative. This also 
includes the idea that a decision-making process must not be too cumbersome to complete, 
given the often-limited time and resources that caregivers have when making health care 
decisions. 
First, let me briefly restate the decision procedure involved in SP as the following: 
(1) Specify the four principles of biomedical ethics given the particular situation; 
(2) Weigh the specified principles given the details provided via step one; 
(3) Balance the principles to determine which alternative will cohere with the greatest 
weighted combination of principles;31 
(4) If the principles do not align with common morality, then adjustments need to be 
made through reflective equilibrium.32 
                                                
30. Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 334–335. 
31. It is important to note here that to maintain non-arbitrariness, Beauchamp and Childress present six 
further considerations when balancing. Refer to earlier in this chapter for a discussion of these considerations.  
32. This can occur either through revision of the specification of the biomedical ethics principles or 
through revision of views held in common morality.  
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Gert, Culver, and Clouser claim that principlism is: “…an unsystematic and ad hoc collection 
of independent principles.”33 Gert, Culver, and Clouser respond to principlism, which they 
consider to be simply a list of principles, with no guidance on how to use or to apply these 
principles to actual decisions.34 
In what ways does the MSA claim to have stronger justificatory power and practicality 
than SP? I will argue that despite Gert, Culver, and Clouser arguing that there are significant 
differences between the MSA and SP, they share many of the same justification processes and 
both prove to be practical. However, I will ultimately argue that SP (when in the context of a 
decision-making procedure) is more practical and provides stronger justification for decision-
making than MSA. 
Gert, Culver, and Clouser argue that SP is merely a list of individual principles that do 
not provide normative or action-guiding strength. Any decision, according the authors, is made 
purely ad hoc with no linking or connecting between the principles. Hence, they argue that 
their moral system provides the link between the moral rules and morally relevant features 
through the two-step decision procedure.35 Let me now describe the MSA decision-making 
process: 
(1) Identify the morally relevant features in the specific case; 
(2) Articulate the justification why the morally relevant features either support or 
oppose a moral rule violation; 
(3) Apply the publicity test. 
                                                
33. Gert, Culver, and Clouser, Bioethics, 99. 
34. Ibid., 100–101. 
35. Ibid., 103. 
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First, SP is not a stand-alone decision-making procedure. Beauchamp and Childress do not 
argue for a precise decision procedure, but rather they present a theoretical reflection of the 
principles that provide the foundations for bioethics decision-making.36 Hence, the critique 
forwarded by Gert, Culver, and Clouser regarding the lack of a procedure is a straw man 
argument, given that this is not what they claim to be doing. Their principles are to be regarded 
in light of further critical steps in bioethical decision-making.  
This being said, on what grounds can we compare the systematicity of the MSA and 
SP? I will focus on the broader comparison of the methodology that I have used in Chapter 
Four as embedded-SP (ESP). As described in Chapter Four and above, ESP uses specified 
principlism within the context of my decision procedure. I will compare ESP and the MSA in 
light of justificatory power and practicality for each of the decision-procedures.37 I will use two 
main criticisms of the MSA with regards to these criteria: (1) justificatory power and (2) 
practicality. 
Justificatory Power 
My concerns with the MSA decision-making process begin with the morally relevant features 
of a case. Gert, Culver, and Clouser criticize Beauchamp and Childress for choosing ad hoc 
principles to begin the process of specification, but I believe that choosing morally relevant 
features is completed in a similar manner. Gert, Culver, and Clouser list a series of ten 
different questions related to morally relevant features of a case. These include for example, 
listing the harms avoided, prevented or caused by violating a moral rule violation, the beliefs 
                                                
36. Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 332. 
37. I also acknowledge that the MSA, based on Gert, Culver, and Clouser’s criticisms of SP, and not of 
my newly-developed decision-procedure.  
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and desires of those affected by the moral rule violation and whether the rule violation is 
intentional.38  
I believe that using a framework, such as principles, to consider the morally relevant 
features is actually very useful. The biomedical ethics principles describe what we often value 
and the umbrella of values that we ought to consider in every case. The principles of 
biomedical ethics help us to practically determine what we need to consider as a starting point 
for morally relevant features of a challenging case. From this point, we can specify them 
further as related to the case at hand. MSA on the other hand, requires that we address each of 
the morally relevant features as a starting point – the list of features they provide.  
Gert, Culver, and Clouser do provide a list of different questions that one can consider 
regarding the morally relevant features. However, this list can be viewed in light of the 
principles of biomedical ethics since their goals are quite similar – the biomedical ethics 
principles provide a clearer understanding regarding justification to explain the reasons why 
we explore ethical questions. Instead of just considering the wishes and beliefs of a patient, the 
biomedical ethics principles elucidate that we do and should value autonomous wishes and 
beliefs and analyze them in light of benefits to others, reducing harms and acting upon 
justice.39 For this point of comparison, I think that ESP is more practical than MSA. It has 
fewer principles, from which we can specify specific details of a case. It also frames the 
discussion in terms of what we value, through autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence and 
social justice, as opposed to listing a variety of different unrelated questions. Considering 
                                                
38. Gert, Culver, and Clouser, Bioethics, 39–40. 
39. Gert, Culver, and Clouser also include professional duties and legal obligations among the morally 
relevant features and moral rules. I will discuss concerns with this blending in the next section. 
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systematicity, the principles are more concise to remember, yet also very descriptive and 
substantive of the values we tend to hold and ought to consider.  
Another criticism of the MSA relates to reducing all values to the notion of harm. Gert, 
Culver, and Clouser argue that the principles of biomedical ethics have some significant 
overlap and can all be reduced to harm. There is one unified comprehensive principle that can 
incorporate all of the others – do no harm. For example, Gert, Culver, and Clouser argue that 
beneficence can be reduced to non-maleficence. Trying to promote good or the best interests of 
a patient is essentially the same as trying to remove any harms for the patient, according to 
Gert, Culver, and Clouser. I have already discussed in detail the different principles in Chapter 
One, especially how I view beneficence as being distinct from respect for autonomy, as its own 
bioethics principle. There are those who question whether beneficence is distinct from non-
maleficence and if they belong in separate categories.40 In this section, however, I would like 
to address the important differences between non-maleficence and both respect for autonomy 
and justice. Can we and should we reduce these principles to non-maleficence (do no harm)? 
First, respect for autonomy means engaging each unique patient to understand better 
her circumstances, values and wishes. This is captured as a morally relevant feature, but I find 
it curious that it is not considered a moral rule – to respect the autonomous wishes of patients. 
Respect for autonomy also requires trying to support these values and wishes as best we can in 
healthcare, given the limited resources and standards of practice the have developed in 
healthcare. Can we reduce respect for autonomy into non-maleficence or to one of the morally 
relevant features? Gert, Culver, and Clouser utilize harm in two ways. First, harm is broken-
down into more specific examples or categories through the ten moral rules. Second, harm is 
                                                
40. Robert M. Veatch, “Resolving Conflicts Among Principles: Ranking, Balancing, and Specifying,” 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 5, no. 3 (1995): 199–218. 
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examined through the public lens to determine whether the moral rule(s) violation is acceptable 
in society.  
The two moral rules that Gert, Culver, and Clouser espouse which are most directly 
relevant to autonomy are “do not deprive of freedom” and “do not deprive of pleasure.”41 The 
other rules are also relevant in the broader sense of autonomy since, for example, killing 
someone would inevitably infringe on someone’s autonomy. Nonetheless, in the traditional 
sense of bioethics, respect for autonomy focuses on exploring the needs of each individual 
patient and providing patients with the ability to refuse or accept treatment depending on their 
own concept of “the Good” and what matters to him or herself. “Do not deprive of freedom” is 
seemingly a negative interpretation of allowing someone to make decisions for herself. It 
involves stepping back to allow someone to have freedom to decide and act as one desires. An 
analogy to this same idea is thinking about negative and positive freedoms. Negative freedoms 
imply a freedom from interference, whereas positive freedoms imply a duty to provide the 
freedom.42 Gert, Culver, and Clouser seem to argue that the duty caregivers have towards 
respect for autonomy is a negative freedom. 
However, respect for autonomy in the traditional sense has a different connotation, 
more along the line of a positive freedom. It is a healthcare provider’s duty to support the 
patient’s wishes and values, including by considering creative ways to enhance autonomy. An 
example may include facilitating an event, such as a tea party, on a palliative care unit to fulfill 
a dream for a patient dying from a terminal illness. Respect for autonomy is a more patient-
                                                
41. Gert, Culver, and Clouser, Bioethics, 36. 
42. Ian Carter, “Positive and Negative Liberty,” ed. Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, 2012, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/liberty-positive-negative/. 
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centered approach to actively facilitating autonomous wishes, as opposed to merely 
disinhibiting freedom. The same argument can be made for not depriving someone of pleasure.  
First, I find Gert, Culver, and Clouser’s definitions to be quite vague – they do not 
specify what pleasure actually means and in light of whose perspective. Does pleasure simply 
mean basic pleasures, like having food and being bathed or should it be interpreted more 
broadly to include what each patient would consider a pleasure? I think that Beauchamp and 
Childress’ principle of respect for autonomy is a much richer and comprehensive way of 
thinking about patient-centered care. I am not arguing that Gert, Culver, and Clouser’s moral 
rules can be reduced to the principle of respect for autonomy, but rather that respect for 
autonomy is a richer concept than the two moral rules, providing stronger justification for 
decisions made by healthcare providers. The moral rules stated by Gert, Culver, and Clouser 
also do not have as strong of a humanistic component to them, failing to explore and to 
prioritize the important narrative and story of each patient. The moral rules focus on 
prescriptive duties, as opposed to a more empathetic and patient-centered values, held deeply 
by healthcare providers. Hence, I have argued that we cannot reduce respect for autonomy in 
the form of mini-principles derived from non-maleficence.  
Justice can be considered similarly. Although one might argue that many of the moral 
rules are related to justice – do not cheat, obey the law, etc. – this interpretation of justice is 
very high-level. Beauchamp and Childress, instead, argue that justice is examining more 
concretely those groups who are often marginalized and require additional consideration 
beyond the standard approach. They consider vulnerable populations, such as the elderly and 
those who suffer from mental illness, and explore how we can promote their wellness and well-
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being in light of commonly held stigma towards these populations. Again, the richness of this 
idea is simply not captured in the moral principles.  
Practicality 
Included in the list of questions that Gert, Culver, and Clouser propose, are those that aim to 
identify the legal aspects of a case. I believe that the decision-framework that I created in 
Chapter Four provides a much clearer and practical process for establishing first, the legal and 
professional duties of a healthcare provider – these obligations establish the parameters within 
which the ethical deliberation occurs. The MSA does not make this clear, and involves much 
ethical deliberation prior to discussion around the legal boundaries within which a healthcare 
provider or caregiver works.43 Hence, the decision framework that I provide is more practical 
in determining what one legally and professionally can and cannot do prior to engaging the 
nuances surrounding the ethical discourse. It saves healthcare providers the time to consider 
what they can and cannot do, prior to discussing alternatives.  
I also wish to comment on the last moral duty of “do your duty.” I find this moral rule 
misleading given that the other moral rules are duties for which healthcare providers ought to 
obey, unless they have good reason to override. Gert, Culver, and Clouser write that the moral 
rule “do your duty” entails a positive duty, whereas the moral rules are a negative duty, or a 
prohibition.44 Gert, Culver, and Clouser also state that in professional contexts, some moral 
rules become duties. 45  These rules are often considered as the professional duties that 
healthcare providers have in association with being part of a particular college or professional 
                                                
43. The legal implications and parameters are not discussed until the 7th morally relevant feature.  
44. Gert, Culver, and Clouser, Bioethics, 79. 
45. Ibid., 80. 
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body. I described above why it is important, practically, to determine the legal boundaries 
within which one must work and the same argument applies to professional duties. Sometimes 
the professional duties will come into conflict, as with the biomedical ethics duties (there is 
much overlap between them), and one must determine from these what one ought to do. 
However, outlining what those duties are in advance may provide more directive guidance than 
waiting for a discussion of rule violation, as it frames the problem and helps to elucidate 
constraints early on.  
Beauchamp and Childress do not define duties in this way, but rather discuss duties as 
norms, which are prima facie binding.46 The norms are defined as the specified principles used 
in their framework. Considering systematicity and practicality, I believe that the idea of having 
multiple competing duties is a more practical concept that encompasses both prohibitions as 
well as promoting a patient’s autonomy and well-being, and avoids speaking about duties 
differently in different contexts. 
Gert, Culver, and Clouser further defend that the moral rules can be specified for each 
culture and in “myriad settings.”47 Again, this process is closely linked to specification of 
principles, a concept that Gert, Culver, and Clouser criticize. In interpreting a moral rule in a 
specific situation, Gert, Culver, and Clouser also argue that this may not result in a moral rule 
violation – it is dependent on how it is specified.48 They consider specification to be, again, ad 
hoc and to not allow SP to be more systematic in its approach. However, Beauchamp and 
Childress spend much time in their chapters on the four main biomedical ethics principles 
outlining how these general principles are interpreted in the process of specification. Gert, 
                                                
46. Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 13–15. 
47. Gert, Culver, and Clouser, Bioethics, 79. 
48. Ibid., 125. 
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Culver, and Clouser similarly utilize the morally relevant features as ways to tap into the 
specific details of each case. Hence, although Gert, Culver, and Clouser claim that their 
approach is more systematic through practicality, Beauchamp and Childress have the same 
practical benefits in SP.  
In addition, when considering a practical approach to ethical decision-making, one 
ought to consider what would be most helpful to front-line health care provider. For example, 
would discussing rule violations be the best way to capture the important content of morally 
relevant information? Or, would discussing alternatives and then the morally relevant features 
in light of each of these cases be more useful? How do we foster a practical procedure, while 
still maintaining a comprehensive and robust decision procedure? I have argued in this section 
that the biomedical ethics principles espoused by Beauchamp and Childress offer a robust 
consideration of what matters in these cases, while not reducing important values simply to 
harm. I also argued that by thinking about alternatives and how the principles are operative in 
each is a practical approach for healthcare providers to understand and analyze what is the 
most morally defensible alternative.  
To conclude this section, although there are those who criticize SP for not being 
systematic, I argued in this section that Beauchamp and Childress’ account of SP provides the 
justificatory power that we require from a robust ethical framework. They do this by utilizing 
the comprehensive principles of respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and 
justice rather than reducing these equally valuable concepts to a single concept, such as 
reducing harm. SP embedded in the clinical framework for deception (ESP) also provides a 
clear and practical method for determining the limitations that one has regarding legal and 
professional duties, in an appropriate and practical way. The order in which I integrate these 
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considerations frames the problem early in the decision procedure to elucidate the constraints 
on decision-making.  
Hence, I have argued that the moral rules offered as a systematic alternative to ESP 
lack significant content, which fewer principles supplied by Beauchamp and Childress can 
actually offer. The ESP methodology hence provides greater justification due to the depth of 
the individual principles, and is yet still practical when embedded into a decision framework 
for front-line caregivers such as the one that I offer. 
Methodological Objection 3: Casuistry 
Although there are several theories in bioethics, there are those who believe that an anti-
theorist or a particularistic position is more appropriate.49 ESP is a top-down method of 
applying general moral principles to specific cases. Casuistry is a bottom-up approach, which 
considers the specific circumstances first and deliberates as to what other paradigmatic cases 
would recommend as the morally appropriate response.50 Case law would be an analogous 
situation to casuistry. Case law utilizes precedent cases from previous court hearings and 
argues based on the relevant features of the previous case, what a judge ought to decide. 
Casuistry utilizes the morally relevant features of each case to determine what one should do in 
future cases. Jonsen describes casuistry as: “rhetorical reasoning applied to moral matters.”51 
The stories and the experiences of the past help to inform what one ought to currently do. 
                                                
49. “SEP - Snapshot,” accessed March 2, 2015, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2013/entriesheory-
bioethics/. 
50. Albert R. Jonsen, “Casuistry: An Alternative or Complement to Principles?,” Kennedy Institute of 
Ethics Journal 5, no. 3 (September 1995): 237–251. 
51. Ibid., 241. 
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Jonsen argues that casuistry may find a moral theory useful if there is a brand new 
ethical issue, such as the introduction of a new life-sustaining treatment, or if there is a need to 
challenge an entire social institution. However, for most daily ethical dilemmas, one can rely 
on previously held judgments according to Jonsen.52  From a moral theory perspective, 
Beauchamp and Childress do not deny the importance of exploring commonly held moral 
views of a community to determine how to specify and apply principles to concrete cases. 
Nonetheless, the question arises regarding methodology – what is the best method for both a 
practical and morally justifiable ethical framework? 
In many ways, casuistry may be attractive given its reference to former paradigm cases, 
which have already done much of the moral work for decision-makers. Decision-makers 
examine what has been done in the past and utilize the morally relevant features to choose 
which is the most morally similar case to decide what one ought to do. Jonsen does argue that 
casuistry is not a distinct discipline from moral theory. He uses the analogy that when faced 
with a dilemma, a person ought to investigate the “palace” in which the dilemma occurs, 
similar to a detective, paying close attention to the specific details of the contents of room (e.g. 
who is involved, what happened, etc.). He states that the moral principles are like the walls of 
this room, framing the dilemma in terms of pillar values that we hold.53 Jonsen argues that the 
foundational principles are complimentary to the casuistic details – one cannot function 
without the other. Beauchamp and Childress would not dispute this fact, as they argue that 
specification, or extrapolating the principles to the details of each case, is a necessary step in 
the ethical decision-making process. 
                                                
52. Ibid., 246. 
53. Ibid., 241. 
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Carson Strong similarly argues that specified principlism on its own does not offer a 
non-arbitrary way of weighing and balancing competing specified principles, and that casuistry 
offers a practical way to do this – by observing how we have done so in the past.54 However, I 
argued earlier in this chapter that weighing and balancing can be non-arbitrary through the use 
of Beauchamp and Childress’ guidelines and Bok’s publicity test. Nonetheless, I think that 
casuistry can be useful in exploring the appropriate weights of competing specified principles 
given former similar situations, but I do not believe that these are necessarily the correct 
responses. 
Hence, I do not believe that casuistry is in conflict with principlism, but rather casuistry 
can be viewed as an important step in the decision procedure. Perhaps one need ask, which 
comes first, as with Gert, Culver, and Clouser’s MSA – the detailed analysis of the morally 
relevant features of a particular case and then a discussion of how they relate to the broader 
principles (moral rules in the MSA) or a discussion of how the principles inform a case by 
processing how they are applied? 
I have argued in the previous section as well as in Chapter Four that from a practical 
standpoint, a decision-maker ought to first have in mind the alternatives of what one can do. 
From this position, a decision-maker should consider the principles and how they apply to the 
case scenario. The principles are comprehensive, given their extensive content, and they are 
practical in that they are simple to remember. The general principles focus decision-makers on 
what matters and then allows a robust discussion regarding what one ought to do. From a 
practical standpoint, this allows a decision-maker to identify the broadly important 
considerations and then narrow in on the particulars. In my opinion, this is much more useful 
                                                
54. Carson Strong, “Specified Principlism: What Is It, and Does It Really Resolve Cases Better than 
Casuistry?,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 25, no. 3 (2000): 334–335. 
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than first trying to determine the particulars and then discuss how they matter in a case. ESP is 
an organized, comprehensive, and practical approach that covers all of the broad moral 
considerations and allows the decision-maker to reflect carefully on each important category of 
values.  
I also believe that if decision-makers wish to consider first the moral particulars of a 
case that is morally acceptable too. I would urge, however, decision-makers to consider the 
broad headings of the moral principles and other considerations that I have included in the 
framework to ensure that all morally relevant features of the case have been explored before 
deciding upon an alternative.  
From this position of gathering information, casuists would inevitably explore similar 
or like cases to determine what one should do. How is the case similar and/or different to 
previous cases? In order to ensure due diligence in a particular case, I believe that this process 
of comparison can inform how we should assign weights to varying principles and balance 
them. However, I argue for a patient-centered framework such that the morally relevant 
features in one case may be weighted differently in another given the specific circumstances 
and values, beliefs and wishes of each unique patient.  
I believe that it is important to consider that just because we acted in a certain way in 
the past, does not necessitate that this is they way that we ought to conduct present or future 
cases. I disagree with Jonsen’s assessment that the principles of biomedical ethics are only 
directly or explicitly used in new cases that arise – such as with new reproductive technology, 
for example – and when we wish to change a social institution. I think that these principles 
ought to be operative in each decision, as a kind of check and balance to explicitly explain 
deeply held values and reasons for the chosen decision. Rather than appealing to a previous 
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decision, reflecting on whether the decision continues to be the right decision helps decision-
makers to shape the moral landscape of biomedical ethics. This would occur if even the 
decisions were about particular cases and not necessarily for large innovations or institutions. I 
think it is important if one were to alter the moral landscape in such a way to be able to justify 
this decision, such as through the principles that Beauchamp and Childress suggest. This would 
aim to ultimately eliminate non-arbitrariness. 
Ana Iltis further criticizes casuistry: “How are we to decide which cases are paradigm 
cases and which aspects of cases are morally relevant?”55 Choosing the paradigm cases is 
similar to virtue ethics and choosing the paradigm example of a virtuous person. How does one 
know when we have chosen correctly in the past? Or perhaps we’ve been previously mistaken 
in our decision-making? Consider for example cases where, as a society, we have decided that 
current practice does not adequately reflect common values. In these types of cases, ESP would 
require that we apply reflective equilibrium to the principles and cases to revise one in order to 
be coherent. Casuistry however indicates that the right alternative is one that is based on past 
decisions.  
Beauchamp offers a clear response to Iltis’ criticism of casuistry regarding how we 
choose which features are morally relevant ones. He states: “For a casuist to reason morally, 
one or more settled values must connect the cases (hence the necessity of ‘maxims’, or moral 
generalizations).”56 The moral principles and their specifications provide the comparative 
points between different cases. They are generally accepted and comprehensive comparative 
points. Beauchamp further writes: 
                                                
55. Iltis, “Bioethics as Methodological Case Resolution,” 275. 
56. Tom L. Beauchamp, “Reply to Strong on Principlism and Casuistry,” Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy 25, no. 3 (2000): 346. 
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Casuists sometimes write as if cases lead to moral paradigms, analogies, or 
judgments entirely by their facts alone or perhaps by appeal only to the salient 
features of the case. But no matter how many salient facts are stacked up, we 
will still need some transferable value premises in order to reach a moral 
conclusion. The properties that we observe to be of moral importance in cases 
are picked out by the values that we have already accepted as being morally 
important. In short, the paradigm cases of the casuists are value-laden with 
general norms, and a case would not be a paradigm case without those 
normative commitments. To this extent, general principles do not follow from 
cases (even if it is also true that paradigm cases do not follow from principles)57 
In summary, I believe that both Jonsen and Strong would agree that casuistry is not a stand-
alone method for resolving ethical dilemmas. Despite their desire to increase practicality for 
ethical decision-making, I believe SP is a necessary foundation for ethical deliberation and that 
casuistry is one method that can be used to help weigh and balance principles. The framework 
that I provided in Chapter Four (ESP) enhances the practicality and usefulness of SP for front-
line caregivers for deception in healthcare. I think each of the authors mentioned in this chapter 
are devoted to creating practical methods for resolving ethical dilemmas, however this is one 
important component of resolving a dilemma. The process must also not dilute ethical 
deliberation, but be robust and provide adequate justification for the chosen alternative. I 
believe that the process I have outlined in Chapter Four provides both a practical and morally 
defensible framework for making ethical decisions for cases of deception. In the next brief 
section I will describe further modifications that I propose for ESP in order to address the 
issues of both practicality and moral justification. 
Modifications to ESP 
I argued that SP, in the embedded framework that I discussed in Chapter Four (ESP), is the 
most ethically practical and defensible framework for deliberating on deception in caregiving. I 
                                                
57. Ibid. 
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will briefly outline several ways in which I have modified SP in the context of deception in 
caregiving.  
First, I utilized two different decision-making levels – organizational and clinical. The 
organizational level distinguished the constraints on deception and the necessary conditions 
when it would be morally inappropriate/appropriate to use deception based on the consistent 
major factors that have significant consequences in cases of deception. These conditions could 
be used to create a policy for organizations and institutions. The clinical decision-making level 
provided a step-by-step guide for caregivers to think carefully about each specific critical 
factor in the unique situation for which a decision should be made. Beauchamp and Childress 
offer SP and the process of weighing and balancing principles. These components are 
incredibly important factors in the decision process, but require additional steps as outlined in 
Chapter Four. Along with the principles they propose I have included trust, deontological, 
consequentialist and virtue ethics considerations. I believe that attempting to include these 
categories within the standard four biomedical ethics principles would dilute their important 
contributions to ethical deliberation. These additional considerations extend to include other 
stakeholders in the decision, including the caregiver(s) and the impact of the decision on 
caregiver(s). Although one could attempt reduce these consequences into the other four 
categories, I think it is important to keep decision-making focused on patient-centered care, 
while also thinking about the broader context within which a patient is situated. Keeping them 
distinct helps to isolate and distinguish what is best for the patient and what is possible from a 
caregiver perspective as well.  
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I have also included Beauchamp and Childress’s guidelines and Bok’s publicity test to 
reduce arbitrariness. These guidelines and the publicity test are another check and balance to 
help reflect on the moral appropriateness of a decision. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, I explored three major methodological objections to SP within the framework 
that I developed in Chapter Four, ESP. I first reviewed two major bioethics considerations: 
narrative bioethics and feminist bioethics. I argued that these seeming rival specialties can 
actually be important components of the ethical framework that I presented in Chapter Four. 
They can and should be incorporated in ESP.  
I then explored three objections to ESP. These objections related to non-arbitrariness, 
systematicity and casuistry. I argued that despite each of these objections, ESP is consistently 
practical and ethically defensible. The benefit of ESP is that it is a comprehensive framework, 
not only as a practical and useful method, but also as a robust and ethically defensible process. 
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Conclusion 
Deception is prima facie morally indefensible and should be avoided under most circumstances 
in caregiving. There are, however, limited situations when deception should be considered as a 
morally defensible alternative in caregiving. These situations require robust consideration and 
should not be taken lightly. The negative outcomes of allowing deception to be permissible and 
defensible in caregiving can be very severe and, thus, require significant benefits to outweigh 
when it should be implemented. Nonetheless, I have argued that there are some very rare 
circumstances when it is the most morally defensible alternative. I specifically discuss cases 
where patients lack mental capacity to make certain decisions for themselves. These situations 
are often when a patient is significantly declining with no chance of recovery and there are no 
other plausible alternatives with a higher benefit-harm ratio. Other more rare circumstances 
would occur if there were significant chance of benefit to the patient, little chance of harm or 
risk and no other plausible alternative. In this type of case, disclosure would be necessary to 
avoid future harm, if possible. Other specific guidelines for these types of cases and when it 
would be morally defensible or indefensible were outlined in Chapters One through Four.  
To defend this position, my thesis had several key sections. First, I described the 
problem of deception in caregiving by reviewing the literature to describe how frequent 
deception occurs in caregiving environments and the major consequences of its use. There 
were also articles describing its perceived benefits and challenges. Many of those whom had 
experienced deception and were later notified did not appreciate being deceived, yet were also 
thankful for being treated when in need of intervention. Additionally, the use of deception in 
healthcare is poorly tracked and documented, a great concern for discerning whether it is being 
used in morally defensible or indefensible situations. 
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In Chapter One, I explored two forms of deception – active and passive. I argued that 
there are no morally relevant differences between these two forms through an analogous case 
(active versus passive euthanasia). I compared four points of traditional contention, including 
intention, consequence, cause and naturalness (expectations), and concluded that these are not 
morally relevant differences between active and passive forms of deception. Within this 
discussion I amended the definition of deception to consider the expectations of the person 
being deceived – that she would have wanted to know the information and/or would have 
found the information useful for her own ends. 
I also reviewed the current philosophical arguments forwarded against and in favour of 
using deception and described why I believe they are inadequate. The Autonomy and Trust 
Accounts dominate the current philosophical landscape in describing the conflict, and I argue 
that the conflict is a multi-faceted issue, including these values along with a pluralism of other 
values. Traditional arguments regarding deception focus on a dichotomy of the principle of 
beneficence in conflict with either autonomy or trust. For the Autonomy Account, I argued that 
even when patients lack capacity to make their own decisions, known autonomous wishes and 
values are still important for substitute decision-makers and care providers to aid in decision-
making. For the Trust Account, I argued that there are many forms of trust that can be utilized, 
which do not necessarily involve direct truth-telling. These forms can be deceptive, but have a 
lesser impact on trust relations. I proceeded to describe the ethical dilemma as being much 
more nuanced and consisting of multiple principles in conflict, including those previously 
mentioned as well as notions of justice and non-maleficence. 
I examined various seeming alternatives to deception and described in detail the 
concerns with each in the second chapter. I explored the benefits and limitations of each 
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physical restraints, advance care planning and absolute truth-telling. I further argued why 
deception could be a plausible alternative in some circumstances, especially when weighing 
balancing the various ethical principles described in Chapter One.  
My third chapter explored several factors in favour of and against the use of deception 
in caregiving beyond the traditional bioethics principles. First, I explored several legal and 
professional constraints on deception, including informed consent, the right to choose/right to 
refuse healthcare in a Canadian context, the right to personal health information and 
professional honesty. I then proceeded to examine deontological factors either in support of or 
against the use of deception. I discussed human dignity, the intrinsic value of truth and 
universality, setting aside the latter two in the clinical decision-making process. The 
consequentialist considerations for deception included the constraints and limitations of 
healthcare providers and caregivers more broadly. Lastly, I reviewed two arguments made 
from a virtue ethics perspective and concluded that virtues are an important component of the 
decision framework, but need to be supported and given more content through the traditional 
biomedical ethics principles, as well as other morally relevant considerations.  
In Chapter Four, I further created and articulated an original framework through which 
we can examine cases of deception. First, I focused on organizational constraints and necessary 
conditions from which healthcare administrators can formulate policies on this issue. The 
constraints on deception include: mental capacity, compliance with treatment (when 
applicable) and risk of significant distrust. The necessary conditions include: significant chance 
of recovery, disclosure and controlled environments. Second, I developed a case-based 
framework to be utilized by caregivers struggling with the decision to deceive, which included 
legal and professional constraints, as well as specified principles. I called this new framework 
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ESP (embedded specified principlism). The aim of the framework is to be both practical and to 
provide comprehensive moral justification. I further discussed how one could weigh and 
balance these morally relevant factors.  
In my final chapter, I argued that ESP is the most practical and morally justifiable 
approach to addressing this issue. I explored several other bioethics models, including feminist 
and narrative bioethics, and argued that these ought to be incorporated into ESP to highlight 
the importance of reducing stigma towards vulnerable/marginalized populations, fostering 
greater trust and other relationships between caregivers and patients and understanding the rich 
narrative of each unique patient. I further explored three major objections to traditional SP 
including arbitrariness, systematicity and casuistry. I argued that Beauchamp and Childress’ 
guidelines as well as Bok’s publicity test are two ways to reduce arbitrariness. I further 
discussed systematicity and casuistry and how ESP is a practical decision process for ethical 
decision-making in healthcare, as well as being both comprehensive and robust. 
Further research to be explored in the area of deception in caregiving is empirical 
research on tracking and monitoring the use of deception much more carefully in healthcare 
and caregiving to determine more precisely further consequences of its use. It would also be 
extremely useful to examine the impacts of each alternative to deception, as well as deception 
and its various forms, again to empirically determine the consequences, and patient and 
caregiver experiences of the use of these various forms.  
In conclusion, I argued that deception in caregiving should be extremely limited. In 
general, its use is morally indefensible, unless a patient’s specific circumstances provide strong 
reasons to act otherwise. 
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